


























“Rail companies’ fiercest competition comes from other transport modes. Efficient 
competition between modes of transport depends on achieving appropriate pricing and 
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Summary 
This report looks at the railway systems in selected European countries (France, Germany, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) with a focus on passenger services 
with the aim to understand whether the institutional approaches to governing those systems 
may be typified and whether the approaches or the types may be related to some measure of 
systemic performance. Overall, this research aims at drawing lessons of general use from the 
situations examined. 
This research is based on three sets of information. First, an in-depth account of the current 
state of railway systems in the countries examined is provided. This has been carried out with 
a particular focus on regulatory arrangements, Public Service Obligations (PSOs) and overall 
evolution of railway-related institutions over the years since 1988. The main purpose of such 
a portrait is to observe and characterise the types of institutional arrangements. Then publicly 
available performance indicators (PIs) have been collected and contrasted with the 
institutional evolutions, seeking a causal link. Finally, a set of interviews with stakeholders 
has been carried out in all countries except Switzerland to investigate the existence of a 
systemic approach, as well as the stakeholders’ understanding of performance. 
The analysis leads us to conclude that each country is a type: there is a variety of institutional 
approaches and, in terms of institutional arrangements, convergence among countries cannot 
be detected. While the policies and different Directives of the European Commission 
certainly do play a role, the institutional path of each country is essential in respectively 
defining the institutional approaches. Moreover, no country seems to be entirely settled into a 
lasting system, even when developments have been introduced in stages. The need for further 
evolution seems particularly important when it comes to interfaces among actors. We have 
observed, however, a certain movement towards regionalisation, which may be taken as an 
emerging trend with so far satisfactory results. We have also observed the importance of PSO 
services for new entrants and the link of such services to the regionalisation trend. Open 
access is of minor relevance in all the States surveyed. 
The establishment of a relationship between the evolution of the institutional arrangements 
and of the publicly available systemic indicators has been unattainable. At times, 
improvements in performance that coincide with institutional reforms were perceived. 
However, such instances are much less common than they would have to be in order to count 
as clear evidence of the effect of the reforms in question. This can mean that either 
performance evolves irrespective of the institutional arrangements or the institutional 
arrangements produce effects only with a time lag beyond the scope of this research. Other 
possible explanations are that the PIs commonly used do not significantly respond to the 
change in institutional arrangements, given that the institutional arrangements are aimed at 
producing systemic effects whereas most of the measured PIs respond to firm behaviour. 
The interviews led us to conclude that no one speaks for the railway system of a country. A 
system view is lacking while there is a demand for a body with a systemic function. 
Depending on the system, such a body may be the incumbent integrated operator, the 
Infrastructure Manager (IM) at arm’s length of the Ministry, or the Regulator. The interviews 
looked also at system PIs, and disagreement as to what good system-wide indicators are 
emerged. The difficulty in relating systemic indicators to the system’s evolution may be due 
to the lack of system’s PIs. Also, some indicators mentioned have less to do with the output 
of the railway system, but rather with the outcomes of a given policy or with input variables. 
4 
Our interviews also show that each actor defines its own PIs, which are most likely the ones 
that suit the actor better than the system. These stakeholder PIs are also not harmonized, nor 
integrated nor consolidated, thus leading to a multiplication of measurements and ultimately 
to the impossibility of defining performance in a coherent manner. 
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Figure 15 as well as the facility to plot the indicators discussed in chapter 5 
GCSR_Switzerland_institutional_evolution_withPIs.xlsx: includes the charts in Figure 17 
and Figure 18 as well as the facility to plot the indicators discussed in chapter 5 








List of acronyms 
In brackets, the Case Country to which the term refers: FR (France), DE (Germany), UK 
(United Kingdom), SE (Sweden), SWI (Switzerland). 
 
AEG Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz (DE) 
AFITF Agence de financement des infrastructures de transport de France (FR) 
AFRA Association Française du rail (FR) 
AOT Autorités Organisatrices de Transport (FR) 
ARAF Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires (FR) 
ASTOC Association of Swedish Train Operating Companies (SE) 
BAV-FOT Bumdesamt für Verkehr, Federal Office of Transport (SWI) 
BKA Bundeskartellamt (DE) 
BLS Bern-Lötschberg-Simplon (SWI) 
BMVBS Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung (DE) 
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (DE) 
BNetzA Bundesnetz Agentur (DE) 
BR British Railways (UK) 
BSWAG Bundesschienenwegeausbaugesetz (DE) 
BU Business Unit 
CPTA County Public Transport Authorities (SE) 
CSSPF Conseil supérieur du service public ferroviaire (FR) 
DB Deutsche Bahn (DE) 
DCF Direction de la Circulation Ferroviaire (FR) 
DETEC Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications 
(SWI) 
DfT Department for Transport (UK) 
EBA Eisenbahnbundesamt (DE) 
EdB Eisenbahnen des Bundes (DE) 
EIBV Eisenbahninfrastruktur-Benutzungsverordnung (DE) 
EIU Eisenbahninfrastrukturunternehmen (DE) 
EPSF Etablissement public de sécurité ferroviaire (FR) 
EU European Union 
EVU Eisenbahnverkehrsunternehmen (DE) 
FOC Freight Train Operator (UK) 
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FOT Federal Office of Transport (SWI) 
FTE Full Time Equivalent 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GWF Greater Western Franchise (UK)  
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
HLOS High Level Output Specification (UK) 
HSE Health and Safety Executive (UK) 
HSL High Speed Line 
ICA Italian Competition Authority  
IM Infrastructure Manager 
IVW Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstraat (NL) 
JPIP Joint Performance Improvement Plan (UK) 
KKV Konkurrensverket (SE) 
KPI Key Performance Indicators 
KpVV Knowledge Centre on Public Transport (NL) 
LOTI Loi Orientation de Transport Intérieur (FR) 
LuFV Leistungs- und Finanzierungsvereinbarung (DE) 
MCAF Mission du contrôle des activités ferroviaires (FR) 
NEG National Express Group plc (UK) 
Nma Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NL) 
NS Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NL) 
OCCR Operationeel Controle Centrum Rail (NL) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFT Office of Fair Trading (UK) 
OPRAF Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (UK) 
ORR Office of Rail Regulation (UK) 
ORTF Organisation et Régulation des Transports Ferroviaires (FR) 
PI Performance Indicators 
PPM Public Performance Measure (UK) 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PSO Public Service Obligation 
PTA Public Transport Authority 
PTE Passenger Transport Executive (UK) 
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R&D Research&Development 
RACO Railways Arbitration Commission (SWI) 
RegB Regierungskomission Bahn (DE) 
RegTP Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (DE) 
RFF Réseau Ferré de France (FR) 
RMMS Rail Market Monitoring Scheme 
ROSCO ROlling Stock leasing Company (UK) 
RU Railway Undertaking 
RUS Route Utilisation Strategy (UK) 
SBB-CFF-
FFS 





Schiedskommission im Eisenbahnverkehr, Commission d’arbitrage dans le 
domaine des chemins de fer, Commissione d’arbitrato in materia ferroviaria, 
Swiss Rail Arbitration Commission (SWI) 
SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français (FR) 
SOB Südostbahn (SWI) 
SoFA Statement of Funds Available (UK) 
SRA Strategic Rail Authority (UK) 
STIF Syndicat des transports d'Île-de-France (FR) 
TER Transport Express Regional (FR) 
TET Trains d’Équilibre du Territoire (FR) 
TGN Thameslink and Great Northern (UK) 
TOC Train Operating Company (UK) 
UIC Union Internationale des Chemins de fer 
VDV Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen (DE) 
VÖV UTP Verbandes öffentlicher Verkehr Union des transports publics, société cooperative 
Unione dei trasporti pubblici, società cooperativa (SWI) 
VwVG Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (SWI) 





This research project is about the liberalizing railway industry in Europe, particularly about 
the institutional dimensions of such liberalization. More precisely, we want to know whether 
liberalization – as an institutional change accompanied, among others, by the creation of 
competition and independent Regulatory Authorities – does lead to better performance of the 
railway systems. Our driving question is whether a causal relationship can be established 
between a given institutional arrangement and a certain performance of a railway system. In 
this introductory chapter we will briefly recall the context of this research project, formulate 
its main research questions, recall the theoretical framework and argumentation underlying 
this research, present its methodology, and outline the report’s broad structure.  
1.1 The context and subject matter 
In the European Union (EU) as of January 1st 2010 European rail undertakings (RUs) are 
granted a right of access to the rail infrastructure of other Member States for the purpose of 
operating international passenger services, including cabotage (Directive 2007/58/EC). Such 
market opening comes on top of the already existing access in the cargo market as of 2004 
(Directive 2004/51/EC). While offering new business opportunities to RUs and 
infrastructures managers, the mandated access takes place in a still developing institutional 
environment. Regulatory Authorities in the EU, as well as the Swiss Parliament, Government, 
and administration, are still struggling with the application of this and the previous Directives 
(Directives 91/440/EEC amended by Directive 2004/51/EC and by Directive 2007/58/EC). 
For instance, Member States are allowed to limit the right of access on routes covered by 
public service contracts if certain conditions are met or to charge a levy on international rail 
passenger services to compensate for the costs incurred by such public service contracts. In 
the case of Switzerland, EU railway packages 1-3 have not yet been transposed into national 
legislation, even though freight transport is liberalized since 1999. 
As witnessed by the opening of the European railway freight sector in 2007, the introduction 
of competition brought major institutional changes and required significant institutional 
adjustments. For example, most of the EU Member States have unbundled their historical 
railway operator (as mandated by Directive 91/440/EEC) and created some sort of Regulatory 
Authority. However, and despite the passing of the EU Directives that are common to all 
Member States, the institutional arrangements governing the railway sectors differ markedly 
from country to country. And so does the performance of the national railway sector, as well 
as the overall benefits derived from liberalization.  
An increasing body of literature covers the introduction of competition in the freight sector at 
the European level (Bozicnik, 2009; Brewer, 1996; Pittman, 2005) and the introduction of 
competition in the passenger sector at the domestic level (UK, Germany). However, there is 
still little research and literature about the institutional arrangements that accompany such 
market opening, especially when it comes to competition in the international passenger 
market as well as to the broader opening of the domestic passenger market.  
This research project aims at identifying, describing and analysing the main types of 
institutional arrangements emerged in a selected number of countries as a result of freight 
liberalization and now also international passenger liberalization. It attempts to draw a 
typology from the institutional landscapes observed and relate the arrangements to their 
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performance. By institutional arrangement we mean – in the intellectual tradition of 
institutional economics – the different actors involved in governing the railway sector of a 
country (e.g., RUs, infrastructure companies, sector specific Regulators, competition 
Regulators, price Regulators, national offices, political actors, legal actors and others more), 
their responsibilities (decision rights), as well as the formal and informal rules governing the 
relationships among these actors (distribution of these decision rights among these actors).  
1.2 The research questions 
Within the above outlined context, this research seeks to establish a relationship between a 
particular institutional arrangement on the one hand and the performance of a national 
railway system under this very institutional arrangement on the other. More precisely, we try 
to answer the following three questions: 
- What are the various institutional arrangements in the European Member States and 
Switzerland as answers to the opening of the freight, as well as the international and in 
some cases the domestic passenger railway markets? Particular attention will be paid to 
the roles and responsibilities of the newly created Regulatory Authorities (where they 
exist), as well as to the roles and responsibilities of the Competition Authorities.  
- How do these different institutional arrangements relate to the performance of the 
respective national railway systems? In other words, which institutional arrangement 
proves to be the most successful?  
- What lessons can be learned from these different institutional arrangements and their 
performance?  
The following Table 1 provides an overview of the parts of the report that are directly 
relevant to each research question. 
Table 1. Research questions and sections of the report addressing them 
What are the various institutional 
arrangements in the European 
Member States and Switzerland as 
answers to the opening of the 
freight, as well as the international 
and in some cases the domestic 
passenger railway markets? 
- Review in chapter 3 
- Detailed representation of actors’ evolution against 
time on the attached spreadsheets (referred to in 
chapter 3)  
- Milestones of actors’ evolution against time on the 
attached spreadsheets (referred to in chapter 3) 
How do these different institutional 
arrangements relate to the 
performance of the respective 
national railway systems? 
- Review of performance measures in chapter 4 
- Discussion of performance measures and 
institutional developments in chapter 4 
- Interactive charts of institutional arrangements and 
performance indicators on the attached 
spreadsheets (referred to in chapter 3) 
What lessons can be learned from 
these different institutional 
arrangements and their 
performance? 
- Conclusions on the institutional arrangements in 
chapter 3 
- Interviews and conclusions on the role of the 
actors and the governance of the system in chapter 
5 
- Report conclusions in chapter 6 
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1.3 The underlying theoretical framework and argumentation 
Let us briefly outline here the theoretical framework underlying this research project. The so-
called “coherence framework” (Finger, et al. 2005) has been developed for the network 
industries in general but is applied here to the particular case of railways. It constitutes a way 
of conceptualizing the co-evolution between technology and institutions in the network 
industries, relating this co-evolution to the network industries’ performance. At its most 
general level, the framework states that there must be “some sort of” coherence between the 
state of technology in the network industries and the institutional arrangements governing this 
state of technology. If this coherence is “insufficient”, there will be consequences for the 
performance of the network industries, i.e., of the respective infrastructure system (e.g., air 
transport system, railway system, electricity system). Furthermore, the framework identifies a 
certain number of so-called “critical, system-relevant functions”, which are particularly 
sensitive to a “lack of coherence”. More precisely, four such critical, system-relevant 
functions are identified, namely interconnection, interoperability, capacity management and 
system management.  
Historically, the network industries are characterized above all by a change in the institutional 
framework, such as liberalization, deregulation and privatization. This, it is argued, creates a 
certain “incoherence” with the existing state of technology in a given network industry, thus 
affecting performance. Telecommunications industry, where the initial change was 
technological in nature, may be an exception, because the change in institutions (e.g., 
liberalization) constitutes actually a step towards recreating certain coherence. 
This general framework is now applied to the specific case of national railway systems: 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization (in the case of the UK) are said to introduce 
certain incoherence in the way the critical, system-relevant functions were governed 
historically, thus affecting the railway system’s overall performance. The assumption is that 
these critical, system-relevant functions must nevertheless be assumed. But the problematic 
issues of who takes these responsibilities and how to coordinate the different actors now 
partially responsible for these functions have emerged. Basically, the question is how the 
coordination (or lack thereof) among the actors in a (partially) liberalized railway 
environment relates to the performance of a given national railway system. 
The (partial) liberalization of the railway sector, as for example promoted by the European 
Commission, leads to a new conceptualization of its governance, whose main characteristics 
are as follows: 
- There is an infrastructure organization operating the tracks and the stations, unbundled at 
least in accounting terms from the train operating companies (or the rolling stock 
companies for that matter); as a sub-position, one may also separate infrastructure from 
stations. 
- There is an independent Regulatory Authority that supervises the infrastructure operator 
(in the interest of the consumers); the Regulator also watches out on discrimination 
regarding the access to and pricing of the infrastructure. 
- The question of financing is a matter of public policy and leads to different incentives 
depending on where and how financing occurs. The intellectually clean position is that 
there is (1) financing for the infrastructure operator and (2) financing for particular lines 
under public service mandates after a tendering procedure. 
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We do not know whether such an idealized governance mechanisms actually works, meaning 
that we do not really know what the performance of such a system actually would be. Thus 
the need for research. However, we do know about the current performance of the 
(sometimes partially unbundled) railway systems, none of which is identical to this idealized 
governance mechanism. It is legitimate to claim that any future system – including a perfectly 
unbundled system – should be at least as efficient as the current system.  
In order to determine the performance of any railway system, we have developed the 
following “storyline”. By storyline we mean the logic of how to approach and ultimately 
measure the performance of a railway system. The storyline goes as follows: 
- Unbundling is an institutional change. However, railways are first of all a technological, 
and not an institutional system. Institutions are built to make the (technological) railway 
system function. At any given state of (railway) technology, institutions can help make 
the railway system function more or less well. The functioning of the technological 
(railway) system will depend, among others, upon a series of critical functions that must 
be performed. These are interoperability, interconnection, capacity management, and 
system management. These functions are always ensured by way of a combination of 
technology and institutional rules. In a fully integrated railway system, the rules for these 
critical functions are internalized, i.e., defined inside the integrated company. Once the 
system is totally unbundled, the rules for ensuring the critical functions of 
interoperability, capacity management and system management must be defined and 
assumed by some other institution (for example the infrastructure company or the 
Regulator). At the beginning of liberalization (unbundling), technology, however, has not 
yet changed. The question now is whether the overall railway system is still performing 
as well as at the time when the rules were internalized (or worse or better).  
- Indeed, the performance of a (railway) system can be defined as the result of a complex 
interplay/interaction between a given state of technology and the rules that govern this 
technology, in particular the rules about the critical functions. More precisely, the state of 
the institutions and the state of technology combined constitute incentives for the 
involved actors, and it is the interplay between these actors (who are or can be inside and 
outside the integrated company) to ultimately produce the outcomes/performance of the 
overall (railway) system.  
- One should be able to describe the performance of any given (railway) system at any 
given moment of time. We propose, in the case of infrastructure systems such as 
railways, operational, technical, economic, social, and environmental performance 
measures (see chapter 4). However, relating such performance (different types of 
performance) to the interplay between any given state of technology and any given state 
of institutions is difficult, and attributing particular performances to particular actors 
(given that we are dealing with a complex socio-technical system) is even more difficult. 
Theory, for example, predicts that the introduction of competition (by way of 
unbundling) leads to better (short term) economic performance. This may well be the 
case (even though this should be ultimately established on the basis of facts and not 
theory), but it is for example not clear whether such economic efficiency gains thanks to 
unbundling and competition are offset by losses in other performance measures (e.g., 
punctuality, accidents, incidents). Ultimately, it falls of course upon the political 
authorities – i.e., the ones who finance and subsidize the railway system – to determine 
which PIs they value more than others and to prioritize them.  
- We thus proposed, at the outset of this project, to study which type of arrangement 
between technology and institutions (“model”) produces which performances (along the 
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different categories of performance). At this point, we propose to establish a purely 
empirical link between the different models and their performances. Rather than to 
derive the performance from the model (i.e., the particular type of arrangement between 
a state of technology and a state of institutions), we propose to explain a given 
performance by the model, i.e., to find causes which are due to a particular model and 
which explain the particular performance of that model. Ideally, of course, we would also 
look at the dynamics, i.e., to understand how changes in the performance can be 
attributed to changes in the model (i.e., changes in the relationship between technology 
and institutions). 
1.4 The underlying methodology 
The research project rests largely on qualitative methodology. 
The analysis of existing literature on the governance and competition in the railway sector, as 
well as a collection of information on the latest developments of institutional arrangements, 
has led to choosing five EU case studies, besides Switzerland. As part of the case studies, a 
pictorial representation of the evolution of the railway sector for the case countries has been 
developed. The main discontinuities in institutional arrangements have then been identified as 
milestones to be used in the quantitative section of the work. 
Quantitative indicators available through international institutions (Eurostat, OECD, 
European Energy Agency), and therefore comparable across countries, have been used as the 
basis for investigating the relationship and the possible existence of an empirical link 
between performance and evolution of institutions. 
Finally a questionnaire was proposed to stakeholders from the case countries to investigate 
their view of the systemic approach to railways within their current institutional arrangement 
and their expectations on performance for the system and for their own organisation. 
1.5 Outline of the report’s structure 
Besides this introductory chapter, this report is structured into four main parts. 
A first part, comprising chapter 2 and chapter 3, gives a brief summary of the literature on 
competition in railways and develops the case studies on which the research is based. The 
existing actors are described and the evolution of the stakeholders since 1988 is outlined for 
each case study, characterising the most interesting elements and developing the support for a 
quantitative analysis in the next main part as well as a typology of institutions. The following 
part is made up by Chapter 4. This is devoted to performance measures, a review of those 
available and the discussion of how they changed against the institutional evolution in the 
case studies. The views of the stakeholders on the systems in which they work and on the 
relevant performances have been collected in the next part, contained in chapter 5. While 
intermediate conclusions are given at the end of each of the previous main parts, the key 





2 Competition in railways: a literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two sections. We start by reviewing the literature on competition 
in the railway sector. Subsequently, we analyse the current state of competition in the 
European railway sector. This will lead us, in the conclusion, to select the countries of our 
study. 
2.2 State of the literature on competition in railways 
This section proposes a brief literature review of competition and of some of the issues raised 
by the introduction of competition in the railway sector. In particular, it highlights the 
importance of defining precisely what is meant by competition and the question of the means 
and ends of competition. 
In his discussion paper on the competition for long-distance passenger rail service, Preston 
(2009, page 4) notes that “rail competition, where it occurs, is likely to be small group in 
nature. Market demand is often too thin to support a large number of operators, whilst there 
may be some economies of scale and density that limit the optimum number of firms in rail 
markets. The relevant industry structure is therefore that of oligopoly competition”.
1
 
While most economists and policy makers agree that competition should be introduced in the 
railway industry, agreement on how this should be done is lacking. According to the OECD 
(2006) the three different modes of competition
2
 in the rail sector are: 
- Competition in-the-market between vertically-integrated rail companies. This form of 
competition requires the existence of at least two separate rail infrastructures capable of 
providing substitute rail services (e.g., two different rail routes between a given city-
pair); this is the predominant form of competition in rail freight services in North 
America.  
- Competition in-the-market between train operating companies with regulated access to 
track infrastructure (which may or may not be owned by one of the companies providing 
train services). This is the predominant form of competition in freight services in Europe 
and most of Australia. Pittman (2008) notes that competition in-the-market can be further 
broken down into a complete “vertical separation” model – the prohibition of the 
network operator from operating its own trains, a policy urged by DG Competition – and 
a “third party access model”, with a vertically integrated infrastructure and train 
company forced to allow access to its infrastructure to competing, non-integrated train 
                                                 
1
 In fact classical models assume competition occurs either in the price dimension (Bertrand competition) or in 
the service dimension (Cournot competition). The conventional wisdom is that where capacity is difficult to 
increase (e.g., rail) competition will be of the Cournot type, but where capacity can easily be increased (e.g., 
bus) competition will be of the Bertrand type (Quinet & Vickerman, 2004). 
2
 Holvad et al. (2003) distinguish two further types of competition: capital market competition and product 
market competition. Capital market competition concerns rail company ownership models and covers the 
spectrum ranging from Government departments under direct political control to arm’s length Agencies and 
finally to private corporations. Product market competition concerns the scale at which rail services can be 
provided by different train operating companies and ranges from pure monopoly to perfect competition. 
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operating companies. These models tend to blur a bit, as intermediate solutions such as 
“accounting separation” are accepted as means of preserving ownership integration while 
making third party access terms more transparent, and thus (it is hoped) preventing 
discrimination. Although route competition has remained a feature in countries such as 
Japan, in-the-market competition between passenger rail operators has been limited. For-
the-market competition, in the form of competitive tendering and franchising is more 
common in the passenger rail industry than in-the-market. 
- Competition for-the-market between rail companies (either for integrated track-plus-train 
services or just for train services alone, operating under a regime of regulated access to 
the track infrastructure). This is the predominant form of competition for regional 
passenger services in many EU countries. 
Overall, the European style of competition varies notably from competition among vertically 
integrated train and infrastructure enterprises, a model chosen by policymakers in the 
geographically large, freight-dominated countries of the Americas – originally by the United 
States and Canada, more recently by Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina
3
.  
In general, the degree to which complete separation of train and infrastructure operations in 
Europe has actually taken place – as well as the degree to which actual competition among 
train operating companies has appeared – varies significantly by country. “Third party 
access” tends to be observed in countries that have nominally chosen the vertical separation 
model but have moved only part way toward achieving it – i.e., countries that have taken 
steps to open up the train sector to competition but have not fully separated the incumbent 
freight operator from its infrastructure operations, Germany being the most salient example 
of this, as it has instituted “accounting separation” but not “ownership separation” of trains 
and tracks. 
Biztan (2003) examined the cost implications of competition over existing US freight rail 
lines by testing for the condition of cost subadditivity. He finds that: (1) there are economies 
associated with vertically integrated roadway maintenance and transport, suggesting that 
separating the two would result in increased resource costs; and (2) railroads are natural 
monopolies in providing transport services over their own network, suggesting that multiple-
firm competition over such a network would result in increased resource costs. These 
findings suggest that policies introducing rail competition through “open access” or on 
bottleneck segments would not be beneficial from a cost perspective. Moreover, the price 
decreases necessary for the introduction of such competition to be beneficial would be large. 
In an early study of the opening of Sweden to internal competition Jensen (1998) finds that 
external competitive pressure is strong in most supply segments and that, focusing on loss of 
scale advantages, the transformation will result in significant costs. Comparing the potential 
for gains by competition against the costs, he concludes that increased efficiency by internal 
competition seems possible only for two train products: domestic combined transport and 
dedicated trains (both freight services). 
Looking at the freight sector Pittman (2005) identifies three attributes that have proven 
problematic for recent experiments with vertical separation: a) a relatively high share of 
                                                 
3
 The “American model” can be divided into a “North American model” – the US and Canada, with an emphasis 
on origin-destination competition between “parallel” vertically integrated railways – and a “Latin American 
model” – Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, with an emphasis on competition for the business of shippers 
and customers at particular points served by more than one railway. 
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network costs in total delivered service costs, b) an apparent persistence of economies of 
scale at the “competitive” train operations level, and, perhaps most importantly, c) strong 
economies of vertical integration that are focused on the interface point of wheel and rail – 
that is, exactly where vertical separation takes place
4
.  
Mulder et al. (2005) look at two questions: (1) whether the vertical separation between 
network and operation caused a loss of economies of scope and to which extent other 
institutional changes have improved the coordination between infra manager and railway 
operators, and (2) which efficiency improvements in railway operations have occurred and to 
which extent they are related to the institutional changes. In general, the literature on vertical 
economies (i.e., economies of scope between train and infrastructure operations) is not 
consistent, but mild economies are at least suggested (C. Growitsch & Wetzel, 2006; Ivaldi & 
Mccullough, 2008). 
Nash (2008) looks at the objectives of European railway reforms, the different models 
adopted for restructuring, the key elements of separation of infrastructure from operations, as 
well as competition both through open access and franchising and regulation and 
infrastructure charging. He concludes that separation of infrastructure from operations 
involves costs, but it constitutes the most effective way of achieving within mode 
competition. Where operations do not greatly overlap and open access passenger and freight 
are unimportant, leasing infrastructure to passenger franchisees may be effective, but the 
model of vertical integration as separate subsidiaries within a holding company structure 
makes it difficult to ensure a level playing field for new entrants and is only effective where 
the vertically integrated operator remains dominant. 
Overall, the literature is not conclusive as to the optimal institutional model: which is the 
model that is most conducive to competition? And which form of competition and related 
instuitutional model is actually leading to the best performance? The literature is mostly 
silent about this latter point. More recently, Mizutani and Uranishi (2011) conducted an 
econometric analysis of railways in OECD countries and concluded that vertical separation is 
linked to cost reductions in the case of low service density and to cost rises with higher 
density.  
State of competition in European railways 
As pointed out by Nash and Matthews (2009), progress on the 2001 White Paper has so far 
been largely restricted to intra-modal competition. Strong competition has emerged in the 
freight business particularly on the crucial North-South axis through the Alps, even if 
concerns on institutional arrangements that in many Member States do not ensure fair 
competition between former national railways and new entrants remain. In their study on the 
introduction of competition for local passenger railway markets in the German State of 
Baden-Württemberg, Lalive and Schmutzler (2008) find that the competitively-procured lines 
enjoyed a stronger growth of the frequency of service than those that were not procured 
competitively, even after controlling for various line characteristics that might have had an 
independent influence on the frequency of service. Their results further suggest that the 
effects of competition may depend strongly upon the operator.  
                                                 
4
 The third factor in particular is a clear illustration of the rationales discussed by Coase & Williamson for the 
broad vertical scope of a single firm and the disadvantages of relying on market transactions under certain 
conditions. 
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In its recent communication (European Commission, 2010), the Commission acknowledges 
that market access remains difficult for new entrants. In order to maintain its policy of 
railway revitalization, the Commission aims to (1) improve non-discriminatory access to 
service facilities, (2) enhance transparency of the railway market’s institutional framework, 
(3) enhance cooperation and coordination to facilitate international rail transport, (4) provide 
effective incentives for sound and sustainable financing, and (5) enhance regulatory body 
independence and competencies. It also addresses the issue of competence regarding non-
discrimination (e.g., Regulatory or Competition Authority)
5
. 
Giannino (2010) argues that “incumbent railway undertakings still have a relevant market 
power” and, when vertically integrated, “they have an incentive to exercise their power to 
frustrate the entry of new competitors into the market. Such practices may fall within the 
competition rules that prohibit abuse of dominant position”. The investigations conducted by 
the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) have shown the potential of discriminatory practices 
carried out by the incumbent (e.g., the case Rail Traction Company/Rete Ferroviaria 
italiana-Ferrovie dello Stato, Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori or FS/GVG). 
Table 2 illustrates the degree of competition in the European railway sector as measured by 
relative market share. 
Table 2. Market opening in Europe (2008) - market shares 








AT 86 14 .740 88 12 .774 
BE 93.9 6.1 .882 100 0  
BG 85.68 14.32  100 0  
DE 78 22 .608 89.9 10.1 .792 
DK - -  91 9 .828 
EE 51 49 .0389 42.3 57.7 .179 
EL 100 0  100 0 1 
ES 95 5 .903 100 0 1 
FI 100 0 1.00 100 0 1 
FR 95 5 .810 100 0 1 
HU 85.6 14.4 .733 98.2 1.8 .964 
IE 100 0  100 0 1 
IT - -  - -  
LT 100 0 1 100 0 1 
LV 90.43 9.57 .818 90.92 9.08 .824 
NL 67 33  98 2  
PL 76.03 23.97 .470 88.89 11.11 .790 
PT - -  - -  
RO 59.01 40.99 .350 98.9 1 .978 
SE - -  - -  
SI 100 0 1 100 0 1 
SK 97.97 2.03  99.97 0.03 1 
UK 0 100 .311 0 100 0.001 
NO 79 21 .620 88 12 .770 
Note: Based on RMMS questionnaire; MO score computed using HHI – 2008 
Comment: For freight, some major European countries (e.g., Italy, Sweden, Denmark) are missing  
Source: Everis (2010) 
                                                 
5
 In the case of access to service facilities, the Commission recommends to extend the scope of Regulatory 
Bodies’ competences to cover Decisions related to Annex II of Directive 2001/14/EC (rail-related services). 
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Table 3 below summarizes the current legal state of competition in the different market 
segments as defined by EU legislation. 
Table 3. Legal state of competition in Europe 
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Latest 2019 For the market 
Protection of 
existing contracts – 
10 year transition 
period 
Source: Compiled by authors, adapted from Desmaris, 2010 
2.3 Conclusion: selection of countries 
The countries for our case studies have been chosen in such a way that they offer the most 
different views on the progressive change in institutions – particularly in terms of unbundling 
and regulation. As a start, we have used Nash’s (2008) typology as presented in Table 4 
below. 
Table 4. Three institutional models of railways in Europe 
Complete separation  
(the Swedish model) 
Holding company  
(the German model) 
Separation of key powers  
























Note: Ireland and Northern Ireland remain vertically integrated  
Source: CEC, 2006, and Nash, 2008 
While Germany and France have been chosen to represent their category of restructuring, 
Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands have been chosen because they represent different forms 
of separation. Britain saw the most radical reform and offers the possibility of looking at 
regulatory institutions that have seen a long development. Sweden was the first European 
country to unbundle its State railways and is the first to fully open access on its rail 
infrastructure. Moreover, two of the case countries fully opened their network for passenger 
services (Germany and Sweden), two chose to control access by way of concessions or 
franchises (the Netherlands and Britain, respectively) while use of infrastructure in France is 
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reserved for the state railway company SNCF. The Netherlands are also particularly 
interesting as they have a multipolar, dense and densely used network with important transit 
freight traffic (port to hinterland traffic), which makes them to some extent comparable to the 
Swiss rail case. Given the purpose of this report it was important to include Switzerland in 
the analysis, which allows drawing conclusions.  
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3 Institutional arrangements in five selected countries, plus Switzerland 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the institutional arrangements currently governing the five selected 
European countries (i.e., France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and Britain) plus 
Switzerland. The country cases are preceded by a presentation about the state of PSO in EU 
legislation. 
Each country study follows a similar presentation format, which presents the main relevant 
actors, their roles and responsibilities, with particular focus on the Regulatory Authority and 
the Competition Authority. The country studies summarise the level of competition in each 
country and give an account of the main events in the evolution of competition and regulatory 
arrangements. 
A separate section in each country’s description is dedicated to the services provided under 
PSOs. There are three reasons for looking in particular at PSOs, namely (i) the importance in 
terms of train-km and of funding of such services
6
, (ii) the fact that PSOs have been in many 
cases the market where new entrants start operating successfully (as in Sweden, Germany, 
and the Netherlands; in the latter case because it is the only market where they are allowed to 
operate), and (iii) because of the political importance of such services. 
Each country’s description is complemented by two charts: the first one depicts the evolution 
of the main actors in each railway system from 1988 to date, drawing attention to the changes 
that have taken place over time and offering the sequence of key facts (e.g., legislation, 
events) that had an effect on the evolution of the rail system. The chart is included here for 
completeness, but it is also reproduced in an annex to this report, as it is printed in large 
format. The second chart singles out the main steps in the institutional evolution in each 
country and summarises the reasons behind those evolutions. 
A large number of elements and actors could have been described and followed in their 
evolution over the years in the charts. We had to make a selection focusing on some more 
prominent aspect.  
As for the actors we selected the main ones in which a vertically integrated railway may be 
unbundled, based on the countries we were examining. Therefore we have looked at: 
- The incumbent operators, passenger and freight, which have disappeared or most often 
changed shape; 
- Rolling stock providers and rolling stock maintenance providers (although in the latter 
case we were able to collect little information); 
                                                 
6
 CER (2011) points out that PSO services are 46% of the turnover generated by SNCF in passenger services in 
2009 (about 9 billion euros) and that in the EU in 2007 they amounted to about 90% of domestic passenger 
transport. 
34 
- The different main functions that may be associated with infrastructure management: 
capacity allocation, traffic control, station management, infrastructure management, 
infrastructure maintenance; 
- New entrants, in the passenger and freight sector, to highlight when they appeared, also 
in relation to the remainder of the developments; 
- The main bodies responsible for regulation: the Competition Authority, the Railway 
Economic Regulator and the Railway Safety Regulator; 
- The bodies responsible for procuring local/regional services and those in charge of 
national services contracted to operators under PSO. 
Finally, we looked at the evolution of the Governments during the same years surveyed for 
the evolution of the rail sector. 
The charts report the status of the long-distance and regional passenger transport 
arrangements (e.g., monopoly, concession, open access) as well as the set-up of the freight 
market. 
There are several aims for these charts: 
- They summarise and condense much of the information collected on the case studies; 
- They are intended to allow us to determine milestones of institutional evolution in each 
case country, as in rather stable overall arrangements; 
- The information depicted should lead us to obtain a typology of institutions in the rail 
sector; 
- The milestones or, more generally, the whole evolution in each case country is to be 
contrasted with systemic PIs in the next chapter, to explore the existence of an empirical 
link between the institutional evolution and the indicators. 
A closing section sums up the key points of the case studies illustrating a typology of 
institutions in the rail sector. 
The institutional and competitive landscapes in EU Member States are conditioned, and 
partly driven, by the three rail packages, requiring among others separation of accounts (at 
least) for infrastructure management and rail operations, the existence of a Rail Regulator, the 
opening of the freight market, the opening of the international passenger market. These had to 
be transposed into national law and States did so in different ways, using the leeway that the 
Directives left open. 
One recent Regulation, 1370/2007 on PSO services, affects directly the competitive 
environment and it is of high relevance, given the importance of the PSO market. 
While mandating contracts to discharge PSO services and stipulating maximum duration, it 
exempted rail services from mandatory public tendering. The key points of the regulation are 
recalled below, before moving on to the case countries, since it applies to all of them, except 
Switzerland. 
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3.2 Public service obligations 
Recent decades have seen enormous changes in the way in which public transport services 
are organised and operated. Where once local, regional or national public authorities ran 
services themselves, many authorities now engage companies specialised in transport 
provision. In return for running services that would not be commercially viable, these 
operators are compensated by public authorities. Contracts for carrying out such PSOs must 
be awarded on the basis of clear, consistent and fair rules, and be open to providers from 
throughout the EU as most recently indicated by Regulation 1370/2007 “on public passenger 
transport services by rail and by road” (see also Appendix IV). 
The previous regulation governing the financing of PSO contracts for public transport in the 
EU dated back to 1969 and had been updated in 1991. However, it no longer provided the 
legal certainty needed today, and has become inappropriate for the task of ensuring that PSOs 
are awarded fairly in all cases. The Commission has therefore put forward a proposal for a 
new regulation. Following a long process started in 2000 the European Commission has 
adopted in 2007 a new regulation for “public passenger transport services by rail and by 
road” (European Parliament and Council, 2007b). The legislation defines PSO as “a 
requirement defined or determined by a competent Authority in order to ensure public 
passenger transport services in the general interest that an operator, if it were considering its 
own commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or 
under the same conditions without reward.” (cfr. Reg. 1370/2007, art. 2(e)). Under such rules, 
public authorities compensate transport operators for undertaking PSOs – either by granting 
exclusive access rights or direct payment. But each Authority is free to choose whether to 
entrust the operation of public transport services to its own internal operator or to award a 
contract to an external operator. 
The PSO regulation asks Member States to provide the Commission with a progress report, 
highlighting the implementation of any gradual award of public service contracts. The key 
points of the PSO regulation are as follows: 
- Mandatory contracts: where a competent Authority decides to grant the operator of its 
choice an exclusive right and/or compensation, of whatever nature, in return for the 
discharge of PSOs, it shall do so within the framework of a public service contract. 
- Duration: the duration of public service contracts shall be limited and shall not exceed 10 
years for coach and bus services and 15 years for passenger transport services by rail or 
other track-based modes. The duration of public service contracts relating to several 
modes of transport shall be limited to 15 years if transport by rail or other track-based 
modes represents more than 50% of the value of the services in question. 
- Awarding: public service contracts shall be awarded in accordance with the rules laid 
down in this Regulation. Unless prohibited by national law, any competent Local 
Authority, whether or not it is an individual Authority or a group of Authorities 
providing integrated public passenger transport services, may decide to provide public 
passenger transport services itself or to award public service contracts directly to a 
legally distinct entity. The competent Local Authority, or in the case of a group of 
Authorities at least one competent Local Authority, exercises control over this entity 
similar to that exercised over its own departments. The special status given in the 
regulation to rail services is of particular interest here: unless prohibited by national law, 
competent Authorities may decide to make direct awards of public service contracts 
where they concern transport by rail. 
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As regulation this new provision takes direct effect in all Member States, but its application 
has generated some issues. For instance, according to the rules to be applied in the transition 




France is currently preparing and discussing a stage of reforms about the governance of the 
rail system, the possible opening of the long distance passenger transport market and the 
tendering of regional rail services, which are all now a monopoly of the state operator, 
Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français - SNCF. The latter runs the most extensive 
European high speed network, a key element in long distance transport in the country. 
Several reform steps were enacted recently due to the need of transposing the European 
framework into French law. The separation of infrastructure and operations in 1997 has 
resulted in an IM that does not carry out directly some important functions, as maintenance 
(contracted back to the State RU SNCF) and traffic control capacity allocation (now carried 
out by the Direction de la Circulation Ferroviaire - DCF, an independent body within SNCF 
following the directions of Réseau Ferré de France - RFF). Freight open access was effective 
from 2006 and the only passenger open access currently allowed is on international services. 
An important recent change is the introduction from 2010 of an independent Railway 
Regulator as described in the following paragraphs and summarised in Table 7 and Table 8 
below.  
The following tables and figure introduce the dimension of railway transport in France, the 
main actors and their role (see also Appendix I).  
Table 5. Selected statistics, France (2005-2009) 
Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Km of rail 29,286 29,463 29,918 29,901 29,903 - 
Train km, in thousand 505,800 484,647 481,635 514,719 480,386 - 
Pax km, in million 76.47 78.79 80.31 84.97 88.61 - 
T km, in million 40.70 41.18 42.62 40.63 32.13 29.96 
Source: Eurostat, Transport in Figures 2011 (EC, 2011) 
 
Table 6. Summary of provisions for access to the French rail market 
Passenger services No access for external operators 
Freight services Open since 2003 but effective in 2006 
Source: Compiled by authors, Quinet (2005), SETRA (2009), Quinet (2010) 
 
Table 7. Regulatory institutions relevant to the French railway market 
Economic Regulator  Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires (ARAF) 
Safety Regulator Etablissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire (EPSF) 
Other Regulatory Agencies 
involved 
Autorité de la Concurrence (AC) 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Table 8. Main information about the Economic Regulator of the French rail industry 
Name of Economic Regulator Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires (ARAF) 
Name in English N.A. 
Creation of Agency  2009 (start in 2010) 
Nature of Regulatory Agency  Independent administrative Authority with “moral personality” 
Scope of intervention  Limited to railway sector; excludes safety (EPSF) 
Role and mission  Allow non-discriminatory access to network 
Composition  7 members appointed by different Agencies 
Sanctioning powers  Can sanction discriminatory behaviour 
Enquiry and information powers  Strong; actors must submit relevant data 
Relation to Competition Authority  Cooperation with Autorité de Concurrence (AC) 
Budget  8 million euros 
Personnel  50 
Relationship to Parliament  Annual report 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 9. Infrastructure management and path allocation in the French railway market 
Infrastructure management RFF for majority of network but maintenance contracted to SNCF 
Some PPP (Vinci on Tours-Bordeaux HSL: 50 year concession) 
Path allocation RFF/DCF 
Traffic control RFF/DCF 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
















































Source: Authors, compiled from various official documents, including Sétra (2009), using a framework by 
Merkert et al (2008) 
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As mentioned above, changes in the institutional landscape in French railways are very 
recent. Until the end of 2009, the Mission du contrôle des activités ferroviaires (MCAF) acted 
as the control organism for the regulation of railway activities in France. In its advisory role 
to the Minister for Transport, the MCAF monitored network access conditions and conducted 
investigations concerning network access complaints. The Ministry for Transport was in 
charge of essential functions: access charges, licenses, PSOs and safety certificates. In 
addition, the Conseil supérieur du service public ferroviaire (CSSPF) was in charge of 
ensuring the coordination of the French railway system
7
. The Etablissement public de 
sécurité ferroviaire (EPSF) is in charge of the application of railway safety regulation. In 
addition, the Regions are in charge of defining and financing (partially) the public service of 
regional passenger transport (TER). Finally the Agence de financement des infrastructures de 
transport de France (AFITF), created in 2004, contributes partially to the financing of 
railway infrastructure. 
RFF, which is responsible for the management of rail infrastructure since 1997, is nominally 
in charge of slot allocation and the operational aspect of infrastructure management. However 
it has largely delegated tasks to SNCF, as mandated by the law. SNCF manages transports, 
technical facilities, safety installations and maintenance in accordance with the instructions of 
RFF. Moreover a law enacted in December 2009 provided for the formation of a separate 
department at SNCF, the DCF, which is in charge of traffic management and capacity studies 
independently of the transport operations of SNCF. The DCF is operational since 1st January, 
2010 and is paid for by RFF. 
In order to commit RFF to various quality improvements (e.g., infrastructure and the 
financing model), the French Government signed a performance agreement with RFF on 3rd 
November 2009. Progress is monitored on the basis of specifically defined indicators. The 
agreement is aimed particularly at preparing the French rail market for the opening process. 
Further changes are being explored via the work of special committees. In May 2011 the 
committee chaired by Member of Parliament Francis Grignon delivered a report on moving 
away from SNCF monopoly on regional services to the Government.  
Later in 2011, the Assises du Ferroviaire started their work with the aim to discuss a wide 
range of items such as the future governance of the French railways, their financing, and the 
possible opening to competition. The Assises delivered their report on December 2011, but no 
action has been taken by the Government as of now. 
Regulation  
Regarding access regulation, the creation of a reference document by the IM involves a 
consultative process and ultimate ministerial approval
8
. Before the Autorité de régulation des 
activités ferroviaires (ARAF) was set up, the absence of an efficiently functioning Regulatory 
Authority constituted a barrier to market entry. 
                                                 
7
 The CSSPF has been dismantled in June 2009 but it should be replaced by a council on terrestrial transport and 
intermodality (Information of July 2010). 
8
 There have been few access disputes after its publication. Complaints and objections are made to the Minister 
who requests the Regulator to investigate and report back. 
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The European Commission (2009) has voiced the following complaints regarding the 
regulatory arrangement in France: 
- Part of the essential functions is still performed by the (incumbent) RU, thereby 
infringing the provisions on independence of essential functions; 
- Charges for the use of the infrastructure are not determined by IM itself; 
- Insufficient incentives for IM to reduce costs and level of access charges; 
- Absence of performance scheme to encourage RUs and the IM to minimise disruption 
and improve the performance of the railway network; 
- Insufficient powers and resources of Regulatory Body to monitor competition in the rail 
service market, pending the effective establishment of a new Regulatory Body; 
- Insufficient independence of Regulatory Body from the (incumbent) RU and/or the IM, 
pending the effective establishment of a new Regulatory Body; 
- Regulatory Body does not have sufficient powers to enforce its requests for information 
and its decisions. 
Pursuant to a law adopted in December 2009, France has now set up an independent 
Regulatory Authority with strong powers. ARAF is intended to enable fair competition on the 
French rail network in the future by a better monitoring non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure and, in particular, the charges levied by the IM. Like the Federal Network 
Agency (Bundesnetz Agentur - BNetzA) in Germany, it is vested with sufficient human 
resources (up to 60 employees) and financial resources (a budget of approximately 8 million 
euros). A team of seven commissioners is authorized to make ex ante, and even ex officio 
decisions. Furthermore, ARAF is entitled to issue immediately enforceable notices and 
impose penalties of up to 3% of revenues. In contrast to the German regulatory framework, 
French law does not oblige the IM to give the Regulatory Authority advance notification if it 
plans to refuse applications for the use of infrastructure. 
Competition and related regulatory actions 
Given that SNCF operates under a monopoly in domestic (both long-distance and regional) 
passenger traffic, competition is non-existent. While international traffic is open to 
competition since December 2009, SNCF remains the sole operator. There were expressions 
of interest by Trenitalia, Deutsche Bahn, an alliance of Veolia and Air France-KLM, Virgin. 
But so far all have been abandoned. The only exception is the most recent entrance of Thello, 
a Trenitalia-Veolia joint venture, in the niche market of overnight long distance services 
between France and Italy. The French Association of Railways (Association Française du 
rail - AFRA), which brings together competitors of SNCF, believes that conditions are too 
restrictive with the main effect of threatening the profitability of new services and 
discouraging new railway companies to develop on the French market.  
A new law relates to the rail transport’s organisation and regulation (Organisation et 
Régulation des Transports Ferroviaires - ORTF). The principal goal of the Law of 8 
December 2009 is to organize the regulation of the rail transport sector, which is currently 
opening up to competition and abandoning its formerly monopolistic structure. The law 
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transposes the provisions of the Third Railway Package, and was approved by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel (French Constitutional Council) in a decision dated 3rd December 2009
9
. 
The law aims at organizing an efficient system of regulation for the railway sector to allow 
non-discriminatory access to all operators. It creates an independent administrative authority 
(ARAF), which is composed of seven members, each nominated for six years and has broad 
investigatory powers, an auxiliary regulatory power, and a disciplinary power. ARAF will 
have to be consulted on all legal propositions concerning railway transport, especially those 
concerning the schedule of tolls to be paid to RFF by rail operators for use of infrastructures, 
as well as the fare schedule for passenger lines operated under a monopoly. ORTF also 
changes the modality of track access charging. RFF will still initiate the process but its 
proposal will be submitted to ARAF, whose decision will have to be respected by the 
Government. 
With the beginning of its activities, ARAF started issuing decisions. As it is mentioned in 
their internet presence, in the first semester of 2011 ARAF made decisions on a case opposing 
EurocargoRail to SNCF and RFF about freight operations in the station of Cerbère, on a case 
of capacity allocation opposing Novatrans to RFF and Combiwest, and on separation of 
accounts of SNCF stations. 
Some experts, however, think that the powers delegated to ARAF are not sufficient. For 
instance, ARAF should be able to weigh in regarding questions of investment or the network 
statement ex ante (and not ex post) (Lumbroso, 2009). In addition, the French Competition 
Authority (Autorité de la concurrence) issued an opinion in May 2009 determining “if, on the 
one hand, possible competition restrictions relative to train stations would be likely to have 
repercussions on the passenger land-based public transport sector and/or on the intermodal 
market, if one exists, and on the other hand, if the incumbent operator’s diversification would 
require the latter to take special precautions in order to maintain competition”. As a result, 
the Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence, 2009) made the following 
recommendations: 
- The governance system for the mission to manage train stations should be reviewed 
along the lines of the models that were set up at the time of the opening to competition of 
public monopolies in other network-based industries; 
- ARAF must be provided with ex ante examination powers relative to the rates of station-
based services and their underlying costs, in order to assess whether or not they comply 
with regulatory requirements. 
Still in 2009, the Autorité de la concurrence found that the SNCF discriminated in favour of 
its subsidiaries by exploiting the website voyages-sncf.com
10
. In its comment on public 
transport (Autorité de la concurrence, 2009) the French competition authority mentioned that 
the incumbent operator must be under scrutiny on both its core and related markets so that 
new entrants can gain access to the French market under the conditions fixed by EU 
regulation. This means, both the stations and the diversification of the incumbent. 
                                                 
9
 Amongst its other provisions, the law deals with foreign truck operators and the progressive liberalization of 
urban transportation in the Paris Region (Ile de France). 
10
 The SNCF was fined 5 million euros and required to make substantial commitments regarding its future 
behaviour. 
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Services provided under PSOs 
There are two types of services run under PSOs in France: 
- Regional traffic, contracted by Regional Authorities to SNCF (there is no choice of 
operator: SNCF is the operator mandated by the law); 
- Inter-regional traffic, traditionally operated by the incumbent operator cross-subsidising 
profitable and unprofitable lines and more recently contracted by the State to SNCF. 
Regions became the Authorities organising transport (Autorités Organisatrices de Transport - 
AOT) for the Transport Express Regional (TER) following the law on inland transport 
development (Loi Orientation de Transport Intérieur - LOTI) that delegates to Regions the 
decision (within their jurisdiction) regarding the content of regional public transport 
including the servicing, the tariffing, the quality of service and information to the user. The 
change in 2002 was preceded by tests of regionalisation carried out voluntarily by seven 
Regions starting in 1997. The decentralisation brought about by the LOTI does not apply to 
Corsica and Ile de France. The latter has a special treatment since long before the LOTI and 
the transport organising Authority there is Syndicat des transports d’Île-de-France (STIF), 
which originates from changes of the Authority initially in charge of transport in Paris only 
since 1949. 
The decentralisation to the Regions has led to an important increase in the number of 
passenger-km as well to renewal of rolling stock. 
While the only operator allowed is SNCF, others may work if they are subcontractors of 
SNCF or work out of the main national network (CER, 2011). Those are the cases for the 
limited operations of VeoliaTransdev. 
Indeed, Desmaris (2010) points out that one of the problems is that Regions do not have the 
choice of operator. As a result, in light of the asymmetry, Regions have a hard time 
concluding favourable institutional arrangements.  
Inter-regional traffic, after having been part of services cross-subsided by SNCF, is now 
(since 1st January 2010) contracted by the State to SNCF. 
Whether the application of the PSO regulation will lead to the obligation for the AOT to open 
to competition the attribution of public service contracts for regional and long-distance is still 
an open question. 
As mentioned above, possible changes are being explored via the work of special 
committees. In May 2011 the Grignon Committee delivered to the Government a report on 
moving away from SNCF monopoly on regional services. The report suggests starting with 
tests on lines, with operators contracted by the Regions and using rolling stock owned by the 
Regions. The report addresses also the issue of rolling stock maintenance, for which SNCF 
would be in charge, and that of transfer of staff from one operating company (notably SNCF) 
to another and possibly back at the end of a contract. Also common working rules for the 
railway sector are an issue to avoid having SNCF and other operators subject to different 
conditions of employment for their staff. 
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Evolution of institutions in France 
This section outlined in table 8 the main events that have shaped the institutional landscape in 
France and have led to the current institutional set-up. To better appreciate the progression of 
changes over time, the evolution of actors that started in 1997 is charted against time (from 
1988 to 2011) in Figure 2. This information led us to summarise a set of milestones in 
institutional evolution that are depicted along with a brief description of what brought them 
about in Figure 3. 
Overall it can be seen that 15 years of changes (marked by four milestones) have taken 
somewhat little away from the initial set-up, mostly due to SNCF holding a monopoly on all 
services (except freight from 2006) and the IM delegating many of its roles back to SNCF, as 
required by national law. 
One important change has been the regionalisation of the local (TER) services to be run under 
PSOs and the State explicitly contracting long-distance PSO services to SNCF starting 2010 
(after many such services had been withdraw while SNCF was concentrating on the 
increasing high speed network). 
Another major change is the institution of ARAF, fully fledged rail Regulator in 2010, four 
years after the opening of the freight market. 
  
43 




RFF is created as IM by State’s law (the Reform Act), which requires also that operations and 
traffic control of the network and operation and maintenance of the safety equipment are still to 
be provided by SNCF according to guidance by RFF, which pays SNCF a fixed fee for its service 
Ownership of the infrastructure is transferred to RFF but stations remain in the ownership of 
SNCF 
SNCF debt from infrastructure investments is transferred to RFF 
Opening of the network to be limited to international groupings of RUs and to international 
combined transport trains 
1998 Agreement between RFF and SNCF on the task of the latter and the remuneration 
2002 
French Regions become the competent Authorities for the organization of regional passenger 
train services, namely those services that operate on the national railways within the territory of a 
Region (excluding specific national interest services and international services) 
SNCF remains the only provider of the regional passenger services and works for the Regions on 
the basis of a convention 
A lump sum is transferred every year from State to Regions to pay for the services and to fully 
subsidized new rolling stock acquisitions 
2003 
Decree transposing the First Railway Package 
Freight trains along the Trans European Rail Freight Network have access to the French Network 
New RUs have to receive a license by the State and a safety certificate by the Transport Minister, 
following a recommendation by RFF which bases its opinion on a report by SNCF 
The MCAF is set up, it is formed by three senior civil servants: it monitors conditions of access 
and deals with complaints 
RFF is assigned to distributing the capacities on the French railway network 
2006 
Effective opening of freight traffic to competition 
Creation of the French Railway Safety Authority (EPSF)  
Option for RFF to enter into public private partnerships to help expand the network 
2008 RFF signs the Contrat de Performance with the State 
2009-2010 Creation of the independent Regulatory Agency (ARAF) 
2010 
Traffic management and studies in preparation of capacity allocation are carried out by the DCF 
on RFF’s behalf. The DCF is an independent division of SNCF 
The State becomes the procuring Authority for long distance TET (Trains d’Équilibre du 
Territoire) 
2011 
The Grignon report on reforming regional railway services is published 
The Assises du Ferroviaire start work to advise the Government on the future of the railway 
sector 




Legend for the overview of the institutional evolution 
The overview of the institutional evolution is a matrix composed by as many columns as the years 
between 1988 and 2011 plus an initial column for the situation before 1988 and a final column for 
planned changes after 2011 that are already known. 
There are four horizontal bands or clusters of rows. 
The top cluster of rows includes the railway market set-up over the years. The chart reports separately 
the set-up for the passenger rail market, divided by long-distance and regional/local, and for the 
freight market. Different market set-ups are depicted by coloured bands spanning the columns 
representing the relevant years. Colours have mostly the role of making changes visible. Wherever a 
market set-up is the same or similar, the colour is the same. Alternatively, different colours are used. 
However, for this cluster of rows only, a homogenous colour coding has been used across charts for 
different countries: light yellow is associated to legal monopoly, orange to concessions or franchises 
(a separate band indicates the possibility of open access) and light blue refers to open access. Cases 
where PSO services and open access (may) co-exist are indicated by horizontal orange and light blue 
stripes.  
The second and largest set of rows refers to each kind of actor/railway body whose evolution is 
depicted along the rows. The focus is on the passenger sector, since this is the focus of this project. 
Therefore, while there are rows regarding the incumbent and new entrants in the freight markets, the 
rows about station and about rolling stock provisions refer to the passenger sector only. Several actors 
may correspond to a kind of actor and this is written or depicted along the row. Actors or types of 
actors are depicted by coloured rectangles. A continuous contour of the rectangle indicates a public 
body; a dashed contour indicates a private body. Colours of rectangles have no particular meaning but 
have the role of making changes visible. Wherever a body is the same, the colour is the same. 
Alternatively, different colours are used. Names of bodies are written only on the rectangles depicting 
their first appearance. 
Large rectangles with dashed blue contour spanning across the first and second set of rows identify 
the milestones in institutional evolution that are singled out for use in the next chart. 
A third band includes only one row and refers to the sequence of Governments, the relevant dates and 
the main figures. 
The bottom band, with columns indicated with alternate white and grey background, includes text 
rectangles reporting main facts within the rail industry or with an influence on the rail industry. Facts 
are linked to market set-ups or actors where immediately relevant. 
 
Legend for the summary of the milestones in institutional evolution 
In Figure 3 the milestones of the institutional evolution have been singled out of the previous figure 
and brief texts explaining the changes occurred have been added between each pair of milestones. 
Therefore the picture depicts the milestones by using the same structure in columns and rows used 
previously. However, while each column refers to a particular year or cluster of years, the distance 
between columns is not to scale and is simply to leave room for the details of the changes. These are 
contained in arrows pointing to the actors resulting from the changes or affected by them. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of institutions in the French railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting 
information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: Gressier (2005), SETRA (2009), Quinet (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors  
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work for capacity allocation 
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Réseau Ferré de France signs 
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SNCF
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President  François Mitterrand from 21 May 1981 to 17 May 1995
Gov: Pierre Mauroy (1) from 22 May 1981 to 23 June 1981; Pierre Mauroy (2) from 23 June 1981 to 23 March 1983; Pierre Mauroy (3) from 23 March 1983 to 17 July 1984; Laurent Fabius from 17 July 1984 to 20 March 1986; Jacques Chirac (2) from 20 March 1986 to 10 May 1988; Michel Rocard (1) from 10 May 1988 to 22 June 
1988;  Michel Rocard (2) from 23 Juin 1988 to 15 May 1991; Édith Cresson from 15 May 1991 to 31 March 1992; Pierre Bérégovoy from 2 April 1992 to 28 March 1993; Édouard Balladur from 29 March 1993 to 16 May 1995. 
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The Grignon report on 
introducing competition in 
regional rail out of Ile de France 
is published in May 2011 and 
addresses working rules, 
transfer of personnel from one 
operator to the next, access to 
rolling stock and to services
The Assises du Ferroviaire are 
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competition, governance and 
financing of rail services
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by stakeholders
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(regional) services start in 7 
regions
Opening of LGV (High Speed 
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March 2006: opening of internal 
market for rail freight
The safety regulator EPSF is 
set up transposing directive 
2004/49
The Mission de Contrôle des 
Activités Ferroviaires (MCAF ) 
is set up, it is formed by three 
senior civil servants: It monitors 
conditions of access and deals 
with complaints
The Haenel report to the prime 
minister suggests to test 
liberalisation of TER in 
voluntary regions
The State becomes the 
procuring authority for long 
distance TET (Trains d’Équilibre 
du Territoire)
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Figure 3. Milestones in the evolution of institutions in the French rail sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by 
collecting information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: Gressier (2005), SETRA (2009), Quinet (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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From 1 January 2010 traffic management and studies 
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In Germany, the restructuring of the historical operators in 1994 saw the creation of an 
integrated railway company (Deutsche Bahn - DB) with subsidiaries offering different 
services (e.g., DB Netz provides energy, DB Schenker provides logistics services). This major 
reorganization was then followed in 1996 by the devolution of regional passenger transport to 
the Länder (i.e., the Regions) and by the creation of a multi-sector Regulator 
(Bundesnetzagentur) in 2006, taking over from the function of regulation from the Federal 
Railway Authority (Eisenbahnbundesamt or EBA). 
Germany presents an interesting case when it comes to the introduction of competition in the 
passenger segment. There is open access on the whole network and, in particular, for long-
distance traffic. Nonetheless the present competitive landscape remains dominated by the 
incumbent operator DB. On long distance traffic there is currently a prospective new entrant 
on the Hamburg-Cologne line but Séguret (2009) remarked that “in the last ten years, only 
ten attempts in the long distance traffic occurred, often surviving a few months, whereas 
more than a hundred concessions were already awarded in the regional traffic”. In fact 
regional traffic is contracted by Regions, by direct award or by tendering. On the latter traffic, 
the presence of new entrants in 2011 accounts for 21.6% of the train-km in contracted rail 
services after a steady increase from 9.9% in 2003 (DB data). DB sees competitors growing 
in terms of train-km in the coming years. In addition, public subventions have been reduced 
(in part because new entrants are on average 15%-20% cheaper than DB on a train-km basis). 
The following tables and figure introduce the dimension of railway transport in Germany, the 
main actors and their role (see also Appendix I). 
Table 11. Selected statistics, Germany (2005-2009) 
Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Km of rail 34,221 34,122 33,890 33,855 33,714 - 
Train km, in thousand 986,686 990,019 1,014,033 1,005,820 986,342 - 
Pax km, in million 74.95 77.80 79.10 80.93 82.43 - 
T km, in million 95.42 107.01 114.62 115.65 95.83 107.32 
Source: Eurostat, Transport in Figures 2011 (EC, 2011) 
Table 12. Summary of provisions for access to the German rail market 
Passenger services Open access for domestic operators (some restrictions for foreign) 
Freight services Open access 
Source: Compiled by authors, Alexandersson (2009) 
Table 13. Regulatory institutions relevant to the German railway market 
Economic Regulator Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetz Agentur - BNetzA) 
Safety Regulator Federal Railway Authority (Eisenbahnbundesamt - EBA) 
Other Regulatory Agencies 
involved 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt - BKA), Monopolies 
Commission (Monopolkommission) 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Table 14. Main information about the Economic (and Safety) Regulator of the German rail 
industry 
Name of Economic Regulator Bundesnetz Agentur (BNetzA) 
Name in English 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railways 
Creation of Agency  2004 
Nature of Regulatory Agency  
Separate higher Federal Authority within the scope of the German 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
Scope of intervention  Includes other network industries; excludes safety (EBA) 
Role and mission  
Market and network regulation to develop and promote sustainable 
competition based on sector-specific regulatory laws 
Composition  N.A. 
Sanctioning powers  Can sanction discriminatory behaviour 
Enquiry and information powers  Strong; actors must submit relevant data 
Relation to Competition Authority  Cooperation with BKA 
Budget  160 million euros for all sectors; exclusively Government-financed 
Personnel  50 
Relationship to Parliament  Annual report; bi-monthly meeting of Eisenbahninfrastrukturbeirat 
Source: Compiled by authors 
Table 15. Infrastructure management and path allocation in the German railway market 
Infrastructure management DB Netz for most of the network 
Some local IMs 
Path allocation DB Netz (IM) 
Traffic control DB Netz (IM) 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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A large number of RUs operates on the DB Netz infrastructure: in addition to DB Group 
companies, there are 323 competitors. 75 of these non-DB companies offer passenger 
services, 153 are rail freight operators and the remainder are construction companies or from 
the rail industry. 
Regulation 
The German railway regulatory law has four central elements: 
- Responsibilities and powers of the Authorities: within the framework of their individual 
areas of responsibility for regulating access to the railway infrastructure, the BNetzA and 
the EBA are responsible for monitoring compliance with requirements regarding the 
separation of infrastructure and transport services. 
- Regulating access to the infrastructure: the central norm defining non-discriminatory 
access to the infrastructure is art. 14 of the General Railways Act (Allgemeines 
Eisenbahngesetz - AEG), in conjunction with the Ordinance Governing the Use of 
Railway Infrastructure (Eisenbahninfrastruktur-Benutzungsverordnung - EIBV). Based 
on this, railway infrastructure operators (Eisenbahninfrastrukturunternehmen - EIU) 
have to provide railway transport companies (Eisenbahnverkehrsunternehmen - EVU) 
non-discriminatory usage of the railway infrastructure they operate, and ensure non-
discriminatory provision of the services they offer in accordance with the EIBV. The 
BNetzA is responsible for regulating access to the network in Germany. These 
responsibilities include checking usage and access conditions. 
- Regulating infrastructure fees: the BNetzA is also responsible for regulating infrastructure 
fees. Public-sector EIUs are obligated to submit in advance every planned new version or 
revision of fee principles and fee increases for the use of train path or service facilities to 
the BNetzA for review.  
- Regulations regarding corporate structure/organisation: public railways in Germany are 
subject to special legal requirements regarding their organizational structure. Art. 9 and 
9a of the AEG, contain far-reaching guidelines regarding railway structures (unbundling). 
Among other things, the EBA is responsible for ensuring the independence of the train 
path operator in decisions regarding network schedules, allocation of train path and 
infrastructure fees, as well as organizational issues, such as supervisory board 
membership, and rules of procedure for the management board. Therefore the EBA is 
responsible for supervising compliance with unbundling requirements. 
The primary institutions responsible for regulating the railway sector in Germany are the 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway 
(BNetzA) and the Federal Railway Authority (EBA). Both Regulatory Bodies are responsible 
for the railway system on the Federal level. 
BNetzA is responsible for the monitoring of non-discriminatory access to railway 
infrastructure (including examination of use and access conditions and pay systems of the 
railway infrastructure company). BNetzA’s task consists in market and network regulation in 
order to develop and promote sustainable competition based on sector-specific regulatory 
laws. BNetzA has five departments in charge of railway regulation: legal and economic policy 
issues; business management, aspects of charging, monitoring, statistics; access to rail 
infrastructure and services; access to service facilities and services; charges for networks, 
service facilities.  
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BNetzA’s tasks in the field of railway regulation derive primarily from art. 14 to 14f of the 
AEG, supplemented by the EIBV. It monitors compliance with the rules governing access to 
railway infrastructure, especially as regards the compilation of the train schedule, decisions 
on the allocation of railway paths, access to service facilities, usage conditions, rates 
principles and rate levels. 
Unlike the telecommunications and postal markets, railway infrastructure is characterized by 
symmetric regulation, i.e. all public railway infrastructure operators are subject to BNetzA 
regulation, irrespective of market position. Public railway infrastructure operators must 
provide railway companies and other parties with access rights – e.g., haulage contractors and 
carriers – not just with access to the route proper but also to the service facilities such as 
railway stations, maintenance quarters, ports and rail sidings. 
In some instances the railway infrastructure operator is obliged to notify BNetzA in advance 
of planned decisions, e.g., when it intends to reject an application for allocation of railway 
paths or for access to service facilities. Within very short periods (scaled from one day to four 
weeks), BNetzA will have the chance to withhold consent to the planned decision. This 
objection will include BNetzA specifications, which will need to be taken into account in the 
new decision and may result in certain rules and conditions not being allowed to come into 
force, e.g., rate levels. Apart from these preventive regulatory rights, there will also be the 
possibility of subsequent verification of usage conditions for rail tracks and service facilities 
and of rules about the level or structure of route rates and other rates. For each period covered 
by a train schedule, currently spanning a whole year, BNetzA drafts an activity report for the 
Federal Government. 
The EBA is responsible for setting up and monitoring all technical and safety regulations for 
the national vehicle register. It is also responsible for market surveillance on the requirements 
of interoperability components, for monitoring training facilities also in terms of opening to 
all parties, and it manages the safety advisory council, which covers safety for non-Federal 
railways. In more detail, EBA is in charge of: plan approval for the facilities of the Federal 
railways, railway oversight, supervision of construction of installations of the Federal 
railway, granting and revoking operating licenses, exercise of public powers as well as 
participation rights, preparation and implementation of agreements on the construction or 
upgrading of railway (in accordance with art. 9 BSWAG, the Federal law on the development 
of track systems), technical investigation of hazardous events in railway operation, granting 
of Federal funds to promote rail transport and combined with other modes, monitoring 
compliance of the service and financing agreement (Leistungs- und 
Finanzierungsvereinbarung LuFV), monitoring compliance with organizational requirements 
(art. 9, 9a AEG). 
The EBA is headquartered in Bonn and has 12 branch offices in 15 locations throughout 
Germany. The headquarters consists of four departments, each with sub-units that also deal 
with the five key areas in the branch offices. The branch offices fulfil primarily operative 
functions, whilst the headquarters, alongside its operative role, also handles important 
fundamental issues. 
In addition there are Regulatory Bodies on the level of the Federal States that are responsible 
for technical and safety regulation of regional RUs and RUs that do not need a safety 
assurance. Several States have delegated this responsibility to the EBA. 
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Competition and related regulatory action 
Next to assuring “safety” and “attractiveness of railway services”, “effective and undistorted 
competition” is one of the main goals of the regulatory framework of the railways in 
Germany. The law also explicitly highlights the aim of fair competition between different 
modes of transport (art. 1 Abs. 3 AEG). However, in contrast to the Telecommunications Act, 
the German General Railways Act does not provide an interpretation of the concept of 
“effective competition”.  
The Regulator has not yet provided any explicit guidance as to how he interprets the notion of 
effective competition in the railways sector. The same holds true for the monopolies 
commission, which is obliged to report on the state and development of competition in the 
railways every two years (art. 36 AEG). It seems that the Regulator mainly refers to market 
shares as the relevant criterion. 
As noted above, there is a large number of companies operating besides DB on the German 
network. Broken down according to types of transport, approximately 23% of the train path 
applications for the 2010 working timetable were for freight traffic, roughly 72% for regional 
passenger traffic and around 5% for long-distance passenger traffic. In the long-distance 
passenger sector, non-DB RUs applied for a total of 113 train paths, which were 16 more than 
in 2009.  
Applications from competitors in the long-distance sector therefore remained low. 
Séguret (2009), concluding a paper on “Is competition on track a real alternative to 
competitive tendering in the railway industry? Evidence from Germany” pointed out that “if 
the goal of the railway regulation is to introduce more competition in the long distance 
traffic, then the German regulation failed to make it possible”. Since market opening, 
competitors have raised accusations of price and non-price discriminating practices by the 
overpowering incumbent (DB). It took more than ten years after the reform for the German 
Economic Regulatory Agency BNetzA to be put in charge of the railway system (2006). From 
the point of view of competitors, it seems that problems of discriminatory behaviour have 
reduced since, but there are claims that the Regulator’s rights to intervene, or even to get the 
information it needs, are still quite limited. Additionally, the possibilities to control access 
charges are currently quite restricted. However, this may change in near future since the 
Government elected in 2009 appears to be committed to strengthening the Regulator’s 
position and defining the judicial basis for regulation (Everis, 2010). 
On regulatory action at European Commission level, the Commission itself voiced in 2009 
the following complaints regarding the regulatory arrangement in Germany: 
- Insufficient safeguards to guarantee the independence of the IM from the railway holding 
and its transport affiliates in the exercise of the essential functions; 
- Insufficient incentives for IM to reduce costs and level of access charges; 
- Infrastructure charges not based on direct costs of train services respectively insufficient 
verification whether market can bear the charges; 
- Regulatory Body does not have sufficient powers to enforce requests for information. 
In the past few years, the BNetzA took a large number of decisions regarding access to the 
infrastructure. In the area of pricing, the comprehensive review of the station price system 
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operated by DB Station & Service AG (Aktiengesellschaft – corporation limited by shares) 
was completed in 2009. The BNetzA declared the station prices void and demanded that the 
company develop non-discriminatory prices. The court decisions taken in 2008 and 2009 
address numerous basic railway regulation issues.  
Table 16. Competition issues dealt with by BDA in 2008 and 2009 
Company under scope Issue 
DB AG Terms of use for railway facilities 2008/2009 
DB Regio AG Maintenance facilities 
Railion Deutschland AG Request for information 
DB Netz AG Network statement 2008 
DB Netz AG Reduction in train path prices 
DB Netz AG Disclosure of framework agreements 
DB Netz AG Framework agreements involving deferred launch of operations 
DB Netz AG Service facilities statement 2008 
Source: Compiled from BDA annual reports 
Services provided under PSOs 
In 1996 the act on regionalisation transferred to the German States the responsibilities for 
contracting passenger services subject to PSOs
11
. Public procurement is not mandated: States 
may award services by using open tenders, non-open tenders and negotiations. As a result, 
opening to competition differ across the Länder and there are different market share of non-
DB operators from 2% in Berlin to 30% in Schleswig-Holstein, for instance. In any case 
regional rail services are awarded as public service contracts on a non-exclusive basis. In fact 
access to infrastructure remains open as it is for any part of the railways from the reform of 
1993. The first tendering took place in 1996 but private competition only started in 2000. 
Overall competition in the markets for passenger is slow to take up. Significant barriers to 
competition restrict the activities of many providers. A major reason lies in the structure of 
the industry leader (DB). By combining infrastructure and transport, the company has 
significant advantages in access to railway infrastructure over other providers. 
Local and regional PSO services, the only ones eligible for subsidies, are procured by 33 
Regional Authorities (Public Transport Authorities - PTAs), which are characterized by 
considerable differences regarding the area to be served and, as mentioned, the way chosen to 
procure the services. There are also differences in the number of PTAs within the Federal 
States. 
Contract duration varies considerably and ranges from 2 to 15 years. Contracts awarded by 
open tenders typically have a longer duration (10 years) than those awarded within 
negotiations (on average 8 years). Franchising Authorities use rather tight service 
specifications (although the degree differs across PTAs) incorporating regional rail services 
into synchronized and coordinated timetables, service frequency, operating hours (first and 
last train), through ticketing, acceptance of the DB tariff and requirements with regard to type 
and quality of rolling stock. 
                                                 
11
 On average, fare revenues make up 40% of the total costs in providing regional passenger services. 
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The German franchising model can thus be characterized as rather planning based whereby 
planning is seen as the task of Regional Authorities. A number of operators, including DB, 
argue that there is a trend of too tight specification of contracts lacking sufficient freedom for 
service improvements and innovations. 
A general standard for the contract of required PSOs does not exist. PTAs use solutions 
adapted to their regional requirements, taking advantage of different contractual forms and 
the competitive environment, as they interpret it. In fact, Link and Merkert (2010) find that 
the character of franchise contracts in Germany varies considerably regarding the question 
whether they are granted within competitive tendering procedures or not and regarding 
features such as duration and contract types (net versus gross contracts). They conclude that 
the so-called regionalisation with the agreed sound financing of rail-PSOs in Germany and in 
particular competitive tendering had positive impacts on service provision (more train-km 
and quality for the same funding), patronage, customer satisfaction (better quality and more 
customer services), and costs. However, the huge diversity across the different States and 
PTAs hampers a systematic impact analysis as the lack of centrally held and publicly 
accessible data does.  
Still Link and Merkert (2010) identify several problems of the German approach to rail 
franchising, which are mostly due to failures in the institutional set-up (vertical integration of 
the DB group and a lack of a sufficient regulation for a long time, as well as the lack of a 
clear legal rules whether regional rail services have to be tendered or not) and to some extent 
also due to lack of more experience of PTAs, in particular during the first years after 
regionalisation. Overall, with improvements in these fields competitive tendering appears to 
bear still potential for further cost savings and quality improvements (although for already 
competitively awarded contracts not as much as in the first round of tendering). 
Evolution of institutions in Germany 
The main events that have marked the evolution of the railway sector in Germany are 
outlined in Table 17. Figure 5 looks instead at the evolution of the main actors characterising 
the sector since 1988: their situation over time is depicted against the key events determining 
their variations. Based on this we characterised three milestones in the evolution occurred. 
Milestones are reference points in time when particularly salient points happened. These are 
depicted in Figure 6. Before moving on those, we recall the changes in rail regulation and 
about recent suggestions appeared for railways in Germany. 
Since Germany’s railway system reform in 1994, the EBA has been the supervisory and 
authorizing Authority for the Federal railways (Eisenbahnen des Bundes - EdB) and the rail 
transport companies (EVU). As part of the merger between the two former state railways, 
Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn to create Deutsche Bahn AG, EBA was 
assigned the sovereign roles that the state railways themselves had until then fulfilled. 
When the rail safety Directive (2004/49/EC) was introduced in Germany in 2007, the EBA 
became the National Safety Authority and as such fulfils all the functions of a Safety 
Authority as defined by art. 16 of the safety Directive. The Directive brought with it new 
functions for the EBA and changed the content or applicable parties of existing ones. It also 
expanded the EBA’s railway supervisory authorities. As a Safety Authority, the EBA is also 
responsible to the Federal railways for monitoring non-Federal railways. 
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With the Third Act amending the Railway Regulations of 27 April 2005 the AEG was 
comprehensively revised. As a result, BNetzA was given a new scope of responsibility in the 
field of railway regulation as of January 2006. As mentioned, BNetzA is tasked with 
monitoring rail competition and the responsibility for ensuring non-discriminatory access to 
railway infrastructure. Substantive supervision in railway regulation is the task of the Federal 
Ministry of Transport, Construction and Town Development (Bundesministerium für 
Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung - BMVBS), organizational responsibility remains with the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie - BMWi). 
In 2009, political parties favoured an increase in regulation of access to service facilities, 
access to traction current and distribution services in railway passenger transport. BNetzA 
also plans to develop concepts for incentive regulation, for noise-based path pricing system, 
for reduction of disruptions (DB, 2009). In its annual report (DB, 2010a) the incumbent 
operator notes that the regulatory framework in Germany is substantially expanded and that it 
is already far more comprehensive than in almost all Member States. It also calls for the 
Federal Government to consider the changes taking place at the European Commission e.g., 
RECAST before focusing its attention on some of the issues (competitively-neutral 
implementation of EU law in general, full opening of the railway markets in all Member 
States and fair competitive conditions in that sector). 
Brandt (2008, p. 21), discussing “Reaping the benefits of stronger competition in network 
industries in Germany”, made recommendations to enhance railway competition in Germany 
including the idea to retain full state ownership of the tracks, while fully privatizing DB AG’s 
transport service subsidiaries, make tendering of regional rail service contracts compulsory, 
review overlapping regulation responsibilities of BNetzA and EBA and make sure that they 
have enough powers and resources, especially as long as DB AG is not fully unbundled 
(extending competence to energy for rail). 
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German Federal Government initiated a commission to develop a reform agenda 
(Regierungskomission Bahn or RegB) 
1990 The Deregulierungskommission issues a report with conclusions similar to that issues by the 
Monopolkommission the previous year 
1991 
The Government Commission of Federal Railways (Regierungskommission Bundesbahn) 
publishes a report suggesting the creation of Deutsche Eisenbahn AG, a new holding company, 
initially owned by the Government and whose passenger and freight division are later to be 
privatized. The reform proposed included transfer of choice on lines to be subsidized transferred to 
the States and open access to the railway network 
1993 
The Act about the merger and restructuring of the Federal railways and the general railway act put 
Directive 91/440 into German law 
The assets of Deutsche Bundesbahn and of Deutsche Reichsbahn are merged into BEV, the 
Federal Railway Asset, from which DB AG will originate 
Open access to the rail network is provided according to Directive 91/440/EEC 
The Eisenbahnbusesamnt (EBA) is formed as a new sector specific Regulator 
The constitutional change which allows the formation of DB AG (see below) opens the possibility 
of selling railway shares to private operators but limits it by reserving a controlling share for the 
State for those railways acting as IMs 
1994 
Passing of the Eisenbahnneuordnungsgesetz (law on the restructuring of the railways). Set-up of 
Deutsche Bahn AG (a private law commercial enterprise), on 1st January, divided into 
subsidiaries: 
Personenfernverkehr (long distance passenger traffic) 
Personennahverkehr (regional passenger traffic) 
Güterverkehr (freight traffic) 
Personenbahnhöfe (Railway stations) 
Fahrweg (Network ) 
1996 
Act on regionalization, whereby as of 1st January 1996 German States become directly responsible 
for contracting out regional passenger services which are public services. The States receive 
funding from the Federal Government and are free to contract the services to any RU, with or 
without public procurement 
1999-
2001 
Separation of transport activities and ownership of rail to meet the Commission requirements 
DB AG transformed into individual public limited company within a joint group holding company 
2002 
By the provisions of the Second law on amendments of railway regulations, EBA becomes 
responsible for monitoring non-discriminatory access to the network of DB Netz 
Since competition law applies, to carry out its remit EBA cooperates with the Bundeskartellamt 
(the German Federal Cartel Authority) 
2005 
By the Allgemeine Eisenbahngesetz, EBA is no longer responsible for access regulation, which 
becomes responsibility of the Federal Regulatory Agency for Telecommunication and Postal 
services (Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post – RegTP), by effect of the transfer 
of the relevant EBA department to RegTP. 
2006 
BNetzA is given new scope of responsibility in railway regulation (monitoring rail competition and 
the responsibility for ensuring non-discriminatory access to railway infrastructure). Substantive 
supervision in railway regulation is the task of the Federal Ministry of Transport, Construction and 
Town Development (BMVBS), organizational responsibility remains with the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology (BMWi). 
Source: Adapted from Kirchner (2005) 
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Legend for the overview of the institutional evolution 
The overview of the institutional evolution is a matrix composed by as many columns as the years 
between 1988 and 2011 plus an initial column for the situation before 1988 and a final column for 
planned changes after 2011 that are already known. 
There are four horizontal bands or clusters of rows. 
The top cluster of rows includes the railway market set-up over the years. The chart reports separately 
the set-up for the passenger rail market, divided by long-distance and regional/local, and for the 
freight market. Different market set-ups are depicted by coloured bands spanning the columns 
representing the relevant years. Colours have mostly the role of making changes visible. Wherever a 
market set-up is the same or similar, the colour is the same. Alternatively, different colours are used. 
However, for this cluster of rows only, a homogenous colour coding has been used across charts for 
different countries: light yellow is associated to legal monopoly, orange to concessions or franchises 
(a separate band indicates the possibility of open access) and light blue refers to open access. Cases 
where PSO services and open access (may) co-exist are indicated by horizontal orange and light blue 
stripes.  
The second and largest set of rows refers to each kind of actor/railway body whose evolution is 
depicted along the rows. The focus is on the passenger sector, since this is the focus of this project. 
Therefore, while there are rows regarding the incumbent and new entrants in the freight markets, the 
rows about station and about rolling stock provisions refer to the passenger sector only. Several actors 
may correspond to a kind of actor and this is written or depicted along the row. Actors or types of 
actors are depicted by coloured rectangles. A continuous contour of the rectangle indicates a public 
body; a dashed contour indicates a private body. Colours of rectangles have no particular meaning but 
have the role of making changes visible. Wherever a body is the same, the colour is the same. 
Alternatively, different colours are used. Names of bodies are written only on the rectangles depicting 
their first appearance. 
Large rectangles with dashed blue contour spanning across the first and second set of rows identify 
the milestones in institutional evolution that are singled out for use in the next chart. 
A third band includes only one row and refers to the sequence of Governments, the relevant dates and 
the main figures. 
The bottom band, with columns indicated with alternate white and grey background, includes text 
rectangles reporting main facts within the rail industry or with an influence on the rail industry. Facts 
are linked to market set-ups or actors where immediately relevant. 
 
 
Legend for the summary of the milestones in institutional evolution  
In Figure 6 the milestones of the institutional evolution have been singled out of the previous figure 
and brief texts explaining the changes occurred have been added between each pair of milestones. 
Therefore the picture depicts the milestones by using the same structure in columns and rows used 
previously. However, while each column refers to a particular year or cluster of years, the distance 
between columns is not to scale and is simply to leave room for the details of the changes. These are 
contained in arrows pointing to the actors resulting from the changes or affected by them. 
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Figure 5. Evolution of institutions in the German railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too large to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting 
information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: Lehmann (1999), Gorka and Hoopmann (2003), Link (2003), Kirchner (2005), CER (2005), Kirchner (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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Figure 6. Milestones in the evolution of institutions in the German railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too large to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been 
obtained by collecting information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: Lehmann (1999), Gorka and Hoopmann (2003), Link (2003), Kirchner (2005), CER (2005), Kirchner (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors  
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From 1996 regional PSO services are contracted by 
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Following the 1993 reforms, access to the rail 
network is  open.
Regional PSO services are contracted without the 
right to exclusive access to the network
While long distance passenger transport  is open to 
commercial entrerprises DB is substantially the 
only operator
Long distance services are provided entirely on a 
commercial basis
In 1994 EBA is set up as supervisory and 
authorization authority for the federal railways 
Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn 
are merged into Deutsche Bahn, a private law AG 
with a privatisation option.
Regional Passenger Transport, Long Distance 
Passenger Transport, Freight Transport and 
Railway Infrastructure have to be  organisational 
and financial independent entities
From 1998 new entrants strat working on PSO 
services contracted by Länder
At least one Länder provides own rolling stock to its 
contracted operators
in 2002 EBA becomes responsible for for 
monitoring third party access to the rail network, 
including pricing. 
Following the revision of the Revision of the 
Allgemeine Eisenbahngesetz, in 2006 the  
Bundesnetzagentur, covering several network 
industries, becomes the rail economic regulator.
Safety remains with the Eisenbahn Bundesamt
Deutsche Bahn AG becomes a holding company. 
Former business sectors become joint-stock 
companies. 
Accounting separation of network management 
and operations
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 is without a doubt among the leading countries when it comes to 
experimenting with railway liberalisation and privatization, in particular with the introduction 
of competition in the passenger segment. In-depth reforms started in 1993 with the Railways 
Act and continued over the years. 
Today, passengers services are delivered via system of franchises awarded to private 
companies (the incumbent British Railways - BR has been divided and sold following the first 
round of reforms). Passenger railway companies are currently 24. There are very few services 
run on open access grounds: the British system allows very limited operations of such 
services and only if not primarily abstractive of revenues of franchisees. 
Franchises are issued by the Department for Transport (DfT) after competitive tenders and 
have different durations. The DfT also supervises the delivery of the franchise contracts. 
There is some regionalisation of responsibilities (mostly for London, Wales and Scotland) 
and Passenger Transport Executives in England who are often co-signatories of franchise 
agreement. 
The DfT is also responsible for developing the Government’s long-term strategy for railways. 
This involves specifying funding for the rail industry, including the level of passenger 
services and the overall size and shape of the network in England and Wales. DfT is also 
responsible for some consumer protection matters, including through ticketing and passenger 
benefits, providing services for disabled people and procedures for handling complaints. 
Freight rail is on open access grounds by five private companies which result mostly from the 
split-up of the freight divisions of BR, operated at the time of the first steps of privatisation. 
RUs (Train Operating Companies - TOCs, in the British parlance) use rolling stock leased by 
ROSCOs (ROlling Stock leasing COmpanies), again originally formed by privatizing the pool 
of rolling stock belonging to the former incumbent. 
The network is owned by Network Rail, a not-for-dividend private company, which operates 
under the strict surveillance of the Office of Rail Regulation. In more detail, Network Rail is 
the owner and operator of the national rail network, including track, signalling, bridges, 
tunnels and stations. It also manages the main stations while other ones are managed by the 
train operating company in whose franchise each station is. Network Rail operates under a 
network licence setting out the conditions under which it must operate, among which Route 
Utilisation Strategies (RUSs). 
The following tables and figure introduce the dimension of railway transport in Britain, the 
main actors and their role (see also Appendix I). 
                                                 
12
 Railways in Northern Ireland are a separate matter: they remain vertically integrated are not treated here. 
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Table 18. Selected statistics, Great Britain (2005-2009) 
Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Km of rail 16,208 16,193 16,218 16,212 16,272 - 
Train km, in thousand 511,984 517,944 507,231 524,936 542,532 550,556 
Pax km, in million 44.42 47.04 50.17 53.00 52.77 55.83 
T km, in million 22.32 27.37 26.38 24.83 21.17 - 
Source: Eurostat, Transport in Figures 2011 (EC, 2011) 
 
Table 19. Summary of provisions for access to the British rail market 
Passenger services 
Franchises + some limited open access (permitted if not primarily 
abstractive of franchise revenues) 
Freight services Open access 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 20. Regulatory institutions relevant to the British railway market 
Economic Regulator  Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) 
Safety Regulator Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) 
Other Regulatory Agencies 
involved 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Competition Commission 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 21. Main information about the Economic Regulator of the British rail industry 
Name of Economic Regulator Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) 
Creation of Agency  2004 
Nature of Regulatory Agency  Non-ministerial Government department 
Scope of intervention  Limited to railway sector; includes safety 
Role and mission  
Independent, fair and effective regulation for safe, well maintained and 
efficient railways 
Composition  
7 non-executive directors and 5 executive directors 
Appointed by the Secretary of State for Transport 
Sanctioning powers  Can sanction discriminatory behaviour 
Enquiry and information powers  Strong; Actors must submit relevant data 
Relation to Competition Authority  Cooperation with Competition Commission (CC) 
Budget  31 million GBP (13 in licence fees and 18 in safety levy) 
Personnel  300 (120 for economics and 180 for safety) 
Relationship to Parliament  Annual report; Board accountable to Parliament 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 22. Infrastructure management and path allocation in the British railway market 
Infrastructure management Network Rail 
Path allocation Network Rail 
Traffic control Network Rail 




















































Source: Compiled by authors, adapted from Merkert et al. (2008)  
Regulation 
The actors in British rail regulation are the ORR (Office of Rail Regulation), the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT), the Competition Commission, and the Department for Transport. 
Established in 2004, the ORR is the Safety and Economic Regulator for the rail industry. It 
also acts as the railway Competition Authority with powers concurrent with the OFT. It is a 
statutory body, with defined functions and duties set out in statute (the Railways Act1993, 
amended by the Railways Act2005). It is led by a Board balanced of non-executive and 
executive members and is funded by a safety levy and licence fees from the industry. The 
Board has the statutory freedom to balance the achievement of the objectives in the way that 
they think is best calculated to promote the public interest. Policy development is evidence-
based and is subject to internal challenge as well as external consultation in line with the 
Cabinet Office’s guidelines. 
ORR’s responsibilities include: 
- Setting Network Rail’s income every five years at an access charges review; 
- Regulating the safety procedures for railways, metro systems, tramways and heritage 
railways (since 2006); 
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- Issuing licences to operators of passenger and freight services, stations, light 
maintenance depots and mainline network; 
- Controlling the fair and efficient allocation of capacity of railway assets through the 
approval or direction of contracts for the use of track, stations, and light maintenance 
depots; 
- Making sure the requirements of interoperability are met; 
- Making sure that the different railway markets are working for the benefit of those using 
railway services and taking action where competition rules have been broken. 
It also monitors and publishes performance information and takes enforcement action if 
required. 
ORR has substantial powers at its disposal to enforce railway and safety legislation: 
- The power to enforce license conditions is under the Railways Act1993; 
- The periodic review process sets out the charges to operate the network and the outputs 
that Network Rail should provide for that money; 
- The outputs that Network Rail is required to deliver are monitored and enforced by ORR 
under the network license; 
- Powers to enforce UK and European competition law in relation to the railways. 
The long-term planning of Network Rail’s outputs and the access charges are reviewed in a 
process involving the Transport Ministries of England, Wales and Scotland submitting to the 
ORR a High Level Output Specification (HLOS) and a Statement of Funds Available (SoFA) 
to reach the objectives in the HLOS over a period of 5 years. The ORR then determines the 
costs of delivering the outputs in the most efficient way, makes an assessment of the 
feasibility of the targets with the available funds, and indicates the access charges to the RUs. 
This process has been put in place for the first time for the period 2009-2014, with the HLOS 
published in the 2007 White Paper “Delivering a Sustainable Railway”. It should however be 
noted that such amendments of charges are not actually passed on to the RU since they are 
subject to the charges determined at the time the franchise was awarded. This is a kind of 
misalignment that is currently being discussed. 
The Competition Commission has replaced the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1999 
and works on mergers and acquisitions following a reference by another Authority (such as 
the ORR or the OFT) or by the Secretary of State. 
The OFT oversees compliance with the Competition and the Consumer legislation. It works 
in partnership will all other Regulators. The OFT may carry out market investigations and 
proceed to refer them to the Competition Commission in case it has concerns with respect to 
competition. It may also investigate mergers and, in case of concerns, refer them to the 
Completion Commission. 
ORR has concurrent power with the OFT to make a reference to the Competition Commission 
“whenever it has reasonable grounds to suspect that any feature, or combination of features, 
of a market of the United Kingdom for goods and services prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition in connection with the supply or acquisition of any goods or services in the 
United Kingdom or a part of the United Kingdom.” 
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Competition and related regulatory action 
The statutory framework for keeping British railway market under review is governed by the 
Railways Act 1993, the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Railways Infrastructure (Access and 
Management) Regulations 2005, which transposed and implemented the requirements of the 
First Package of EU Rail Directives and parts of the Second Package. This framework 
implicitly recognises that knowledge of markets assists ORR in exercising its functions and 




Table 23. Competition issues dealt with in 2008 and 2009 
Company under scope Issue 
First-Scotrail Review of 
Undertakings 
Proposed acquisition by FirstGroup plc (FirstGroup) of the Scottish 
Passenger Rail (ScotRail) franchise 
Rolling Stock Leasing Market 
Investigation 
Leasing of rolling stock for franchised passenger services and the supply 
of related maintenance services (the reference goods and services) in the 
UK 
Stagecoach / Scottish Citylink  Completed joint venture 
EWS Railway Holdings / Marcroft 
Engineering  
Completed acquisition  
Greater Western Passenger Rail 
Franchise 
Proposed acquisition of the new Greater Western Franchise (the GWF) 
by FirstGroup plc (FirstGroup). 
National Express Group / 
Thameslink / Great Northern Rail 
Franchise 
Proposed acquisition of the Thameslink and Great Northern (TGN) rail 
franchise by the National Express Group plc (NEG). 
National Express Group PLC / 
Greater Anglia Franchise 
Acquisition by National Express Group plc (NEG) of the Greater Anglia 
franchise 
Firstgroup plc / Scotrail Proposed acquisition by FirstGroup plc (FirstGroup) of the Scottish 
Passenger Rail franchise (the Scottish rail franchise) currently operated 
by ScotRail Railways Limited (ScotRail) 
DaimlerChrysler AG / Railcare 
Limited 
Acquisition on the supply of heavy maintenance services for railway 
rolling stock in the United Kingdom 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on European Commission - DG Competition website 
Services provided under PSOs 
National services have been divided into lines through franchising and managed by the DfT. 
The tendering is based on the lowest subsidy required. Rail franchise agreements are the 
contracts which the DfT holds with train operating companies for the provision of passenger 
train services. These contracts are awarded by the DfT following open competition. Whilst 
key elements of the service provided to passengers are mandated as part of the contract, other 
features are left to the commercial judgment of bidders and operators. Operators are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of train services. There are currently 15 rail 
franchises managed by the DfT. Overall, the DfT paid GBP 3.8bn in subsidy to the railway in 
year 2011 including grants paid to Network Rail to operate, renew and maintain the national 
rail infrastructure. Current franchises have been let for an average of around eight years, 
although some have been shorter to reflect circumstances in specific areas.  
                                                 
13 Market studies should not be confused with market investigations carried out by the Competition Commission 
or sector inquiries carried out by the European Commission. 
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The current process of franchising involves the DfT (in consultation with Network Rail) 
setting out a minimum level of train service that should be delivered by the operator
14
. This is 
not usually a timetable, but a set of minimum frequencies, maximum journey times and 
stopping patterns. Some of these services will not cover their costs and, without being 
specified, they would not be provided by the franchisee.  
In a recent study KPMG finds a lack of conclusive evidence about the relationship between 
franchise term and franchisee performance are:  
- Franchisee bid assumptions for patronage growth or cost reduction proving not to be 
sustainable, meaning that some sample TOCs did not see out the full term of their 
contracts. Performance can also deteriorate as management seeks to cut costs to reduce 
financial losses. This effect may override any impact that franchise length might have on 
franchisee performance;  
- Many of the investments or actions that will improve performance or customer 
satisfaction in the UK rail industry do not necessarily have a financial payback over the 
life of the franchise, even if it is a relatively long contract such as 15 years (and some 
investments may not generate a TOC financial return over any time period). Alternative 
mechanisms to bring about improved outcomes might include the Franchising Authority 
specifying investments in tender requirements. UK rail franchises tend to have a number 
of committed obligations to deliver specific improvements incorporated into the contract 
on signature. Often the nature of these committed obligations differs materially between 
contracts and are not related to franchise length;  
- The different UK TOCs are highly individual businesses operating in different 
geographic locations with different fleets and inheriting assets of differing age and 
condition. They also experience different external events (performance shocks, changes 
to the local economy, Network Rail performance, etc.) over the period of their contracts;  
- The ability of a management team to impact the results delivered may be related as much 
to its quality as to the term of a contract. 
Evolution of institutions in Britain 
The current institutional arrangements in Britain are the results of the major change initiated 
in 1993 “carefully designed to introduce competition wherever possible all along the supply 
chain and to provide appropriate incentives throughout the industry” (Nash and Smith, 2010). 
The passage of the Railways Actin 1993 initiated a rapid set of changes that were quickly 
carried out: contracting passenger services organised in 25 franchises in 1996-1997 was one 
of the final steps of the replacement of the vertically integrated BR by a set of private 
companies working on separate elements of the railway system. Infrastructure was sold to the 
private company Railtrack (replaced in 2002 by Network Rail, with a different structure and 
not-for-dividend) as well as rolling stock and infrastructure maintenance and track renewal 
companies. Freight transport is carried out on open access grounds by private companies 
which have bought specialised sectors of BR (e.g., container transport). 
                                                 
14
 Specifications for recent franchises have included elements relating to: access to the network (car parks, cycle 
parking, multi-modal interchange); stations, stations facilities and station improvements; quality of service; 
national passenger survey targets; fares and ticketing; security and revenue protection; passenger information; 
and environmental impacts. 
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Regulation, at the outset of the privatisation, was with the Office of the Rail Regulator, to 
become the Office of Rail Regulation in 2004 when the Regulator was replaced by a Board, 
and with Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) mostly in charge of franchises. In its 
time in force the Regulator had frictions with the Government on amounts of money to be 
transferred from the Government to Railtrack, due to the infrastructure being in a poorer state 
than thought at time of privatisation and to the franchisees being insulated from increases in 
access charges, which falls directly on the Government (Winsor, 2010). 
Need for more strategic outlook on services led to the formation of the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA) in place of OPRAF, allowing also more Government involvement in the 
matter. SRA expressed the will of the Government to have direct control of railways and 
caused frictions by attempting to extend its jurisdiction on that of the Rail Regulator (as told 
by the then Rail Regulator, Winsor, 2010). SRA lasted only from 2001 to 2006 and now 
franchising and strategic planning are with the DfT, although the recent McNulty Report 
(2011) calls for more strategic view and involvement of the whole industry. 
The Railways Act 2005 transferred responsibility for the health and safety regulation of the 
rail and light rail industries from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to the ORR. The 
handover took effect in April 2006 when ORR merged with, and assumed the responsibilities 
of, the rail section of the HSE (including Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate). 
The latest changes in railways in Britain are being driven by the McNulty Report (“Realising 
the potential of GB rail – Report of the Value for Money Study”) issued in May 2011 to 
advise the Government on rail issues and followed by the Command Paper, that the 
Government issued in March 2012.  
The McNulty study found that the rail industry in Britain costs some 30% more than it should 
(even 40% against some European cases) and identified barriers to efficiency, then putting 
forward measures to overcome them with a view “to expand the network capacity as 
necessary”, therefore no network reductions are intended. 
The barriers to efficiency identified include: fragmentation of structures and interfaces (that 
does not foster alliances towards efficiencies), the role of Government and industry, 
ineffective and misaligned incentives (referring not only to RUs being isolated from changes 
in infrastructure access charges, but also to rolling stock: RUs do not have incentives to 
manage rolling stock costs). 
The McNulty Report advocated clarity in rail policy, improvements in structures and 
interfaces also with incentives. It further encouraged more industry involvement in strategic 
discussion (a “Rail Delivery Group” has promptly been set up by the RUs and Network Rail), 
and better management in several areas of the rail supply chain, including “approaches to 
enable lower-cost regional railways”. 
The study underlined, for instance, that Network Rail works in a too centralised way and that 
RUs take short term views of the industry. It is also pointed out that franchise periods are 
“relatively short” (one effect of this is the planned change of the Greater Anglia franchise, 
lasting for the period 2012-2014 and recently awarded, to become 15 years’ long) and that 
there are “overly-prescriptive franchises, insufficient risk transfer from Government, and 
difficulty in agreeing changes to franchise agreements”. The study also pointed out that 
“whole-system approaches are difficult to apply in an industry that often needs them”. 
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Among the many recommendations, the HLOS/SoFA process should “include specific cost 
objectives and a greater degree of longer term planning”. In fact the Government with its 
Command Paper of March 2012 seems to have postponed a response on this to the 
forthcoming HLOS document, expected in July 2012, which should include elements such as 
incentives to deliver savings and industry alliances. 
The McNulty study also recommended having at least two “joint ventures/alliances” between 
Network Rail and RUs as well as one vertically integrated pilot, both by 2013/2014 and with 
a view to explore closer alignment of infrastructure and operation. The first device is seen 
with some concern by freight operators (since the passenger RUs would be part of the 
partnerships), while the second awaits implementation after initial suggestions to try 
integration in the 25 years’ long Merseyside franchise, which is a special case as it is self-
contained and managed by the local Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) only, without 
intervention from the DfT. 
Another recommendation of particular interest here was to “move towards the industry 
having a single Regulator, the ORR”. The McNulty study envisaged the ORR becoming the 
Regulator of the franchises (now this role is with the DfT), still procured by the DfT as they 
are now. In this view ORR would also be in charge of overseeing fares. The rationale is that 
division of roles between the Government and the Regulator would be clearer. 
The recommendations put forward in the McNulty Report may lead to a further round of 
reforms in areas as diverse as industry objective and outputs, leadership, incentives, fares, 
safety and standards, or asset ownership and private investment, although recent Government 
response with the Command Paper is not yet driving changes. 
The main events that have marked the evolution of the British railway system are summarised 
in Table 24. Their effects on the main actors in the system and the changes of those are 
depicted against time since 1988 in Figure 8. That figure allows appreciating for how long 
each kind of actor has been part of the sector. The changes intervened led us to characterise 
four milestones in the institutional changes which are singled out in Figure 9 along with the 
main events determining them. 
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Table 24. Brief account of the main points on the evolution of the regulatory and competition 
arrangements  
Year Evolution 
1992 The New opportunities for railways White Paper issued by the DfT points towards 
competition, vertical separation, and direct involvement of the private sector in rail to obtain 
responsiveness to customer needs, service quality and improved efficiency against a trend of 
decreasing rail usage and increasing State funding 
1993 The Railways Act incorporates the recommendations of the New opportunities for railways 
White Paper opening the way to the privatization of the railways 
1994 Railtrack, a new company owned by the State, takes over the railway infrastructure from 
British Railways (BR) 
BR infrastructure services are sold to seven infrastructure maintenance companies and six 
track renewal companies 
BR rolling stock for passenger services is transferred to three Rolling Stock Leasing 
Companies (ROSCOs) still State owned 
Competition for the tracks is introduced for passenger services (open access is to be 
introduced gradually to ensure viability of the franchises) 
Open access is introduced for freight services 
The freight sector of BR is separated into six freight operating companies 
ORR, the Office of Rail Regulator, is created as independent Regulator of Railtrack. It grants 
Railtrack its licence with requirements for asset’s stewardship and safety, determines rail 
charges, approves access agreements 
OPRAF, the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, is set up to award franchises, pay subsidies 
and monitor the delivery of the services by the RUs 
Safety of rail operators is managed by Railtrack, whose safety arrangements are, in turn, the 
responsibility of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as overall safety regulation 
1995-1997 The six freight operating companies are sold to private investors 
1996 Railtrack is sold to the private sector 
ROSCOs are sold to the private sector 
1996-1997 25 private Train Operating Companies (RUs) are awarded the first franchises (some lasting 7 
years some 15 years, longer ones against commitments in investments) 
2001 In October Railtrack is placed into administration due a major financial crisis following the 
Hatfield accident, happened the previous year 
OPRAF (the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising) becomes the Strategic Rail Authority and 
its role widens to include the strategic development of the rail industry(no strategic planning 
body was present during the period with ORR and ORR/OPRAF as Regulators) 
2002 The ownership of the infrastructure is transferred from Railtrack to Network Rail a not for 
divided company (it may make profits but has to reinvest them or build up a financial reserve) 
2004 The former Office of the Rail Regulator becomes the Office of Rail Regulation. Behind the 
name change of the ORR there is an important organizational change: the introduction of a 
Board for decision making 
Government White Paper putting forward the abolition of the SRA and the transfer of its role 
to the Department for Transport 
2005 Strategic and financial responsibilities as well as the duties for setting the national level of 
outputs for the railways industry were transferred to the Department of Transport and the role 
of the Office of Rail Regulation is reinforced. The HLOS/SoFA procedure to determine 
funding, access charges and outputs of Network Rail for a period of 5 years is introduced. 
2007 The HLOS/SoFA procedure is started for the first time with the indication of HLOS on the 
White Paper Delivering a Sustainable Railway 
2011 The Rail Value for Money (McNulty) report delineates action to tackle the high costs of 
railways in Britain 
Source: Compiled by authors, Nash, Smith, & Matthews (2005), Nash and Smith (2010), website of authors 
 
The following two charts offer an overview of the institutional evolution in Britain from 1988 
to 2011 (Figure 8) and a summary of the milestones in institutional evolution and of the 
reasons for the changes (Figure 9). 
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Legend for the overview of the institutional evolution and the milestones 
The overview of the institutional evolution is a matrix composed by as many columns as the years 
between 1988 and 2011 plus an initial column for the situation before 1988 and a final column for 
planned changes after 2011 that are already known. 
There are four horizontal bands or clusters of rows. 
The top cluster of rows includes the railway market set-up over the years. The chart reports separately 
the set-up for the passenger rail market, divided by long-distance and regional/local, and for the 
freight market. Different market set-ups are depicted by coloured bands spanning the columns 
representing the relevant years. Colours have no particular meaning but have mostly the role of 
making changes visible. Wherever a market set-up is the same or similar, the colour is the same. 
Alternatively, different colours are used. However, for this cluster of rows only, a homogenous colour 
coding has been used across charts for different countries: light yellow is associated to legal 
monopoly, orange to concessions or franchises (a separate band indicates the possibility of open 
access) and light blue refers to open access. Cases where PSO services and open access (may) co-exist 
are indicated by horizontal orange and light blue stripes. 
The second and largest set of rows refers to each kind of actor/railway body whose evolution is 
depicted along the rows. The focus is on the passenger sector, since this is the focus of this project. 
Therefore, while there are rows regarding the incumbent and new entrants in the freight markets, the 
rows about station and about rolling stock provisions refer to the passenger sector only. Several actors 
may correspond to a kind of actor and this is written or depicted along the row. Actors or types of 
actors are depicted by coloured rectangles. A continuous contour of the rectangle indicates a public 
body; a dashed contour indicates a private body. Colours of rectangles have no particular meaning but 
have the role of making changes visible. Wherever a body is the same, the colour is the same. 
Alternatively, different colours are used. Names of bodies are written only on the rectangles depicting 
their first appearance. 
Large rectangles with dashed blue contour spanning across the first and second set of rows identify 
the milestones in institutional evolution that are singled out for use in the next chart. 
A third band includes only one row and refers to the sequence of Governments, the relevant dates and 
the main figures. 
The bottom band, with columns indicated with alternate white and grey background, includes text 
rectangles reporting main facts within the rail industry or with an influence on the rail industry. Facts 
are linked to market set-ups or actors where immediately relevant. 
 
 
Legend for the summary of the milestones in institutional evolution 
In Figure 9 the milestones of the institutional evolution have been singled out of the previous figure 
and brief texts explaining the changes occurred have been added between each pair of milestones. 
Therefore the picture depicts the milestones by using the same structure in columns and rows used 
previously. However, while each column refers to a particular year or cluster of years, the distance 
between columns is not to scale and is simply to leave room for the details of the changes. These are 
contained in arrows pointing to the actors resulting from the changes or affected by them. 
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Figure 8. Evolution of institutions in the British railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too large to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting information from 
the literature and, partly, thanks to personal communications of experts 
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Figure 9. Milestones in the evolution of the railway sector in Great Britain, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too large to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting 
information from the literature and, partly, thanks to personal communications of experts 
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Political direction for changes stated in  the 
White Paper "New Opportunities for Railways" 
(1992): involvement of private sector and 
competition to obtain higher service quality, 
efficiency and value for money.
The Railway act of 2003 enacts political will  
expressed in the white paper
“The restructuring was carefully designed to 
introduce competition wherever possible all along 
the supply chain, and to provide appropriate 
incentives throughout the industry” (Nash and 
Smith, 2010).
Some argue that the new structure was set for a 
declining sector. In fact, Railtrack was sold assuming 
stable traffic (which instead increased) while RUs 
bids assumed growth
The Railway Act of 2003 established open access 
for freight from the outset with competition to 
protect the interests of freight users.
The separation of ORR (infrastructure provider 
regulator) and OPRAF (responsible for franchises 
and fare levels) is due to the intention to separate 
economic regulation (to be independent) from 
determining service and subsidies (role linked to 
government).
Government seeks stronger role in directing 
industry. No actor is tasked with developing a 
strategic view of the sector, though OPRAF has 
the necessary data. The SRA is then set up, 
including the remit of OPRAF and the 
development of rail strategy.
Increases in traffic volume. From 1997 
government directs to greater role 
f railways in the transport system.
Initial criticism about Railtrack stewardship of 
network leads to modification of Railtrack 
license in 1997 bringing about improvements 
of indicators of stewardship.
In 2000 ORR changes the structure of charges 
to align incentives of IM and RUs 
Hatfield accident (2000). Consequent decision 
by Railtrack to enact speed restrictions on 
network and major actions of maintenance or 
renewal. Drop in performance follows and 
large penalties are paid from Railtrack to RUs. 
The West Coast Main Line project costs soar as 
do general maintenance and renewal costs. 
Faced with need to increase subsidies for 
infrastructure, Railtrack is put into 
administration in October 2001. The 
government replaces it with Network rail 
(selected with a competition), with a different 
structure: a not for divided company 
limited by guarantee, with no shareholder.
SRA abolished in 2005 following White Paper of 
2004 (issued following cost increases in railways)
Strategic Planning and franchises become direct 
responsibility of the Department for Transport
In 2004 the Office of the Rail Regulator becomes 
the Office of Rail Regulation. The regulator is 
replaced by a board. The intention is to reduce the 
power of individuals in regulation (similar changes 
occur in other sectors)
Rolling stock is allocated to Rolling Stock Leasing 
Companies (ROSCOs) sold to the private sector in 
1996. Passenger operations are to rely on ROSCOs 
for rolling stock, to avoid issues with such assets 
being directly owned by operators
Railtrack, becomes the infrastructure manager. It is 
temporarily state owned and is sold to the private 
sector in 1996
The Railway Inspectorate becomes part of the HSE.
While most safety regulation remains with the 
HSE, Railtrack takes responsibility for safety 
standards and for approving safety procedures of 
RUs
Passenger services are franchised to 25 RUs (TOCs 
in the British terminology). Franchises are 
contractualised in Franchise agreements and 
Franchise Plans
BR freight operations are separated in different 
companies and sold tot he private sector in 1995-
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All others are assigned by a RU using them
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3.6 The Netherlands 
Outline 
The Netherlands have a railway system divided in two parts from the operational viewpoint: a 
“core” network where national passenger services are run by a single operator (Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen - NS, the incumbent) on a concession awarded by the State, and a number of 
peripheral lines with local relevance along which services are contracted by Local Authorities 
to operators via public tendering (those lines were separated from the main network in 1998-
2005 since loss making for NS). Funding for services on peripheral lines also comes from the 
State although it is administered by the Local Authorities. Local passenger services have seen 
much interest from private operators, which recently are also suggesting that their role could 
extend to services on the core network. NS, the State owned passenger operator resulting 
from the reorganisation of the former single railway company, has the concession to carry out 
services on the main network and has to operate commercially and be profitable. Freight is an 
open market since 1996 and is particularly relevant due to the traffic linked to the ports, 
notably that of Rotterdam. The freight branch of the former single railway company has been 
acquired in 2000 by DB Schenker. 
ProRail, State owned, is the IM for almost all the network. ProRail, besides being in charge 
of infrastructure management, is responsible for traffic control and capacity allocation. 
Infrastructure management, including the other responsibilities just mentioned, is carried out 
by ProRail on concession by the State. The current concession runs along the same time span 
of that for NS: from 2005 until 2015. 
The following tables and figure introduce the dimension of railway transport in the 
Netherlands, the main actors and their role (see also Appendix I). 
Table 25. Selected statistics, The Netherlands (2005-2009) 
Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Km of rail 2,797 2,801 2,888 2,896 2,886 - 
Train km, in thousand 134,615 135,394 151,386 n.a. n.a. 139,685 
Pax km, in million 15.15 15.89 16.32 16.31 16.42 - 
T km, in million 5.87 6.29 7.22 6.98 5.58 6.39 
Source: Eurostat, Transport in Figures 2011 (EC, 2011) 
 
Table 26. Summary of provisions for access to the Dutch rail market 
Passenger services 
The market is not open and a concession is required to operate: 
The main network services in concession to NS until 2015 
20 peripheral lines are tendered by local Governments 
Freight services Open market since 1998 
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Table 27. Regulatory institutions relevant to the Dutch railway market 
Economic Regulator  Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit(NMa)/Vorvoerkamer 
Safety Regulator Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstraat (IVW) 
Other Regulatory Agencies 
involved (if any) 
NMa is the Authority for Competition, the Rail Regulator is a department of it 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 28. Main information about the economic (and safety) Regulator of the Dutch rail 
industry 
Name of Economic 
Regulator 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit(NMa)/Vorvoerkamer 
Name in English Netherlands Competition Authority/Office of Transport Regulation 
Creation of Agency  2004 (Office of transport Regulation); 1998 NMa  
Nature of Regulatory 
Agency  
Independent 
Scope of intervention  Limited to market; security is supervised by independent NSA (IVW) 
Role and mission  
Regulation; non-discriminatory access to rail and services; user charge (article 
30 2001/14/EC) 
Composition  3-member executive board  
Sanctioning powers  Fines until 10% of revenue 
Enquiry and information 
powers  
Yes: as in competition law 
Relation to Competition 
Authority  
Same organization (combined)  
Budget  Financed by Ministry of Transport  
Personnel  7 FTE on rail regulation (380 FTE all of NMa)  
Relationship to Parliament  Annual report  
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 29. Infrastructure management and path allocation in the Dutch railway market 
Infrastructure management ProRail (concession until 2015) 
Path allocation ProRail (concession until 2015) 
Traffic control ProRail (concession until 2015) 



































































Source: Compiled by authors, adapted from Merkert et al. (2008)  
In more detail, ProRail (fully owned by the State but separate from NS) is the IM on the basis 
of a concession started in 2005 – and lasting until 2015 – as a result of the new Railway and 
Concession Act. ProRail is responsible for: 
- Rail capacity management; 
- Train path management; 
- Real-time passenger information; 
- Management of passenger transfer spaces at the stations; 
- Infrastructure management and development. 
 
There is another IM, Keyrail, but its role is limited to the Betuwe line. The latter has been 
opened in 2008, and goes from the port of Rotterdam (the major port of the Netherlands and 
one of the most important in Europe) towards Germany, and is for use by freight trains. 
Keyrail is a joint venture of ProRail and the Rotterdam and Amsterdam Port Authorities, and 
it is currently contracted as the IM for the Betuwe line for a fixed period of 5 years. 
 
As a result of a concession started in 2005 and lasting until 2015, NS Reizigers, the rail 
passenger incumbent passenger operator, enjoys the exclusive right to providing long 
distance passenger services on the main Dutch network and receives no subsidies (the latter 
point was one of the guiding aims of the reforms). Also, the concession of NS entails working 
against PIs: NS has to propose each year realistic target values for them to the Parliament. If 
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the agreed target levels of the PIs are not met, NS has to explain the reason and may be given 
penalties. More recently thresholds are being set rather than targets. 
 
Other operators have entered the market of local passenger services, procured by Local 
Public Authorities on funds transferred by the State, and the open market of freight services. 
Regulation  
The actors in Dutch rail regulation are: 
- NMa/Vervoekamer, as Economic Regulator, which is part of NMa, the Dutch 
Competition Authority; 
- IVW (Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstraat) as Safety Regulator. 
The task of NMa (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit), the Dutch Competition Authority, is 
“making markets work” and this includes: 
- Oversight of all industries of the Dutch economy;  
- Enforcement of compliance with the Dutch Competition Act;  
- Taking action against parties that participate in cartels;  
- Taking action against parties that abuse a dominant position;  
- Assessing mergers and acquisitions;  
- Regulating the energy markets and transport markets. 
On the 1st January 2004 the Office of Transport Regulation of NMa (NMa/Vervoekamer) was 
established as Railway Regulator. This office is independent of the Ministry of Transport and 
Economic Affairs but their independence is limited by the fact that the Transport Minister is 
responsible for monitoring observance of Directive 2001/14/EC. 
The Office of Transport Regulation since 2009 has merged with the Office of Energy 
Regulation (still part of the NMa) to form the Office of Energy and Transport Regulation. 
The scope of the Office of Transport Regulation spans railways, aviation (Amsterdam 
Schipol airport) and pilotage (in ports), as well as public transport (such as trams, metro and 
bus transport) in Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam. In more detail, its tasks are (NMa, 
2010): 
- Regulating compliance by the IM with parts of the concession regulations with regard to 
managing the main railway network;  
- Regulating non-discriminatory access to the railway infrastructure;  
- Regulating a correct and on-time development and publication of the Network 
Statement;  
- Regulating non-discriminatory access to additional services and facilities on and off the 
rail network;  
- Regulating compliance with access agreements; 
- Regulating non-discriminatory allocation of the railway network capacity and of other 
essential rail-related services and framework agreements;  
- Regulating the infrastructure charges;  
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- Approving long-term (more than five years) framework agreements between IM and 
operator; 
- Monitoring competition in the rail transport services industry;  
- Cooperation on a European level. 
The Office of Transport Regulation may act on complaint or by carrying out an ex officio 
investigation. In the first case it must issue a decision within two months of receiving the 
necessary information and acts pursuant to the provisions in sect. 71 of the Dutch Railway 
Act and art. 30, par. 2 of Directive 2001/14/EC. It acts ex officio if it suspects that the 
Railway Act is or has been violated. NMa members may investigate within the undertakings’ 
premises, inspect documents on site, and make enquiries. Ex officio investigations are carried 
out according to sect. 70 of the Dutch Railway Act. 
NMa/VK also issues informal opinions on the request of a regulated party. 
The Office of Transport Regulation publishes a yearly “Railway monitor” including general 
conclusions on the market. For instance, the 2010 issue underlines the need for an 
international one-stop shop for capacity allocation, deals with the network occupation by the 
IMs for maintenance and provides a summary and analysis of its own decisions in the light of 
the state of industry. 
The IVW is the Safety Regulator and covers the main rail, tram, metro and other railways and 
is part of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. IVW certifies 
operators, their rolling stock, their workplaces and provides operators with safety licences. 
Competition and related regulatory action 
In 2008 the European Commission sent a letter of notice to all except one railway equipped 
countries in the EU about their failure to implement the First Railway Package. The 
Netherlands is the only EU member that did not received the letter of notice. The points made 
by the Commission were in general (EC press release IP/08/1031): 
- Lack of independence of the IM in relation to railway operators; 
- Insufficient implementation of the rules of the Directive on track access charging, such 
as the absence of a performance regime to improve the performance of the railway 
network and the lack of incentives of the IM to reduce costs and charges; 
- Failure to set up an independent Regulatory Body with strong powers to remedy 
competition problems in the railway sector. 
In 2008 the Office of Transport Regulation published 11 decisions related either to the art. 70 
or 71 or the Railway Act, providing respectively for ex officio investigations and handling of 
complaints (dispute mediation). One decision following a complaint – a dispute mediation – 
was published in 2009. 
As mentioned above, The NMa/Transport Office, the Dutch Railway Regulator, may act ex 
officio or upon complaint. Investigations recently carried out ex officio included looking into 
issues with the allocation of capacity by the IM ProRail to itself (for maintenance) and with 
the relevant allocation procedure, verifying the information provided in the network 
statement finding incorrect, missing or unclear content. Moreover, in April 2010 
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NMa/Transport Office published the report from an investigation into access, capacity, 
quality of facilities, lack of information and level of charges for using refuelling station for 
diesel freight trains. The investigation originated from a Transport Office analysis and the 
closing report indicates that the capacity issues had been eased since the investigation started 
by a switch to using electric locomotives, rather than diesel ones, by a reduction in demand 
for container trains (due to the economic climate), and by a change in technology (the new 
one allowing faster refuelling) and opening times of the diesel refuelling facilities. The 
information issues should be addressed by a change in the ProRail network statement that the 
NMa is to check (source: NMa news and press release 23.04.2010). 
The NMa/Transport Office dealt with a number of complaints, for instance about capacity 
allocation by the IM ProRail to itself, which included regular complete closure of line at 
night for possible maintenance decided a priori and that conflicted with requests by 
operators, for which ProRail has been ordered to provide customised solutions to RUs 
requesting capacity when such blanket stops to circulation would be imposed. The 
NMa/Transport Office stated that requests of capacity for maintenance should be treated on 
the same level as requests by rail operators. There were a number of complaints on such issue 
(as they related to different lines and were by different operators). Deciding on one of those, 
the NMa/Transport Office ruled also that if no solution is found to resolve capacity conflicts, 
ProRail should provide and independent dispute resolution. 
In 2008 the Transport Office decided that a complaint by ProRail against NS Reizigers about 
a reduction in liability limit that ProRail claimed was forced to accept by NS, on the threat of 
not finalizing the access agreement. ProRail argued that it was forced to accept conditions 
that were discriminatory towards other undertakings. However the Transport Office found the 
complaint unfounded since NS had only taken advantage of the possibility of carrying out 
negotiations that other RU had not pursued. Therefore there was no discrimination. 
NS complained in 2008 against ProRail for an increase of the fees for using the main network 
in 2008 (which it felt related to NS only and were not stated on the network statement) and 
the fact that access charges are payable one month in advance of using the train path. The 
latter part of the complaint was rejected while that on fees increase was upheld by NMa even 
though ProRail explained that higher charges were requested due to higher maintenance costs 
for night and weekend work. ProRail and NS came to an agreement in accordance with the 
conclusion of NMa, thus reducing the fees payable by NS for 2008. 
In 2009 NMa decided against the setup of a performance scheme used in 2008 and 2009 by 
ProRail to reduce noise during braking. After a complaint filed by DB Schenker, which 
carries out only freight transport, NMa noted that the performance scheme lead to different 
bonuses for freight and passenger rolling stock which ProRail was not able to justify. ProRail 
was ordered to correct of the performance scheme. 
The NMa/Transport Office recently had also a decision taken after a complaint overturned in 
court and then finally confirmed by an appeal court in 2008. The appeal court ruled that the 
IM cannot set unilaterally the infrastructure changes and that those are negotiable. This had 
already been stated in a decision by the NMa/Transport Office previously, but an appeal to a 
court had overturned the decision. 
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Services provided under PSOs 
In the Netherlands services on the trunk network have to be profitable overall and are run by 
NS Reizigers, which holds a concession. PSO obligations on the main network are therefore 
established by the State and are compensated only by granting exclusive operations rights. 
Some unprofitable local railway services have been separated from the main network of 
services run by NS. Responsibility over them has been transferred to Local Transport 
Authorities, which put the relevant concession out to tender, open to any railway operator. 
This set-up has part of its origin in the transitional contract between the Dutch State and NS 
covering the years 1996-2000, which included a gradual reduction of subsidies to passenger 
rail services and allowed NS to stop performing non-profitable services. 
From 1994 tendering of bus services had been used as the test base for tendering of all public 
transport services (except those of the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague), which 
has been generalised and made compulsory with the Law for passenger transport 2000, 
enacted in 2001 without being initially applicable to rail. The same law became effective for 
regional railway services in 2005, after some years of experimentation with the 
decentralisation and tendering of rail passenger services, started in 1998. 
With such decentralised system, the national Government sets the policy goals (in the case of 
regionalisation of public transport: better, more effective public transport), transfers the funds 
to the Regional Authorities that are responsible for tendering, and determines the goals, 
specifications, service delivery and possible sanctions. It is up to the Regional Authorities to 
design the tenders (for gross-cost or net-cost contracts) and their details. The decentralization 
started with the Regional Authorities receiving the same level of subsidy that was used before 
decentralisation as an incentive to use those sums to seek more efficient and higher quality 
rail services. The maximum duration of the concessions awarded by Local Transport 
Authorities is typically 5 years. The duration of 10-15 years is agreed when there are 
commitments by the operator to introduce new rolling stock. 
The transfer of powers and limited opening of the market for local rail services resulted in the 
appearance of several operators. For instance, the bus operator Oostnet (later ConneXXion) 
won an early competitive tender to operate a local railway line in the East of the Netherlands 
that was being dismissed as loss making by NS and proposed for closure. NoordNed, a joint 
venture between NS Reizigers, Arriva and a bank, was awarded a non-competitive contract to 
operate a bus-train network in Friesland, and in 2003 NoordNed won a competitive tendering 
to operate routes in the Province of Groningen. In later tenders those operations were 
awarded to Arriva. NS Reizigers also entered joint ventures with other operators such as 
ConneXXion and Keolis. 
While tendering of bus services is relevant to the whole country (except the major cities 
mentioned) rail services tendered by Public Authorities are a minority: van Dijk (2007) 
reports that they are about 8% of heavy rail transport. In the period 1998-2006, 13 services 
were regionalised, 10 of which tendered (seven of the tendering procedures focused mainly 
on the goal of minimum subsidy and 3 on improving the quality and quantity of supply), and 
after 2006 four more services were tendered. The services contracted out were on peripheral 
lines so as to have limited interference with the main railway network. In fact, the 
concessions are rather small (typically 1-3 rail services with a maximum of 6), which is also 
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intended to limit the risk of the private RUs. This, however, limits also the chances of good 
offers when new rolling stock is to be acquired. 
According to van Dijk (2007) there are mixed results on whether it has been better to give 
responsibility for the development of the transport offer to the Regional Government or the 
transport company. When transport undertakings were in charge little innovation has been 
observed while when Regional Authorities took responsibility there were more ideas and 
plans but also more prescription. Moreover, the results expected were not all successfully 
achieved. 
Still van Dijk (2007) reports that experience from the 1998-2006 period shows that Regional 
Authorities have gained quality improvements (extra supply, new rolling stock) or savings in 
operating costs (20-50%) for the same services which compares with smaller savings (0-10%) 
obtained when contracts have been directly awarded. This can be explained by with different 
working practices and lower overhead and operation costs compared to when NS was 
operating the same services.  
Van de Velde (2010) explains that the 2.75% increase in passenger-km per year between 
2000 and 2006 on peripheral lines (compared to 0.7% on the core network) may be explained 
with service improvements such as more supply (wider time coverage, more frequent trains), 
new rolling stock and integration with bus services. Indeed, companies running such rail 
services are also running bus services in the same area. 
Initial experience showed also the importance of monitoring and the need for performance 
checks performed by the public Authority or by consultants rather than having the operators 
handing in their own figures, as noted by van Dijk (2007). Also the same initial experience 
suggested the need for the possibility of changes to the service provided to be put forward 
during the execution of the contracts but also the importance of having the means to propose 
and to judge those changes clearly stated at the beginning of the contract. 
The dependence upon NS, the incumbent, for rail ticket integration and revenue-settlements 
has also been found to be an issue. 
Evolution of institutions in the Netherlands 
The main events marking the evolution of the institutional landscape of the Dutch railway 
sectors are recalled in Table 30. Before the table we add some details about how the current 
IM came to replace a set of organisations to an extent similar to those still managing part of 
the infrastructure value chain in France. Then we mention what the literature report about a 
recent item (the 2008 review of the 2004 changes) and the current debate about the extent, 
and possibly the organisation, of the core network. 
These notes are followed by the chart depicting the evolution of the actors since 1988 (Figure 
11) from which we extracted four milestones, as detailed in Figure 12. 
The set-up of ProRail in 2003 meant the actual separation of infrastructure management and 
train operations in the Netherlands. The provision of the services that ProRail is responsible 
for is carried out against a set of target PIs which are updated every year. If the agreed target 
levels of the PIs are not met, ProRail has to explain why and may be given penalties. 
79 
The current framework for infrastructure management stems from the initial provision of 
traffic control, infrastructure management, capacity allocation and railway safety by means of 
three task organization set within NS but separate from it, and directed and financed by the 
Ministry of Transport. In 1999 the Dutch National Audit Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) 
issued a report stating that the Ministry of Transport had failed in its supervisory and steering 
role for those task organizations. The Ministry had not adequately specified the tasks, and had 
not implemented incentive schemes. It had been ascertained that contractually permitted 
direct intervention by NS board had led to improved efficiency but the independence of task 
organizations was no longer guaranteed. ProRail was then formed to actually separate 
infrastructure management from NS. 
The new legal framework for railways set up in 2004 required that an evaluation of how the 
system works be carried out in 2008. This appeared in (2008) found that: 
- The structure of the sector need to be put to better use; 
- Patronage is increasing; 
- Transport operators and the IM are primarily responsible for day to day operations; 
- The legal system could work better. 
Therefore no radical reorganisation is required (van de Velde, 2010). Still van de Velde 
(2010) mentions that the evaluation underlined the importance of cooperation among actors, 
rather than legislation only, in achieving improvements in the rail sector. 
In particular the local services, on concession by Provinces or City Regions, are the only 
market where private operator may operate, and have been operating since the start of the 
current set-up (2000, after some years of tests). 
Currently, there is a debate about the extent of the core network (whether it should be 
reduced and how much) and about interfaces between the core network and the local lines 
from 2015 onwards, when the new concession for operating service on the core network will 
be issued (most likely again to NS). Services from local lines extend on the core network only 
if NS agrees. However regional operators have shown interest in services on the core 
network, one of them with the intention of becoming responsible for the whole core network, 
others with the idea of seeing it split into several concessions. They state they would do better 
for less and would achieve enhanced coordination of bus and rail services as they did when 
taking over services of regional interest. 
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Table 30. Brief account of the main points on the evolution of the Dutch regulatory and 





NS, the State railway, is reorganized into a commercial part and three task organization, all 
remaining State owned. 
The commercial part includes: 
NS Reizigers (the former passenger division) 
NS Cargo (the former freight division) 
NS Station (developing and operating stations) 
NS Vastgoed (real estate) 
The three task organization are independent of the rest of NS and directed and paid for 
directly by the Ministry of Transport: 
- Railned licensing operators, allocating capacity, overseeing railway safety 
- NS Verkeersleiding in charge of traffic control and real time passenger information 
- NS Railinfrabeheer as IM (maintenance and construction) 
1996-2000 No infrastructure charges are levied 
Subsidies from State to NS are gradually reduced 
Unprofitable services identifies and contracted separately to NS with reduction in subsidies 
1996-1999 Sole case of open access rail passenger operator: Lovers Rail. It competes with NS on the 
short stretch of line Amsterdam Haarlem (17 Km) 
After Lovers Rail ceases services in 1999 




Transfer of competence for bus, tram, metro and regional railway services to Local Public 
Authorities 
Competitive tendering for public transport services becomes mandatory (competition for the 
track with concession with subsidies put out to tender). National rail services are exempted 
from this requirement as are services within Amsterdam , Rotterdam and The Hague (the city 
services are exempted since they are awarded in house) 
Competition on the rails for passenger services is no longer possible 
1999 The Dutch Audit Office issues a report stating that the Ministry of Transport had failed in its 
supervisory and steering role of the three task organizations within NS. Independence of task 
organizations form NS was seen as no longer guaranteed 
2003 As of 1st January ProRail (fully owned by the State but separate from NS) replaces the 
previous IMs and becomes responsible for: 
- rail capacity management 
- train path management 
- real-time passenger information 
- management of passenger transfer spaces at the stations 
- infrastructure management and development 
- infrastructure is therefore separated from operations 
2004 On 1st January NMa/Vervoekamer is established as Railway Regulator. The Office of 
Transport Regulation is part of the Dutch Competition Authority 
New Railway and Concession Act and text of the Concessions 
2005 Main line passenger services are awarded with a 10 year exclusive concession to NS Reizigers 
Infrastructure management is awarded with a 10 year exclusive concession to ProRail 
Both concessions are linked to the achievement of PIs which are revised every year 
Source: Compiled by authors, main sources van de Velde (2005); van de Velde (2010) 
 
 
The following two charts offer an overview of the institutional evolution in the Netherlands 
from 1988 to 2011 (Figure 11) and a summary of the milestones in institutional evolution and 
of the reasons for the changes (Figure 12). 
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Legend for the overview of the institutional evolution 
The overview of the institutional evolution is a matrix composed by as many columns as the years 
between 1988 and 2011 plus an initial column for the situation before 1988 and a final column for 
planned changes after 2011 that are already known. 
There are four horizontal bands or clusters of rows. 
The top cluster of rows includes the railway market set-up over the years. The chart reports separately 
the set-up for the passenger rail market, divided by long-distance and regional/local, and for the 
freight market. Different market set-ups are depicted by coloured bands spanning the columns 
representing the relevant years. Colours have mostly the role of making changes visible. Wherever a 
market set-up is the same or similar, the colour is the same. Alternatively, different colours are used. 
However, for this cluster of rows only, a homogenous colour coding has been used across charts for 
different countries: light yellow is associated to legal monopoly, orange to concessions or franchises 
(a separate band indicates the possibility of open access) and light blue refers to open access. Cases 
where PSO services and open access (may) co-exist are indicated by horizontal orange and light blue 
stripes. 
The second and largest set of rows refers to each kind of actor/railway body whose evolution is 
depicted along the rows. The focus is on the passenger sector, since this is the focus of this project. 
Therefore, while there are rows regarding the incumbent and new entrants in the freight markets, the 
rows about station and about rolling stock provisions refer to the passenger sector only. Several actors 
may correspond to a kind of actor and this is written or depicted along the row. Actors or types of 
actors are depicted by coloured rectangles. A continuous contour of the rectangle indicates a public 
body; a dashed contour indicates a private body. Colours of rectangles have no particular meaning but 
have the role of making changes visible. Wherever a body is the same, the colour is the same. 
Alternatively, different colours are used. Names of bodies are written only on the rectangles depicting 
their first appearance. 
Large rectangles with dashed blue contour spanning across the first and second set of rows identify 
the milestones in institutional evolution that are singled out for use in the next chart. 
A third band includes only one row and refers to the sequence of Governments, the relevant dates and 
the main figures. 
The bottom band, with columns indicated with alternate white and grey background, includes text 
rectangles reporting main facts within the rail industry or with an influence on the rail industry. Facts 
are linked to market set-ups or actors where immediately relevant. 
 
Legend for the summary of the milestones in institutional evolution 
In Figure 12 the milestones of the institutional evolution have been singled out of the previous figure 
and brief texts explaining the changes occurred have been added between each pair of milestones. 
Therefore the picture depicts the milestones by using the same structure in columns and rows used 
previously. However, while each column refers to a particular year or cluster of years, the distance 
between columns is not to scale and is simply to leave room for the details of the changes. These are 
contained in arrows pointing to the actors resulting from the changes or affected by them. 
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Figure 11. Evolution of institutions in the Dutch railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting 
information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on: van de Velde (2005), van de Velde (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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The Government is to 
investigate:
- if the main network definition  
should change (eg more lines 
should be detached from it and 
subject to compettitive 
tendering)
- how the interface between 
local rail concessions and main 
network concession (due to be 
re-issued in 2015) may work 
after 2015Publication of the evaluation 
(referred to 2008) on the 2005 
railway policy.
Some points:
- improvements are necessary 
in rail organisation and user 
charges framework
- need for added transparency 
of NS and ProRail.
- need for more cooperation 
among IM and operators
The Office of Transport 
Regulation merges with the 
Office of Energy Regulation 
(both part of NMa)
KeyRail is a joint venture of 
ProRail, the port of Rotterdam 
authority, the port of 
Amsterdam authority. It has a 
concession as infrastructure 
manager for the newly built 
Betuwe line only.  The line is 
dedicated to freight traffic. The 
concession lasts 5 years
The Netherlands are the only 
railway equipped EU Member 
State that does not receive a 
letter of notice by the EC for 
failing to implement the first 
railway package
Starting 2005 NS Reizigers 
holds a concession as sole 
provider of passenger services 
on the main Dutch network until 
2015.
Starting 2005 ProRail holds a 
concession Infrastructure 
Manager of the rail network until 
2015.Prorail is responsible for:
- rail capacity management
- train path management
- real-time passenger 
information
- management of passenger 
transfer spaces at the stations
- infrastructure management 
and development
From 1 January 2005,  
competitive tendering of 
regional rails services as per 
Transport Act 2000 becomes 
effective for railways
December: the text of the 
concessions is finalised: 
ProRail is the Infrastructure 
Manager of the network and NS 
is the sole provider of 
passenger services on the main 
lines for the first concession 
period of 10 years 
On the 1st January 2004 the 
Office of Transport Regulation 
of NMa is established as 
railway regulator
From January ProRail replaces 
the three task organisations as 
infrastructure manager 
New Railway and Concession 
Act approved in April by the 
Parliament but concessions' 
text -necessary to 
operationalise the Act- still 
under discussion
Second transitional contract between the Dutch State and NS.  This transitional contracts is extended several times since the new legislation about the 
concession is not yet ready
Competitive tendering of public 
transport is enacted but it does 
not involve rails services until 
2005
NS performance falls below 
levels of second transitional 
contract with the State
In September the Ministry 
introduces the Herbezenning 
spoor (Railway reconsideration) 
relaxing the performance 
targets
At the end of the year the new 
targets are -just- failed.  NS 
supervisory board members 
resign
Internal reorganisation of work 
practices at NS (eg with drivers 
remaining within limited 
geographical areas) receives 
strong opposition from Unions, 
including industrial action
Passenger Transport Act
Transfer of competence for bus, 
tram, metro and regional 
railway services to local public 
authorities.
Competitive tendering for public 
transport services becomes 
mandatory (in rail: competition 
for the tracks with concession) 
but not immediately for rail.  
National rail services and urban  
services within Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and The Hague are 
exempted
Competion on the rails for 
passenger services is no longer 
possible
NS Cargo is sold to the Railion 
Consortium of Deutsche Bahn
The Ministry of Transport 
publishes the policy document 
De Derde Eeuw Spoor (The 
Third Century of Rail) pointing 
towards a 10 year concession 
to NS with performance
indicators to be met.
This requires a new railway and 
concession legislation.
While the new legislation is 
finalised, MoUs between State 
and NS guarantee rail 
performance
The Dutch National Audit Office 
(Algemene Rekenkamer) issues 
a report stating that the Ministry 
of Transport has failed in its 
supervisory and steering role 
for the task organizations.  The 
Ministry has not adequately 
specified the tasks, and has not 
implemented incentive 
schemes.  Moreover, 
contractually permitted direct 
intervention by the NS board 
has led to improved efficiency 
but the independence of task 
organizations is no longer 
guaranteed.
The rail freight market is open
Testing of decentralisation and 
tendering of rail passenger 
services starts
Sole case of open access rail passenger operator: Lovers Rail.  It competes with NS on the short stretch of line 
Amsterdam Haarlem (17 Km)
Lovers Rail ceases rail services in 1999.
Transitional contract between the Dutch State and NS, now State owned but independent.
No infrastructure charges are levied. Subsidies from State to NS are gradually reduced.
Unprofitable services are identified and contracted separately to NS or private operators with reduction in subsidies
NS is reorganized into a holding 
with a commercial part and 
three task organizations, all 
remaining state owned.
The commercial part includes:
- NS Reizigers (the former
passenger division)
- NS Cargo (the former freight
division)
- NS Station (developing and
operating stations)
- NS Vastgoed (real estate)
The three task organization
are independent of the rest of 
NS and directed and paid for 
directly by the ministry of 
transport:
RailNed: licensing operators, 
allocating capacity, overseeing 
railway safety
NS Verkeersleiding: traffic 





Report by the Wijffels 
Committee that sets out the 
reforms on rail organisation in 
the Netherlands.
The report makes the point that 
passenger transport should 
become a commercial and not a 
subsidised activity and that 
infrastructure construction and 
maintenance should remain the 
responsiblity of the State
NS Reizigers (single operator)
Experimental public tendering of services on some peripheral railway lines
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Figure 12. Milestones in the evolution of institutions in the Dutch railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained 
by collecting information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: van de Velde (2005), van de Velde (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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Open access Open access
NS Reizigers (single 
operator)
Exp. tendering 
1995 Dutch railway reform
aims: increasing the market share of rail, 
reducing its cost on the State, and remove 
dependence of NS on subsidies as well as 
directing its attention to customers.
The initial push is given by directive 91/440 
with the Wijffels committee issuing a report for 
redesigning the relationship between railway 
operator and State. The government acts
following the content of the report. Operations 
become a non-subsidised activity and 
infrastructure a responsibility of the 
government. No introduction of competition is 
explicitly foreseen but in practice it is made 
possible since the current transport law is 
based on "market initiative"
The government in 1999 issues a policy document ("The 
third century of rail") pointing to a rail  reform and to have 
10 years' concessions for the management of the network 
and for railway operations. The government believes there 
should be a period for the railways to settle into the new 
framework of separation of the IM without the introduction 
of competition. 
Parliamentary works, however, take until  2004: the new 
Railway and Concession Act is approved in April  2003 but 
agreement on the text of the concessions is reached only in 
December 2004.
"The third century of rail" document
envisaged the privatisation of NS
(then abandoned)
2002: full institutional separation of NS is enacted 
and ProRail (fully owned by the State but separate 
from NS) is set up as of January 2003 by joining the 
three task organisations 
From 1 January 2005 -and for 10 years- ProRail is 
the infrastructure manager of the Dutch network 
by direct award of the concession (also the for part 
of the network where local authorities contract 
services).
In the Government proposal the concession was to 
be unlimited but the Parliament sets it to 10 years, 
in line with the duration of the concession for 
operations on the core network
By concession performance indicator levels are 
proposed by ProRail every year and agreed upon by 
the Ministry after consultations
NS is reorganised as a group and divided in 
commercial and non commercial activities. 2/2
The non-commercial part of NS operations is 
organised into three task organisations 
responsible for licensing, capacity allocation, 
safety advise to Ministry (Railned); traffic 
control and real time information (NS 
Verkeersleiding) and construction and 
maintenance of infrastrcuture (NS 
Railinfrabeheer). The cost of the task 
organisations is covered directly by the State 
and they have to act independently of NS even 
though they are part of the NS holding
Following several years of experimental tendering of 
local railway services by some Provinces (while all 
Provinces contract out bus services) competence for 
several local services  on peripeharal lines is 
transferred to provinces with the  mandate to  have 
public tenders. Funds for operations come from the 
State
Progressive reduction of subsidies during transitional 
contract 1996-2000 (in 2000 no subsidies) and 
separation of non-profitable lines from the NS network
General conditions make possible the entrance of 
open access operators. But the legislative framework is 
not entirely apt. Operator Lovers Rail tries to compete 
on a short stretch of rail and on weekend trains. It 
would aim for services on a longer line but it is not 
given permission. Operations cease in 1999
1996-2000 no infrastructure charges 
1999: the National Audit Office finds that the 
Ministry did not perform properly its supervisory 
and steering role of the task organizations.
Permitted intervention by NS board lead to 
improvements in efficiency of task organisations 
but the National Audit Office deems that their 
independence could not be guaranteed. Remedial 
action by the Ministry required and overdue.
2000 "Wet Personenvervoer", the new passenger 
transport law, introduces competitive tendering in all 
public transport.
The law abandons the principle of "market initiative" 
for the "authority initiative"therefore excluding open 
access
NS is reorganised as a group and divided in 
commercial and non commercial activities 1/2.
NS Reizigers, the passenger part of the concern, 
has to act commercially. Costs are to be covered 
from revenues of operations by using internal 
cross-subsidy
Progressive reduction of subsidies during transitional 
contract 1996-2000 (in 2000 no subisidies) and 
separation of non-profitable lines from the NS network
1996-2000 no infrastructure charges
NS identifies, in accordance with the Ministry of 
Transport, which lines may be operated commercially 
(recurring to cross-subsidy among lines).Loss making 
lines are contracted separately by the Ministry to NS.
Testing of decentralisation and tendering of rail 
passenger services continues
In 2008 an evaluation of the railway system required 
by law finds that:
• the structure of the sector needs to be put to 
better use;
• patronage is increasing;
• transport operators and the infrastructure 
manager are primarily responsible for day to day 
operations
• the legal system could work better
therefore no radical reorganisation is required (van 
de Velde, 2010).
While law is discussed, NS operates on
transitional contracts following MoUs.
Punctuality and customer satisfaction falls in 2000 
and there is wide protest by railway unions on 
reorganization of duties following proposed 
reroganization of NS.
In 2001 NS does not achieve relaxed performance 
targets and senior management resigns. Government 
refocuses policy on railways.
1 January 2005 NS is directly awarded the concession 
to operater services for 10 years
By concession, performance indicator levels are 
proposed by NS every year and agreed by the 
Ministry.






Sweden is likely the European country with the most liberalised railway system and that 
started relevant reforms earliest. In fact, the first step, the separation of the State railways into 
IM and railway operator, dates back to 1988. As of October 2010 any service may be offered 
on open access grounds, even if overlapping with services funded under PSOs. A book by 
Gunnar Alexandersson, appeared in 2010, on the evolution of the land passenger transport 
sector in Sweden and titled “the accidental deregulation” clearly states that liberalisation was 
not an intention of the initial reforms, though those reforms made it possible. 
For such a complete change, institutions and their roles have evolved during the years and the 
current actors, some of which appeared or were reshaped very recently, are listed in the tables 
below (see also Appendix I). 
Table 31. Selected statistics, Sweden (2005-2009) 
Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Km of rail 11,017 11,020 10,972 11,032 11,138 - 
Train km, in thousand 127,683 131,453 135,904 142,468 135,812 138,588 
Pax km, in million 8.94 9.62 10.26 11.10 11.30 11.22 
T km, in million 21.68 22.27 23.25 22.92 20.38 23.46 
Source: Eurostat, Transport in Figures 2011 (EC, 2011) 
 
Table 32. Summary of provisions for access to the Swedish rail market 
 Passenger services 
Framework phased out in October 2010 
Profitable lines operated by SJ AB (the incumbent RU) under monopoly right 
(ceased from October 2010, see below). 
Open access provision for night services, commercial weekend services, 
chartered trains, international services 
Unprofitable long-distance and regional services contracted by PTAs to RUs on 
a competition for the track basis (whether a line is unprofitable is defined by SJ 
AB) 
Framework phased in as of October 2010 
Open access for all passenger services, including those previously reserved for 
SJ AB (the incumbent RU) 
Actual effects from the 2011 timetable 
Unprofitable long-distance and regional services contracted out respectively by 
Trafikverket and by PTAs as before (from 1 January 2012 being replaced by 
Regional Transport Authorities) 
Freight services Open access since 1996 




Table 33. Regulatory institutions relevant to the Swedish railway market 
Economic Regulator  
Transportstyrelsen (Swedish Transport Agency) since 2009, when it has 
replaced the previous Järnvägsstyrelsen (Swedish Rail Agency) – established in 
2004 – and other modal Agencies 
Safety Regulator 
Transportstyrelsen (Swedish Transport Agency) since 2009, inheriting the 
remit of Järnvägsstyrelsen which, in turn, had replaced the previous Railway 
Inspectorate in 2004 
Other Regulatory Agencies 
involved (if any) 
Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority)  
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 34. Main information about the Economic (and Safety) Regulator of the Swedish rail 
industry 
 Name of Economic (and 
safety) Regulator 
Transportstyrelsen (from 2009, previously Järnvagässtyrelsen) 
Name in English Swedish Transport Agency 
Creation of Agency  2004 (as Järnvagässtyrelsen) 
Nature of Regulatory Agency  Independent Agency under the Ministry of Transport 
Scope of intervention  All modes 
Role and mission  Fair regulation + economic emphasis + Rail Competition Authority 
Composition  7-member council  
Sanctioning powers  
Decisions of Transportstyrelsen are legally binding and it has the power of 
imposing fines. There are no fixed rules on the level of the fines and they are 
determined so that it is more expensive to continue paying fines than to 
comply with the decisions. However, before a fine is imposed, a court has to 
decide whether the fine shall be imposed and at what level. 
Enquiry and information 
powers  
Important  
Relation to Competition 
Authority  
Cooperative 
Budget  6 million euros annually  
Personnel  65 FTE in the Rail Department  
Relationship to Parliament  Annual report + quarterly meetings  
Source: Compiled by authors  
 
Table 35. Infrastructure management and path allocation in the Swedish railway market 
 Infrastructure 
management 
Trafikverket (Swedish Transport Authority) since April 2010 (replaces the 
previous Railway Authority and other modal Authorities) owns and manage 
most (approximately 80%) of the rail network 
Other main IMs are: A-Train, Öresund Bridge Consortium, Port of Gothenburg, 
Inlandsbanan AB 
Path allocation 
Trafikverket (Swedish Transport Authority) or relevant IM; path requests over 
the infrastructure of more than one IM need be submitted to one only 
Traffic control Trafikverket (Swedish Transport Authority) 





















































Source: Compiled by authors, adapted from Merkert et al. (2008)  
SJ, the incumbent and State owned, RU nowadays concentrates on passenger transport only 
and is one of the nine passenger only operators present. Several have operated over the years 
since the beginning of the reforms and have later disappeared. There are also some 15 
operators dedicated to freight transport, among which Green Cargo, the incumbent, set up in 
2001 from the freight division of the former State railways. Both SJ and Green Cargo are still 
the main operators in their sector. 
The main actors in Swedish railway infrastructure are Trafikverket, Jernhusen and the 
Regional Authorities. Trafikverket (successor of Banverket and other administrations since 1 
April 2010
15
) is the National Authority owning and maintaining the State’s rail infrastructure 
(80% of the total), and being responsible for traffic control. Trafikverket owns also a number 
of stations and simple stops (others being in the ownership of Jernhusen or of Regional 
Authorities). 
Trafikverket gets its resources by grants decided by the Parliament for periods of several 
years and from track access charges. As of 2004 track access charges, set as marginal costs 
for operations and maintenance, covered 11% of total fund used by Banverket for operations 
and maintenance and are currently scheduled to increase. 
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 On 1st April 2010 Trafikverket (the Swedish Transport Administration) took over the activities of the Swedish 
Rail Administration (Banverket), the Swedish Road Administration, sections of the Swedish Maritime 
Administration, and the Swedish Institute for Transport Communication and Analysis. On the previous day 
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At the end of 2009 the production unit of Banverket (as it was still called then) has been 
privatized as Infranord AB. While Trafikverket manages the State owned infrastructure, there 
are a number of other IMs, the major ones as defined in (Järnvagässtyrelsen, 2008) being A-
Train, Öresund Bridge Consortium, Port of Gothenburg, Inlandsbanan AB. Other 
infrastructure is managed by Regional Authorities, ports, factories and municipalities. In fact, 
at the end of 2008 there were 449 IMs, the majority of these being industries with sidings 
(Transportstyrelsen, 2010). 
Jernhusen is the State owned manager of railway real estate and owns over 100 stations, 12 
freight terminals, and facilities for the maintenance of rolling stock. Jernhusen also invests in 
real estate located close to stations. Regional Authorities own and maintain some stations and 
stops. Many freight terminals are owned by several different actors. 
Trafikverket is also responsible for procuring by competitive tendering interregional 
passenger services by all modes and coordinating services procured by Local Transport 
Authorities. It took over this role in 2010 from Rikstrafiken which had been the multimodal 
National Passenger Transport Authority since 1998. Rikstrafiken has been phased out when 
its remit passed to Trafikverket. 
The County Passenger Transport Authorities (CPTA - Trafikhuvudmän) are responsible for 
characterizing and either providing or procuring unprofitable bus or rail passenger services in 
their respective counties. Rail services are procured by competitive tendering (competition 
for the tracks), mostly using gross cost contracts. Some CPTAs work together to procure 
through services that are useful to each of them separately. Joining forces to organise public 
transport across county border has just become readily possible with 1st January 2012new 
Swedish Public Transport Act, whereby Regional Transport Authority will replace CPTAs.  
Other actors that should be mentioned are Transitio and ASJ. The former is a company owned 
by several CPTA and leasing rolling stock to operators winning the tenders for local services, 
as well as providing heavy maintenance for leased rolling stock. ASJ forms part of the State 
owned railway companies and leases rolling stock for long distance services to companies 
running PSOs for Trafikverket (and formerly, Rikstrafiken). 
Regulation  
The two actors in regulation of railways in Sweden are Transportstyrelsen (Economic and 
Safety Regulator) and Konkurrensverket (the Swedish Competition Authority). 
Transportstyrelsen is the Swedish Transport Agency and was established on 1st January 
2009. It has replaced Järnvägsstyrelsen (the Swedish Rail Agency), the Railway Regulator, 
which had been set up by the railway law of 2004, to enact the regulatory functions required 
by the EU, as well as other modal Agencies. Transportstyrelsen has departments concerned 
with different modes of transport (rail, road, maritime, civil aviation), it maintains the traffic 
registry and has a development department (dealing e.g., with issues relating to human factors 
and technology).  
The railway department of Transportstyrelsen issues licenses and it acts as Economic and 
Safety Regulator on railway, light rail and underground systems. The aim of 
Transportstyrelsen as Economic Regulator is to promote an efficient railway market with fair 
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competition and equal conditions of access. They supervise track access and relevant charges, 
capacity allocation, and may be called upon to settle disputes e.g., on allocation of capacity 
by the IM, on the charges or on the provision of services. 
Transportstyrelsen has been active in its role as dispute settler on several cases. Reports from 
investigations are available in Swedish on its website: there have been three decisions in 2008 
and two in 2006. The decisions of Transportstyrelsen are legally binding and it has the power 
of imposing fines. Lewerentz (personal communication, 2011) clarified that there are no fixed 
rules on the level of the fines and they are determined so that it is more expensive to continue 
paying fines than to comply with the decisions. However, before a fine is imposed, a court 
has to decide whether the fine shall be imposed and at what level. On competition monitoring 
Transportstyrelsen works carrying out routine duties (e.g., an annual sector analysis of the 
RUs), and further monitoring either of their own initiative or on the request of actors on the 
rail market that observe competition limiting phenomena. 
In the area of competition, the Swedish Transport Agency cooperates with Konkurrensverket, 
the Swedish Competition Authority, whose main role is to ensure that parties abide by the 
Swedish Competition Act (issued in 1993).  
As Safety Regulator, Transportstyrelsen has inherited from its predecessor Järnvägsstyrelsen 
the duties of the former Railway Inspectorate set up in 1991, and is therefore concerned with 
safety on the railway, light rail and underground systems. They approve infrastructure, 
vehicles and technical systems before they may be put into service. Transportstyrelsen 
approves also station names and education/training plans for railway personnel where safety 
is concerned and carries out market surveillance to ensure that technical systems adhere to 
TSIs. 
Competition and related regulatory action 
As for the passenger market Nash and Nilsson (2009), while recognising the dominance of SJ 
on the passenger market, suggest that there is substantial competitive pressure. Their point 
relates to the fact that savings on contracts have been obtained and maintained and that the 
literature has never agreed on how many bidders are required to make for an acceptable 
degree of competition. They also remark that it is acknowledged that the savings in costs 
when the number of bidders increases beyond three is not very large. 
Järnvägsstyrelsen, now Transportstyrelsen, the Economic and Safety Regulator, in its 
“Sector analysis of railway undertakings” (consulted ones are the 2006-2007 issue – based on 
2007 data – and, the latest, the 2008-2009 issue based on 2008 data) on the basis of different 
considerations has a less optimistic view of the Swedish rail market. In those documents the 
Regulator remarks the presence of barriers to entry in both the passenger and freight rail 
market (although it should be noted that the market analysed retained the exclusive right for 
SJ AB to run profitable interregional services, now phased out). The same reports noted that 
there is no effective competition in either the passenger or the freight market since both are 
dominated by the incumbent, respectively SJ AB and Green Cargo AB, which means that 
competition is weak (the ideal competitive environment would see several competitors of 
similar importance) and there is “gentlemanly competition”. This is noted in particular for the 
freight market over 10 years after the introduction of open access. Indeed, Alexandersson and 
Hultén (2009) remark that buyers of freight services have been slow to make use of the new 
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competitive market and when they have used it has often been aimed at making the 
incumbent Green Cargo lower its prices, rather than actually switching to another operator. 
The recent step of opening the market of all passenger services starts a new transformation of 
the Swedish rail system as it implies the reconsideration of the way services procured by 
public Agencies are managed, also accounting for the fact that current contracts will expire at 
different points in time. Services that are currently subsidized will likely continue to be in the 
future although whether a line is unprofitable will no longer be decided by SJ, as in the past. 
The open market of long distance passenger transport might also bring about new issues in 
path allocation. This is possibly the reason for the recent introduction of auction as a 
mechanism for path allocation in case of conflicts on lines declared as congested, and should 
other methods fail (Trafikverket, 2010). 
Transportstryrelsen or its predecessor Järnvägsstyrelsen made 8 decisions on disputes from 
2005 onwards, as reported on the Agency website. It also made a determination on the 
conditions of access agreements. The dispute resolutions concerned for instance access fees 
setting for ports, the response times set in the network statement by the IM, the information 
content of the network statement, allocation for capacity by the IM. 
Konkurrensverket (KKV), the Swedish Competition Authority established in 1992, examined 
several cases related to the railway market. Many of the cases examined by KKV are related 
to alleged anti-competitive collaboration or information sharing between RUs. 
In one case the behaviour of SJ AB has been investigated by the Competition Authority, 
which in 2000 fined it for predatory behaviour for submitting an under-priced bid to a CPTA 
in order to exclude a competitor. 
KKV also expresses opinions on Government proposals. For instance, in 2004 and 2007 they 
advised against establishing joint operating rights on the West coast of Sweden in the belief 
that such transformation would create a large monopoly endangering viable transport 
operations in its vicinity, limit the possibility of establishing commercially viable traffic, limit 
competitive solutions and would be a major departure from the railway operation model 
being established. In this case the Government did not follow KKV view. 
In annual reports KKV makes its points towards a more liberalised rail market. For instance in 
the 2004 annual report it recognizes the new solutions brought by new operators, the reduced 
costs due to procurement of services and argues for the end of the privilege for SJ have a 
monopoly over long-distance profitable services (and this is a recurrent call over annual 
reports). KKV also pushes for reduction of State involvement in services, again in 2004, 
suggesting that TGOJ, a freight company linked to the State owned freight incumbent Green 
Cargo, should be privatized. Moreover, KKV has lamented the lack of an actual international 
railway market (due, in its view, to different standards) whose existence would possibly bring 
to Sweden new entrants from abroad. In the 2006 annual report, KKV pointed to a number of 
areas in need of development, in both the passenger and the freight sectors, such as vehicle 
supply, access to service and maintenance facilities, terminals and other joint functions as 
well as capacity distribution and its supervision. 
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Services provided under PSOs 
Competitive tendering of PSO passenger rail transport services in Sweden started in 1989 
with regional lines, and continued then in 1992 with unprofitable long-distance services. 
Tendering of railway lines has been made possible by provisions that did not aim for it but 
were intended to separate the national RU operations and infrastructure to reduce the burden 
of its deficit on the public purse. As noted by Alexandersson and Hultén (2009), tenders have 
since proven a successful means to lower costs and increase efficiency, and legislation to 
frame tendering practices has been introduced with time (the same authors remark that 
procurements was not initially subject to any strict regulation). Contracted rail services now 
cover most of both regional and interregional lines. 
There have been two major changes very recently: SJ, the incumbent and still the main 
Swedish RU, has lost its monopoly on profitable lines as of October 2010 and the market is 
open. On 1st January 2011 Trafikverket has taken over the responsibilities for contracting 
long distance services that since 1998 were with Rikstrafiken, the National Passenger 
Transport Authority. One reason for founding Rikstrafiken had been to have an Authority 
covering all modes of transport. With establishment of Trafikverket, acting across transport 
modes, there was no longer need for a separate Agency (Lewerentz, 2011, personal 
communication). As already remarked in other sections, further changes may be expected, for 
instance due to the possible need to clarify the interface between PSO and commercial 
services. This stems also from the fact that, as part of the monopoly just ceased, SJ would 
characterise the services that it considered unprofitable and dismiss them, at which stage they 
would become candidates for PSO subsidies, which could be for the continuation of the 
services by rail or another mode. Now services subsidised and contracted by Public 
Authorities and commercial services are on the same level. 
There are two different and separate markets for PSO rail passenger contracts in Sweden: 
local services and long-distance services. As told in Alexandersson and Hultén (2008) the 
beginning of public procurement of unprofitable passenger services on local railway lines has 
been marked by the Transport Policy Act of 1988 which, besides separating railway 
operations and infrastructure in different bodies, transferred the Authority over running 
unprofitable passenger services on local railway lines from the State to the CPTAs 
(Trafikhuvudmän). Those had already been operating for almost ten years, since 1979, to 
coordinate and, in some cases, procure local bus services. In 1988 they acquired the wider 
responsibility of characterizing and either providing or procuring unprofitable bus or rail 
passenger services in their respective counties. CPTAs received also the necessary rolling 
stock as well as funds equivalent to the subsidies previously claimed by SJ to run the services 
for which they were given responsibility. Vertical separation of railways and transfer of 
responsibilities for unprofitable regional services to CPTAs opened the door to contracting 
those services to operators different from SJ with public tenders. The first new Swedish 
passenger RU, BK Tåg, started operations in 1990 in that framework. The second, Sydtåg, 
followed in 1995. It should be noted that not all the CPTAs initially went for tendering their 
rail services and some chose to negotiate long term contracts directly with SJ. 
Some CPTAs work together to procure through services that are useful to each of them 
separately. Moreover, some CPTAs joined forces to acquire Transitio, a company set up in 
1998 that owns or leases the rolling stock for regional services and procures its financing, 
production (aiming for standardization) and maintenance, and then leases the rolling stock to 
the RUs which have been awarded passenger rail service contracts (RUs remain responsible 
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for light maintenance). The provision of rolling stock to RUs obviates a possible barrier to 
entry, is aimed to achieving economies of scale in rolling stock supply, and makes up for the 
misalignment in the duration of transport service contracts and working life of rolling stock 
(considering that fact that rolling stock may have a working life of more than 30 years while 
contact for operators may end after less than 10). It is worthwhile noting that, while rolling 
stock was initially only transferred to CPTAs, in 2001 the national Government started 
subsidising the purchase of new rolling stock by the counties. 
Procurement of services by CPTAs is characterized mostly by gross-cost contracts. Planning 
and marketing of the services, as well as decisions on ticket price levels, remain the 
responsibility of the CPTAs. However, sometimes the operator receives a share of the 
revenues in order to stimulate performance (Alexandersson and Hultén, 2009). Otherwise, 
systems of penalties are commonly used. Contract periods vary between 3-5 years, but there 
is often a clause making it possible to extend the period by 1-3 years if results are 
satisfactory. 
Following the vertical separation of SJ in 1988, long-distance rail services, after dismissal by 
SJ and if considered worthy of subsidy by the Parliament, were initially contracted again to 
SJ by a State negotiator following annual negotiations (instead of covering the deficit of SJ as 
a whole, the State had thus a clearer view of funds’ destination). In 1992, after a change in 
regulation, it became admissible for the State negotiator to use public procurement for inter-
regional railway lines (in a similarly way to that possible for regional lines), and until 2000 
all those services were awarded by competitive tendering to SJ. In 1998 a new transport 
policy bill had provided for a new National Passenger Transport Authority, Rikstrafiken, to 
become responsible for procuring long-distance transport services (by all modes of public 
transport). Rikstrafiken commenced operations in 1999 taking over from the State negotiator, 
with the aim of coordinating the services tendered by the CPTAs. As mentioned, Trafiverket 
has in turn taken over the remit of Rikstrafiken as of the beginning of 2011, and Rikstrafiken 
has ceased to exist. Since the change is very recent, practices by Rikstrafiken are still relevant 
to this report. 
Rikstrafiken has established a practice of using net-cost contracts for long distance services. 
Bidding operators have to forecast costs and revenues and bid for the subsidy of the 
difference, and are able to influence the service more than under gross-cost contracts. 
However, price levels, minimum supply, and quality requirements cannot be changed during 
the execution of the contract. As reported by Alexandersson and Hultén (2009), those 
parameters are also used in the evaluation of bids in the tender, which is therefore not based 
only on the lowest request of subsidy. Recently Rikstrafiken has published the weights 
attached to each parameter so as to enable bidders to have an understanding of the strength of 
their bid. Contract periods for long-distance services have been initially as short as 1 year 
(due to short term commitment to keep services by the State) and have been then extended to 
5 years. Duration is now between 3 and 12 years with an option for additional years, typically 
activated. 
Rolling stock for services contracted out by Rikstrafiken is typically leased by ASJ, the 
administration remaining from the former vertically integrated SJ. 
Contracts generally include bonus-malus mechanisms based on performance but deficits not 
foreseen by the operator when bidding for the service cannot be refunded by the procuring 
Authority. 
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The literature points both to advantages and issues with procurement of rail PSOs in Sweden. 
Among the advantages are innovations (in rolling stock, management, ticket systems, 
working practices), increases in patronage, reduced subsidies. Available data (see Table 36 
below) show the savings obtained. There have also been reductions in subsidy level for lines 
procured by the State even before actual entry of new companies. Alexandersson and Hultén 
(2009) note that on average CPTAs’ tenders have attracted more bidders (2-3) than the 
State’s tenders (1-2), and it has generally been difficult for firms to win tenders for a specific 
line of traffic system twice in a row. 
Table 36. Examples of effects on subsidies in competitive tenders 
Lines procured by CPTAs (regional lines) tender no. Year subsidy effect 
Network in county of Jönköping etc. 1 1989 -21% 
2 1993 -25% 
3 1997 Minor increase 
Ystad-Simrishamn 1 1995 -18% 
2 1998 -10% 
Herrljunga-Hallsberg 1 1994 -10% 
2 1999 -3% 
3 2002 Minor increase 
Borlänge-Malung 1 1991 n.a. 
2 1994 -20% 
3 1996 Minor 
Uppsala-Tierp 1 1991 n.a. 
2 1999 -20% 
Stockholm, commuter trains 1 1998 -32% 
2 2005 +10% 
Lines procured by the State (interregional lines) tender no. Year subsidy effect 
All lines 1-2 1992-93 -21% 
3-6 1994-98 No increase 
7 1999 -28% 
Northern trains 7 1999 -20% 
10 2002 -42% 
Source: Alexandersson and Hultén (2009) 
 
Among the issues with the existing systems, Alexandersson and Hultén (2009) characterise 
unfulfilled bids, the predatory behaviour of some bidders, and sometimes worsened 
possibilities for passengers to find connecting journeys involving several operators. They also 
noted that SJ monopoly on profitable services (phased out in October 2010) affected the 
general competitive situation and the prospects for the development of the sector. SJ 
involvement was an issue when it was in charge of providing rolling stock and access to 
stations and terminal buildings while there have been improvements as those services have 
been taken over by other organizations. Those issues were felt directly by the public 
procurement Authorities, which had to reach agreements with SJ on the costs of those 
services. 
Tenders have suffered from scarcity of bidders, sometimes only one or two, therefore 
possibly hindering a good functioning procurement. Unfulfilled contracts have resulted in 
renegotiations, reduction of services, and substitution of rail services with buses. Two 
companies involved in regional services went bankrupt (and even SJ risked bankruptcy in 
2002-2003 after placing optimistic bids). 
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There have also been issues with strategic behaviour on the part of SJ, refusing coordinate 
ticketing with other operators or providing lower quality connections with the services by 
another operator (this was the case after BK Tåg won the tender of Stångådalsbanan in 2002). 
Evolution of institutions 
Sweden can claim to have been a precursor in railway reforms and market opening in Europe, 
starting with the 1988 separation of infrastructure and operations of the national railways 
until the decision taken in 2009 by the national Parliament to open the market for long 
distance rail passenger services as of October 2010, with full market opening for rail freight 
already effective from 1996. The changes have been gradual over the years, and the 
development has not been initiated with the aim of introducing competition but to solve the 
State Railways’ financial problems. Much of the reform process has also been independent of 
EU development as Sweden joined the EU in 1995. 
SJ now reports profits but in 2003 the State had to transfer a large sum of money to it in order 
to avoid its bankruptcy. Observers (e.g., Alexandersson and Hultén, 2005) note that this was 
due to the fact that the 2001 reform was underfinanced but some (e.g., Nash and Nilsson, 
2009) note also that one alleged reason for the bad shape of SJ balance sheet was related to 
having won contracts on non-commercial services on bids below their cost. 
Entrance of new operators on long distance contracted services has not happened until 2000. 
Whenever competitors appeared, SJ reduced its own bid during the process in order to keep 
other operators from entering the market. Observers also note that, more in general, there 
were initially several too low bids for unprofitable regional services. 
Along with deciding for full market opening of passenger services, in 2009 the Government 
started looking into a new framework and legislation for public transport. In spring 2009 a 
Government Committee suggested a wide liberalisation of services with Local Authorities 
waiting for companies to take on commercial services before tendering subsidized ones 
(Westin, 2009). The proposal has not gone on. While there will be a general market opening, 
commercial services will not take precedence onto subsidised ones. In such a set-up 
information sharing about services and their operations is to become even more important, 
also for travellers. 
The market opening for commercial passenger services may possibly require a general re-
thinking of the set-up also in view of the interfaces with subsidized services (now run on 
contracts that expire at different points in time) that dominate as they are active on 
unprofitable lines, which are the majority of the Swedish railway lines. 
There seem to be also the necessity for adjustments to allow for easier entries into the market, 
and easier access to rolling stock and services. The 2007 “Sector analysis of railway 
undertakings” by the Economic Regulator Järnvägsstyrelsen concluded with 
recommendations to lower barriers to entry investigating the feasibility for actions to widen 
the possibilities of purchasing or renting used rolling stock (investigating the possibility that 
rolling stock dismissed by SJ or Green Cargo is not scrapped but put on the market either on 
sale or for rent, should there be request). In fact the issue of the access to suitable rolling 
stock is reported by Alexandersson and Hultén (2009) as the item more discussed during the 
process of liberalisation, an issue also mentioned by the Everis report (Everis, 2010). The 
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2007 recommendations by Järnvägsstyrelsen also mentioned the idea of establishing an 
independent company for shunting and marshalling operations, since at the time of the 
analysis those operations were completely in the hands of Green Cargo – the freight 
incumbent – therefore smaller companies, which do not have the possibility of purchasing 
locomotives for the purpose, would find themselves dependent on their main competitor. In 
wider terms, issues with access to infrastructure are also mentioned in the Everis report 
(2010) that tells about problems had by one operator with accessing Jernhusen-owned 
railway stations (Jernhusen is the railway real estate operator, State owned) for selling ticket 
and marketing services (putting up posters and signs). 
The main events directing the evolution of the Swedish rail sector are recalled in Table 37. 
The following two charts offer an overview of the institutional evolution in Sweden from 
1988 to 2011 (Figure 14). From that figure we characterised six milestones in the evolution 





Table 37. Brief account of the main points on the evolution of the regulatory and competition 




The Swedish State Railways (SJ) are vertically separated into: 
- SJ: operator (that retains capacity allocation and traffic control) with monopoly over 
profitable long distance passenger traffic 
- Banverket: IM  
Both remain State owned. 
CPTAs become responsible for providing unprofitable regional passenger services and 
receive relevant rolling stock and subsidies. They may use public procurement to provide 
services. 
Long distance unprofitable services are run by SJ on the basis of annual negotiations with 
the State for subsidies 
1989-1990 First services procured by a CPTA with entrance of a new railway operator 
1992 Public procurement allowed for unprofitable long distance passenger services 
1995 
Sweden joins the EU 
SJ sells ASG, a leading truck transport operator, to follow the instruction of concentrating on 
being a rail operator 
1996 
Traffic control and capacity allocation transferred from SJ (incumbent) to Banverket (IM) 
Open access for rail freight services 
SJ sells Swebus (to Stagecoach), the largest bus transport operator in Sweden, to follow the 
instruction of concentrating on being a rail operator 
1998 Transport 
Policy Bill 
Rikstrafiken is created to take over from the State’s negotiator the procurement of 
interregional public transport, including rail services 
2000 Railway 
Bill 
SJ divided in several companies. Among them: 
- SJ AB, passenger operator 
- Green Cargo AB, freight operator 
2004 
Set up of Järnvägsstyrelsen, the Swedish Railway Agency, acting as both Economic and 
Safety Regulator 
2007 Liberalization of provision of charter and night train services 
2009 
Järnvägsstyrelsen merges with other modal Regulators to form the Swedish transport 
Agency, Transportstyrelsen 
Open market for holiday and weekend passenger services (1st July) 
Open market for international services (1st October) 
A bill opens access from Oct 2010 to profitable long-distance passenger services, so far a SJ 
monopoly 
Banverket production unit is privatized and becomes Infranord AB 
2010 
Banverket, the IM, joins other modal transport administrations to become Trafikverket 
Trafikverket becomes also responsible for contracting long distance unprofitable services 
under PSOs. Rikstrafiken, which had this role previously, is phased out. 
October. Formal opening of market for all passenger services including profitable long-
distance services and services that may overlap with others funded under PSOs. The actual 
first effects to come into being with the Dec 2011 timetable. 
The Arlanda line is exempted by the opening since it is run with exclusive right by A-Train 
AB as part of a Build Operate Transfer contract 
2012 
CPTAs are reshaped into Regional Transport Authorities and gain more freedom of action 
(they may join forces to organise services together without asking the Ministry) 
Source: Compiled by authors, (main sources: Andresson and Hultén, 2005; Alexandersson and Hultén 2008; 
Alexandersson and Hultén, 2010, Alexandersson et al. 2012)  
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Legend for the overview of the institutional evolution 
The overview of the institutional evolution is a matrix composed by as many columns as the years 
between 1988 and 2011 plus an initial column for the situation before 1988 and a final column for 
planned changes after 2011 that are already known. 
There are four horizontal bands or clusters of rows. 
The top cluster of rows includes the railway market set-up over the years. The chart reports separately 
the set-up for the passenger rail market, divided by long-distance and regional/local, and for the 
freight market. Different market set-ups are depicted by coloured bands spanning the columns 
representing the relevant years. Colours have mostly the role of making changes visible. Wherever a 
market set-up is the same or similar, the colour is the same. Alternatively, different colours are used. 
However, for this cluster of rows only, a homogenous colour coding has been used across charts for 
different countries: light yellow is associated to legal monopoly, orange to concessions or franchises 
(a separate band indicates the possibility of open access) and light blue refers to open access. Cases 
where PSO services and open access (may) co-exist are indicated by horizontal orange and light blue 
stripes. 
The second and largest set of rows refers to each kind of actor/railway body whose evolution is 
depicted along the rows. The focus is on the passenger sector, since this is the focus of this project. 
Therefore, while there are rows regarding the incumbent and new entrants in the freight markets, the 
rows about station and about rolling stock provisions refer to the passenger sector only. Several actors 
may correspond to a kind of actor and this is written or depicted along the row. Actors or types of 
actors are depicted by coloured rectangles. A continuous contour of the rectangle indicates a public 
body; a dashed contour indicates a private body. Colours of rectangles have no particular meaning but 
have the role of making changes visible. Wherever a body is the same, the colour is the same.  
Alternatively, different colours are used. Names of bodies are written only on the rectangles depicting 
their first appearance. 
Large rectangles with dashed blue contour spanning across the first and second set of rows identify 
the milestones in institutional evolution that are singled out for use in the next chart. 
A third band includes only one row and refers to the sequence of Governments, the relevant dates and 
the main figures. 
The bottom band, with columns indicated with alternate white and grey background, includes text 
rectangles reporting main facts within the rail industry or with an influence on the rail industry. Facts 
are linked to market set-ups or actors where immediately relevant. 
 
Legend for the summary of the milestones in institutional evolution 
In Figure 15 the milestones of the institutional evolution have been singled out of the previous figure 
and brief texts explaining the changes occurred have been added between each pair of milestones. 
Therefore the picture depicts the milestones by using the same structure in columns and rows used 
previously. However, while each column refers to a particular year or cluster of years, the distance 
between columns is not to scale and is simply to leave room for the details of the changes. These are 
contained in arrows pointing to the actors resulting from the changes or affected by them. 
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Figure 14. Evolution of institutions in the Swedish railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting 
information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: Nilsson (1995), Alexandersson and Hultén (2005), Alexandersson and Hultén (2008), Alexandersson and Hultén (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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air transport following Icelanding 
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for profitable long distance 
services is phased out
Practical effect l ikely to be seen 
from Dec  2012 timetable
The Arlanda line is exempted by 
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Open market for international 
services (1 October)
Banverket production unit is 
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AB
Open market for holiday and 
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Järnvägsstyrelsen merges with 
other modal regulators to form 
the Swedish Transport Agency, 
Transportstyrelsen
Swemaint and Euromaint sold to 
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Liberalization of provision of 
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previously SJ monopoly
Railway law
Järnvägsstyrelsen, the Swedish 
Railway Agency, acting as both 
economic and safety regulator for 
railways is set up
To avoid SJ bankrupcy, the State 
intervenes by giving it  a large sum 
of money
2000 Railway Bill
SJ divided in several companies 
(with effect from 2001):
- SJ AB, passenger operator
- Green Cargo AB, freight operator
- ASJ (Affärsverket), a lessor of 
roll ing stock for long distance 
transport
- Swemaint, vehicle maintenance
- Euromaint, vehicle maintenance
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services
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and buildings used for train 
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with SJ are transferred to 
Banverket
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public transport, including rail 
services
Open access for rail  freight services
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allocation transferred from SJ 
(incumbent RU) to Banverket (IM)
Common facilties to be made 
availabale to the operators under 
commercial and non-discriminating 
terms
SJ sells Swebus (to Stagecoach), 
the largest bus transport operator 
in Sweden, to follow the 
instruction from the State to 
concentrate on being a rail  
operator issued in 1995
The State orders SJ to concentrate 
on being a rail  operator
SJ sells ASG, a leading truck 
transport operator
Bill  on far-reaching deregulation is 
passed in Parliament in May
After the elections and the change 
of government in September the 
deregulation is postponed
The Arlanda line is tendered as a 
Build Operate Transfer contract
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Figure 15. Milestones in the evolution of institutions in the Swedish railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained 
by collecting information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the following: Nilsson (1995), Alexandersson and Hultén (2005), Alexandersson and Hultén (2008), Alexandersson and Hultén (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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1988 Transport Policy Act
SJ is vertically separated into
- SJ: operator (plus capacity allocation and traffic 
control) 
- Banverket: infrastructure manager 
SJ keeps owning bus and truck operators, hotels, 
restaurant
The reform is for the State to  get direct control of
infrastrucure and of spending on railways as well 
as to lower the cost of operating rail services. 
Motivation are high subsidies repeatedly needed  
by SJ
After the 1988 Transport Policy Act SJ retains 
monopoly on long distance profitable services and 
runs long distance unprofitable services on the 
basis of annual negotiations with the state for 
subsidies
After the 1988 Transport Policy Act capacity 
allocation and traffic control are retained by SJ
As an effect of the 1988 Transport Policy Act 
Banverket is the new infrastructure manager,
obtained from the vertical separation of SJ
1988 Transport Policy Act. The CPTAs -already in 
place and dealing with bus transport- become 
responsible for providing unprofitable regional 
passenger services and receive relevant rolling 
stock and subsidies.
CPTAs receive rolling stock previously used by SJ for 
services that are in their remit after the Transport 
Policy Act
Some CPTAs group together to buy Transitio, a 
rolling stock company from Bombardier. Transitio 
leases rolling stock for regional services. Later in 
time it will also buy new rolling stock
In 1996 open access is established for rail freight
With a view to see transport as multimodal, the rail 
regulator merges with other modal regulators in 
2010 and becomes Transportstyrelsen
With Trafikverket acting intermodally the need to 
have a seprate intermodal procuring authority for 
long distance transport no longer stands: 
Rikstrafiken is phased out and its role is taken over 
by Trafikverket 
With a view to save costs and focus on core 
business, the infrastructure maintenance part of 
the IM Banverket is privatized
As a result of the 2004 Railway Law transposing
the First Railway Package, Järnvägsstyrelsen, the 
Swedish Railway Agency, is set up. It is both the 
economic and the safety regulator for railways
The State negotiator for PSO long distance services 
is phased out and replaced by Rikstrafiken to put 
this multimodal role in a separate agency,-though 
dependent on the Ministry of Transport- after the 
1998 Transport Policy Act
Rikstrafiken
As an effect of the  1998 Transport Policy Act, track 
access fees are lowered to encourage rail  freigth 
and have a level ground with modal competition
Open access Open access
Following a decision by the Parliament in 2009, 
open acces is gradually intorduced for different 
kind of long distance services and finally 
established for all services starting October 2010. 
As a result SJ loses its monopoly on profitable long 
distance services
Swemaint and Euromaint sold to private companies 
in 2007
2000 Railway Bill aimed at equipping SJ for a 
competitive market and ensure equal access to all 
operators
SJ divided in several companies (with effect from 
2001). Among them:
- SJ AB, passenger operator
- Green Cargo AB, freight operator
- ASJ (Affärsverket), a lessor of rolling stock for 
long distance transport
2000 Railway Bill. In 2001 Swemaint and 
Euromaint, both carrying out vehicle maintenance, 
result from the separation of SJ in different 
companies
2000 Railway Bill. In 2001 Jernhusen, formerly a 
part of SJ, becomes the real estate company 
owning major stations, several freight yards and  






In 1995 Sweden joins the EU
The State order SJ to concentrates on being a rail 
operator
SJ sells ASG, a leading truck transport operator, in 
1995, and Swebus, the major bus operator, in 
1996
In 1992 public procurement allowed for 
unprofitable long distance passenger services. It is 
still SJ that determines which lines are unprofitable
in 1990 the first new passenger RU takes on a CPTA
contracted rail services. It has won the contract the 
previous year. The next new entrant follows in 
1995.
In 1993 Konkurrensverket, the Competition 
Authority, is formed following the introduction of 
the Competition Act
The first freight new entrant, appears in 1993.  It is 
the State owned company LKAB linked to a major
mining company.
in 1996 traffic control and capacity allocation 
transferred from SJ (the incumbent RU) to 
Banverket , the IM. This results from a reform 
conceived in 1994 after a shift in Parliament 
majority (initally a radical re-organisation had 
been approved)
Common facilties to be made available to the 
operators under commercial and non-
discriminating terms
In 2009 Banverket merges with the road 
transport admistration to exploit synergies and 
take a general multimodal view also at 
investments
in 1992 Public procurement allowed for unprofitable 
long distance passenger services (first new entrant on 










Switzerland, the reference country for this study, has separated accounts of its main Federal 
railway company SBB as a consequence of bilateral agreements with the EU in 1999 and has 
a railway sector that remains publicly owned, even though companies other than SBB are 
often referred to as private railways. The sector is characterised by an integrated public 
control and by passenger services provided on concession while freight rail transport is on 
open access since 1999. There are several differences from other States reviewed: the main 
actors in the institutional landscape of Swiss railways and outlines in the following tables and 
figure. 
Table 38. Selected statistics, Switzerland (2005-2009) 
Criteria 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Km of rail 3,399 3,563 3,563 3,557 3,599 - 
Train km, in thousand - - - 207,697 215,618 - 
Pax km, in million 16.14 16.58 17.43 18.03 18.59 - 
T km, in million 11.68 12.47 11.95 12.27 10.57 11.07 
Source: Eurostat, Transport in Figures 2011 (EC, 2011) 
 
Table 39. Summary of provisions for access to the Swiss railways 
 Passenger services 
Long distance – market closed and reserved for SBB on the basis of a 
concessions granted by the Confederation 
Regional – ordered by the Federal Office for Transport and the Cantons to RUs 
either via direct request or, potentially, by tender 
Freight services Open access since 1999 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 40. Regulatory institutions relevant to the Swiss railways 
Arbitration commission 
(supervision of capacity 
allocation) 
Schiedskommission im Eisenbahnverkehr (SKE) - La commission d’arbitrage 
dans le domaine des chemins de fer (CACF) - Commissione d’arbitrato in 
materia ferroviaria (CAF) - Swiss Rail Arbitration Commission (RACO) 
Safety Regulator Bumdesamt für Verkehr (BAV) - Federal Office for Transport (FOT) 
Other Regulatory Agencies 
involved 
Preisüberwacher – Price Supervisor 
Bumdesamt für Verkehr (BAV) - Federal Office for Transport (FOT) 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Table 41. Main information about the Arbitration Commission 
Name of Regulator 
Schiedskommission im Eisenbahnverkehr (SKE) - La commission d’arbitrage 
dans le domaine des chemins de fer (CACF) - Commissione d’arbitrato in 
materia ferroviaria (CAF) - Swiss Rail Arbitration Commission (RACO) 
Name in English Swiss Rail Arbitration Commission (RACO) 
Creation of Agency  2000 (as a result of Railway Reform I, in 1999) 
Nature of Regulatory Agency  Administratively part of the Federal Office of Transport 
Scope of intervention  Capacity allocation, access charges 
Role and mission  Judicial activity: RACO is an appeal body dealing with complaints 
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concerning network access. By agreement, it also supervises Swiss railway 
capacity allocator Trasse Schweiz to ensure fairness and transparency of 
allocation 
Composition  Board of 7 members 
Sanctioning powers  
Legal powers in case of access; no power to sanction in case of supervision 
of Trasse Schweiz 
Enquiry and information 
powers  
Ex post enquiry and information powers in case of network access. No power 
at all in case of Trasse Schweiz 
Relation to Competition 
Authority  
None 
Budget  CHF 459,600 (2009) equal to EUR 366,500 approximately 
Personnel  1 FTE 
Relationship to Parliament  Annual report addressed to the Federal Assembly 
Source: Compiled by authors, SKE website and annual reports, OECD (2006b)  
 
Table 42. Infrastructure management and path allocation in the Swiss railways  
Infrastructure management SBB-CFF-FFS or private companies 
Path allocation 
Trasse Schweiz AG (since 2006) after receiving timetable drafts prepared by 
relevant IM (SBB-CFF-FFS or private companies)  
Traffic control Relevant IM (SBB-CFF-FFS or private companies) 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
The IMs of the Swiss railway network are mostly vertically integrated RUs providing open 
access to their infrastructure: SBB-CFF-FFS (the Swiss Federal Railways) and 41 (as of 
2008) private railways among which BLS (organised as a holding), the main ‘private’ railway 
company. Capacity allocation is coordinated by a further company (Trasse Schweiz AG). 
SBB-CFF-FFS is the main railway company in Switzerland and holds the concession, granted 
by the Confederation, to operate long distance passenger services. SBB is owned by the 
Confederation and the Federal Council sets its objectives every four years. 
The division SBB Infrastructure is the manager of the infrastructure belonging to the 
company, since an internal reorganization implemented in 1998. The Swiss rail network 
extends for some 5,000 Km, 1,382 of which are narrow gauge, and 3,139 of which are the 
SBB network (source Bundesamt für Verkehr - BAV website); all of the SBB network is 
standard gauge (with one small exception) and totally electrified (Weibel, 2005). 
BLS, or Bern-Lötschberg-Simplon -Lötschbergbahn AG, mostly owned by the Canton of 
Bern (55.8%), is a ‘private railway’ which has its own infrastructure and currently 
concentrates on the Bern S-Bahn (the second biggest S-Bahn in Switzerland) and on freight 
traffic. BLS also runs bus lines and lake navigation lines. The BLS subsidiary managing 
infrastructure is BLS Netz (BLS owns 33.4% of it while the remainder belongs to the 
Confederation, 50.1%, and the Canton Bern, 16.5%). BLS Netz manages 520 Km of rail 
infrastructure, 434 of which are actually owned by BLS. Part of the BLS infrastructure is the 
Lötschberg tunnel, opened in 2007. The Lötschberg tunnel has been built by the subsidiary 
BLS AlpTransit AG which on 1st January 2009 merged into BLS Netz. 
























































Source: Compiled by authors, adapted from Merkert et al. (2008)  
The presence of a capacity allocator is a unique feature of this country among those reviewed 
in this research. Trasse Schweiz AG is the capacity allocator and provides non-discriminatory 
access for 94% of the Swiss standard gauge network. Trasse Schweiz is a not-for-profit 
limited company owned with equal shares by the three main RUs (SBB, BLS, SOB) and by 
VÖV UTP (Verbandes öffentlicher Verkehr, Union des transports publics, société cooperative 
Unione die trasporti pubblici, società cooperative), the association of public transport. It 
commenced operations in 2006 and was set up following the bilateral agreements on land 
transport between Switzerland and the EU which required that capacity be allocated by an 
independent organization. A development of the legal basis of Trasse Schweiz is expected 
with the second stage of the railway reform (Isenmann, 2010). In 2009, a clear majority in 
Parliament supported the idea of turning Trasse Schweiz AG into an independent public-law 
Agency. However, there was no agreement about whether this should be instead of full 
unbundling between transport and infrastructure, or in addition to such unbundling. 
Moreover, there was continuing uncertainty about the developments in EU law in this area 
developments that Switzerland would like to take into account as much as possible (Cf. art. 
27 of the EU-Swiss Treaty on transport over land of 1999.) For these reasons, the future 
organization of the track allocation process is one of the topics that have been put to the 
independent group of experts established in October 2010, who are expected to publish its 
report in the spring of 2012. 
Trasse Schweiz collects the capacity requests, sends them to the IMs asking them to design a 
draft timetable, coordinates capacity conflicts solutions and motivates rejections of capacity 
requests, and finally approves the annual timetable attributing the paths. It may declare a 
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railway line congested and, in such a case, it puts forward short and medium term actions to 
solve congestion. It also checks and publishes the catalogues of the paths for the Gotthard and 
Lötschberg-Simplon axes. 
Previous to Trasse Schweiz, namely before 2006, capacity allocation on SBB and BLS 
networks was the responsibility of a joint office, the One Stop Shop (OSS), set up in 2001 by 
the two RUs. 
Capacity allocation by Trasse Schweiz is supervised by the arbitration committee, 
Schiedskommission im Eisenbahnverkehr (SKE). 
Management of day to day railway traffic is typically the responsibility of the relevant IM. 
Regulation  
The three actors in Swiss rail transport regulation are the SKE, which is the Railways 
Arbitration Commission (RACO), the BAV, which is the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) 
and the Preisüberwacher, which is the Price Supervisor. 
The SKE is a commission set up by the Federal Council as a result of the first Railway 
Reform in 1999. It was formed following the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and 
the EU, which planned the creation of an arbitration commission, and started work at the 
beginning of the year 2000. The role of SKE is to act as an arbiter in disputes about open 
access to the railway network or about infrastructure charges. Therefore it only acts upon 
complaint, which may be filed by any user of the railway network (such as a RU) or IM. The 
permanent staff is currently one person, forming the secretariat, while the commission 
includes seven people, who are appointed by the Federal Council and sit on the commission 
for a four years period, which may be renewed. The Commission rules at the request of the 
Secretariat, which is responsible for carrying out the enquiries. The Arbitration 
Commission’s entire activity is subject to the provisions of the Federal Act on Administrative 
Procedure (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz - VwVG; SR 172.021), the Railways Act 
(Eisenbahner Baugenossenschaft Basel - EBG; SR 742.101) and the Federal Department of 
the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications - DETEC Ordinance on the 
Railways Arbitration Commission (SR 742.122.7) (SKE website, 2010). The decisions by 
SKE, which must be taken within two months of the completion of the relevant 
investigations, may be appealed at the Federal Administrative Court. 
As of 2004, the remit of SKE has been extended to monitoring capacity allocation supervising 
initially the relevant office jointly set up by SBB and BLS and, since 2006, monitoring the 
work of Trasse Schweiz, which replaced the previous capacity allocator. 
SKE is based in Bern, has the status of extra parliamentary commission, is supervised by the 
Federal Council and Assembly, and the President, the member of the commission who chairs 
its activities, must submit a report once a year to the Federal Council. Administratively, it is 
part of the Federal Office of Transport. 
Since its formation, the SKE has not been called to make decisions on any complaint: filed 
complaints have been resolved by promoting talks. To monitor non-discriminatory 
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assignment of paths, SKE interviews RUs on a regular basis. SKE also develops international 
activities. 
According to the message of the Federal Council to the Assembly on the second stage of the 
second part of the Railway Reform II, SKE is to acquire the power to start ex officio 
investigations (DETEC, press release, 20.10.2010). 
The BAV is part of the Ministry for Transport and Energy and is competent for all inland 
transports, railways included. Its role includes contributing to designing Swiss transport 
policy on public transport. It is moreover the Safety Regulator of railways and has an 
economic regulatory role. The infrastructure division of BAV plans all railway infrastructures, 
deals with authorization procedures and monitors construction, contributing to organizing 
funding. As part of its railway safety responsibilities, BAV approves rolling stock and is in 
charge of regulation about technical equipment, operations and staff. BAV also issues 
concessions to build and operate railway lines, safety certifications and track access permits 
to RUs. 
Track access permits are valid up to 10 years, are renewable and are issued by BAV after 
checking against a number of characteristics related to safety, employment, solvency and 
insurance of a railway company, as specified in art. 9 of the Federal Law on Railways. 
Track access agreements are negotiated directly between the prospective operator and the IM 
and State track access charges. However minimum track access charges are set by the BAV 
along with the principles of path allocation. Conversely, the BAV has no say on the actual 
path allocation. 
In the public purchasing of services subject to PSO, BAV orders from the railway companies 
the services or the infrastructures necessary and finances or co-finances them. This does not 
only refer to passenger PSO services but also to freight PSO services (rolling motorway and 
unaccompanied intermodal transport). 
BAV also approves the compensation stated in the contracts between Cantons and operators 
for the supply of PSO railway services. 
The Preisüberwacher, the Price Supervisor, derives his competence from the Act on the 
Supervising of Prices (Preisüberwachungsgesetz, 1985). Pursuant to art. 4 of this Act, he 
observes the development of prices and intervenes when a price increase is abusive. This 
Authority applies to all markets for goods and services, and has on occasion been used in the 
railway industry. Companies with significant market power, like SBB, have to pre-clear their 
price increases with the Price Supervisor. 
The Price Supervisor is elected by the Federal Government and is administratively linked to 
the Federal Department of Economic Affairs. Parliament is currently considering proposals to 
eliminate or sharply reduce his role in the railway industry. 
The Wettbewerbskommission (WEKO), that is the Swiss Competition Commission, is 
competent according to the Federal Act on Cartels (1995, modified in 2004), the Ordinance 
on merger control (1996), the Law on the internal market (1995), and the Law on technical 
trade barriers (1996). The competence on railways of the WEKO is limited by art. 3 of the 
Federal Act on Cartels. The WEKO makes decisions on competition and merger cases, has 
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the status of extra parliamentary commission and is administratively linked to the Federal 
department of economic affairs. 
Competition and related regulatory action 
The Swiss market for freight services is open since 1999 while the market for long-distance 
passenger railway transport is closed and reserved by concession to the Federal Railways 
SBB-CFF-FFS, which are fully owned by the Confederation. Regional services are run by 
SBB or by private railways after procurement by Cantons which may be carried out by 
ordering directly the services to an operator or by tendering them.  
There exists in fact some 40 Privatbahnen (private railways) or more correctly 
Konzessionierte Transportunternehmungen (licensed transport companies). Indeed, they are 
set up as private enterprises but the majorities of the shares belong to Public Authorities (the 
Confederation, the Cantons, the municipalities) so the influence of private capital is minimal, 
as noted by van de Velde (1999). 
Separation of infrastructure and services is legally required at accounting level but narrow 
gauge and smaller railway companies are exempted from this provision. 
Accounting separation of infrastructure and operations makes possible open access, which is 
relevant also for passenger services, for instance BLS runs part of the Bern S-Bahn on SBB 
tracks. 
Statistics published by LITRA suggests the difference in importance between the rail services 
provided by SBB and those by private operators: in 2008 SBB carried 285 mio passengers 
while 145 mio travelled with private railways. 
In terms of public bodies enabling competition (but necessary also for fair open access) it 
should be noted that Switzerland lacks a full Railway Regulator: SKE has only some of the 
remits and powers of a fully-fledged Railway Regulator, so much so that in OECD (2006a) 
the Swiss regulatory approach to railways is indicated as light handed. Moreover the path 
allocator is not an independent public body but a company owned by the major railways and 
the association of public transport. 
In fact, rather than competition, a key element of the Swiss public transport system so far 
(including the rail system) is integration made possible by punctuality, good connections, 
timetable (whose preservation is a key principle in service changes preparation), and through 
common ticketing between railway companies and local bus services. These elements have 
been listed by van de Velde (1999) who, however, remarked also that “a total economic proof 
of the advantage of this integrated system, which avoids all competition between services, 
does not seem to exist”. 
There is little to report about the actions of the Railway Regulator SKE or the Competition 
Commission WEKO. For both Authorities the few complaints filed have been resolved 
finding agreements before a pronouncement by the commission was required. The SKE has 
received three complaints since its formation, but on none of those the commission had to 
make a decision: the SKE in all cases facilitated talks that have led to agreements among the 
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parties and the withdrawal of the actions. On this Schiesser (2009) argues that the main 
purpose of SKE, to avoid lawsuits, was thus achieved. 
A less positive balance is expressed by OECD in 2006 when it was remarked that “[the 
SKE’s] role remains marginal, however, with only two cases so far, which essentially 
involved complaints by the CFF against other companies”. The same source argues further 
that “there is no independent supervision of charges. The only independent Regulatory Body 
in the current Swiss institutional structure is the RACO. However, this very small Agency, 
which has modest resources and has very limited activity thus far (2 cases handled in 4 
years), cannot really play a counterbalancing role”. Still OECD (2006b) notices that the SKE 
does not have the power to sanction non-compliance with its decisions and that, in practice, 
irreconcilable path allocation requests are dealt with pragmatically on a “first come, first 
served” basis. In the event of bottlenecks, the law gives priority to passenger transport 
movements at regular interval, as well as to connecting trains. 
The WEKO, according to OECD (2006a) plays a minor role on railway transport, also since 
there is an exclusion under art. 3 of the Cartel Act. 
During the years 2000-2009 there were only two actions by WEKO that relate to the railway 
market. In 2000-2001 WEKO conducted an investigation for abuse of dominant position 
against SBB which would offer to new operator Lokoop certain services only as part of a 
comprehensive service, unlike requested by operator Lokoop. The secretariat had suggested 
ordering SBB to change its commercial behaviour but SBB changed its offer to satisfy 
Lokoop requests before the decision by WEKO and the investigation was closed (OECD, 
2006a; WEKO, 2001). 
In 2009 WEKO has been involved in the consultations for the railway reform programme 2. 
In the opinion expressed it suggested that tendering procedures for rail services should be 
extended by making them compulsory. Moreover it underlined the need to keep making sure 
that minimum track access charges and access charges calculation methods do not distort 
competition. 
The most recent major intervention by the Price Supervisor was in July 2011, when he 
objected to the price increase SBB intended for 2012. After detailed negotiations, the average 
price increase was reduced from 6.4% to 5.9%. This is the usual approach taken by this 
official, whose powers are potentially far reaching, giving him the leverage necessary to 
negotiate price reductions. (Dietrich & Bürgi, 2005). 
Services provided under PSOs 
Services under PSO obligations are ordered and co-financed by the Confederation (in practice 
by the BAV) and, when they have regional importance only, also by the Cantons. Passenger 
PSO national services are ordered by the BAV from SBB, which holds the relevant 
concession. Freight PSO services include unaccompanied combined transport and the rolling 
motorway, which are co-financed in order to facilitate transferring freight traffic from the 
road to the rail, for instance the rolling motorway through the Swiss Alps. 
While in the past services have been performed directly by companies owning lines, in 1996 
optional tendering was introduced for regional lines by the Ordinance on indemnities, loans 
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and financial aids according to the railway law ADFV (Schweizerische Bundesrat, 1999). 
CER (2005) reports that, as of 2005, only two Cantons had taken such provision into the 
Cantonal law but had not yet made use of the possibility. Still CER (2011) indicated that the 
“the legal basis for doing so is not clearly defined and subject to different interpretations”. 
This stems likely from the possibility of tendering being based simply on Ordinance. 
Cantons may now choose a company and order the services or, potentially, tender the 
services every two years. The duration of the provision of services is the result of a change to 
the Ordinance on the indemnities for regional passenger transport which came into force on 
1st January 2010: prior to the change services were ordered every year. Tenders may be used 
when important changes on several lines are planned or when the offers are not satisfying. 
Alternatively, the procuring Authority may decide to tender services at regular time intervals. 
In any case, the Cantons are responsible for negotiating and finalizing public service 
contracts with RUs but the BAV helps with comparing offers against others across the 
network. On the request of the Cantons, the BAV may also step in to help with comparing 
very different offers. Whenever a line serves more than one Canton, the responsibility for 
procuring the services rests with one of the concerned Cantons only. 
The Ordinance on indemnities, loans and financial aids according to the railway law sets the 
minimum number of services per day and requires, in case of sufficient patronage, hourly 
services, leaving room to intensify the service where needed. When requested to provide 
services for a Canton, a RU submits an offer and the two parties negotiate the compensation, 
which is determined in advance on the basis of a budget, and the timing of the payments. The 
compensation, then, needs to receive the approval by the BAV. Cantons have to cover the 
costs not funded from the contributions of the Federal Government. However, at least 20% 
total costs must be covered by the revenues. The RU that is awarded a service has exclusive 
right to run that service. Fares must be comparable for similar services across the 
Confederation, independently of the costs of production. 
PSO services cannot have profits: possible profits are collected in a special fund devoted to 
cover PSO services deficits only. Drawing money from such funds is the only way to 
compensate companies for deficits deriving from PSO services, as the compensation 
determined prior to the beginning of the contract cannot be revised. 
Rolling stock is acquired by the RUs but, if the financing to acquire them has been approved 
by the body procuring the relevant services, in case a new RU steps in following of a 
tendering procedure, the latter may be requested to take over the rolling stock by the 
undertaking leaving the service. 
Evolution of institutions 
The two milestones for the dynamics of Swiss railway institutions after 1988 that we 
characterised are 1999-2000 (with the rail reform, the overland transport agreement, the 
change of structure of SBB, the introduction of the SKE, the ordering principle for regional 
transport) and then 2006 (when BLS changed to a holding and Trasse Schweiz was set up). 
Such milestones and the status of all actors at the time are characterised in Figure 18. The 
milestones have been obtained looking at the evolution of the actors since 1988, which is 
depicted in Figure 17, and noting the main events that have characterised the rail sector in 
Switzerland, as recalled in the following Table 43. 
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Table 43. Brief account of the main points on the evolution of the regulatory and competition 




The Rail2000 bill is approved by popular vote 
1992 
AlpTransit 
The Swiss electors approve the construction of the new transalpine rail corridors under the 
Gotthard massif and under the Lötschberg massif 
1993 
Message on the revision of the railway law (Regional traffic) by the Groupe de Réflexion 
Reorganization of SBB regional traffic 
1994 Alps initiative to keep transalpine goods traffic through the Swiss territory on the rail 
1996 Introduction with an ordinance of the possibility of tendering public services by Cantons 
1998  
Message on railway reform  
March 1998. The Law on passenger transport becomes applicable also to rail transport: 
concessions give exclusive right to carry out passenger transport services on a line 
September 1998. Performance related heavy lorry tax: 1/3 of the income goes to the 
Cantons, 2/3 to the modernization of the railway network 
November 1998. Federal Act concerning the construction and financing of the infrastructure 
projects of public transport: the financing for Rail2000, AlpTransit, the connection of 
Eastern and Western Switzerland to the European high speed network and for noise 
protection along the railway lines is secured 
December 1998. Railway Reform 1 
The railway reform, a transposition of the EU Directive 91/440/EEC, which introduces non-
discriminatory access to the network and aims to increase efficiency in public transport. The 
railway reform is conceived as a rolling reform: the set of acts of the first reform may be 
followed by further laws 
SBB becomes a joint-stock company and is reorganized internally. The Federal Council 
defines a performance agreement that SBB has to comply with, covering a period of four 
years and items such as finances, productivity, safety and others. The performance 
agreement is prepared in cooperation with SBB and is finally be approved by the Parliament. 
A framework of payments to SBB for the same period is decided upon by the Chambers of 
the Federal Government 
The Federal Act on the refinancing of the Swiss Federal Railways reliefs SBB of its existing 
debt 
Railway Reform 1 provides for the establishment of the Railway Arbitration Commission 
(SKE/CACF/CAF) 
1999 
Bilateral land transport agreement signed between Switzerland and the European Union 
Open access for freight 
2000 The Railway Arbitration Commission (SKE/CACF/CAF) is set up on 1st January 
2001 SBB and BLS set up a joint office (the One Stop Shop) to sell train paths 
2004 
The remit of the Railway Arbitration Commission (SKE/CACF/CAF) is extended to include 
supervision of train path allocation performed until 2006 by the One Stop Shop set up by 
SBB and BLS 
12 December 2004. Completion of the first stage of the Rail 2000 project implementation 
(B21). With the aim “more frequent, more rapid, more direct, and more comfortable routes” 
2005 
The Assembly determines that the second stage of the Railway Reform will be delivered in 
packages: (1) revision of public transport provision, (2) interoperability, access to the 
network, (3) financing of infrastructure  
2006 
Trasse Schweiz is set up as the capacity allocator for the rail network owned by SBB, BLS, 
SOB (94% of the Swiss railway network) 
With the creation of Trasse Schweiz, SKE monitors capacity allocation by the new body 
2010 
1st January 2010. The first package of Railway Reform 2 concerning revised provision for 
public transport becomes operational 
In October message from the Federal Council to the Assembly about the second stage of 
Railway Reform 2, to give a basis to SKE in the new law and to allow it to act ex officio 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Weibel (2005), SKE website, DETEC website 
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Legend for the overview of the institutional evolution 
The overview of the institutional evolution is a matrix composed by as many columns as the years 
between 1988 and 2011 plus an initial column for the situation before 1988 and a final column for 
planned changes after 2011 that are already known. 
There are four horizontal bands or clusters of rows. 
The top cluster of rows includes the railway market set-up over the years. The chart reports separately 
the set-up for the passenger rail market, divided by long-distance and regional/local, and for the 
freight market. Different market set-ups are depicted by coloured bands spanning the columns 
representing the relevant years. Colours have mostly the role of making changes visible. Wherever a 
market set-up is the same or similar, the colour is the same. Alternatively, different colours are used. 
However, for this cluster of rows only, a homogenous colour coding has been used across charts for 
different countries: light yellow is associated to legal monopoly, orange to concessions or franchises 
(a separate band indicates the possibility of open access) and light blue refers to open access. Cases 
where PSO services and open access (may) co-exist are indicated by horizontal orange and light blue 
stripes. 
The second and largest set of rows refers to each kind of actor/railway body whose evolution is 
depicted along the rows. The focus is on the passenger sector, since this is the focus of this project. 
Therefore, while there are rows regarding the incumbent and new entrants in the freight markets, the 
rows about station and about rolling stock provisions refer to the passenger sector only. Several actors 
may correspond to a kind of actor and this is written or depicted along the row. Actors or types of 
actors are depicted by coloured rectangles. A continuous contour of the rectangle indicates a public 
body; a dashed contour indicates a private body. Colours of rectangles have no particular meaning but 
have the role of making changes visible. Wherever a body is the same, the colour is the same. 
Alternatively, different colours are used. Names of bodies are written only on the rectangles depicting 
their first appearance. 
Large rectangles with dashed blue contour spanning across the first and second set of rows identify 
the milestones in institutional evolution that are singled out for use in the next chart. 
A third band includes only one row and refers to the sequence of Governments, the relevant dates and 
the main figures. 
The bottom band, with columns indicated with alternate white and grey background, includes text 
rectangles reporting main facts within the rail industry or with an influence on the rail industry. Facts 
are linked to market set-ups or actors where immediately relevant. 
 
Legend for the summary of the milestones in institutional evolution  
In Figure 18 the milestones of the institutional evolution have been singled out of the previous figure 
and brief texts explaining the changes occurred have been added between each pair of milestones. 
Therefore the picture depicts the milestones by using the same structure in columns and rows used 
previously. However, while each column refers to a particular year or cluster of years, the distance 
between columns is not to scale and is simply to leave room for the details of the changes. These are 
contained in arrows pointing to the actors resulting from the changes or affected by them. 
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Figure 17. Evolution of institutions in the Swiss railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too big to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained by collecting 
information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based upon: van de Velde (1999), Weibel (2005), Meyer and Meier (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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19/12/1995 KAV Regulation:
Regulation about the Shares of 
the Cantons in the Financing of 
Regional Transport
21/06/1999 CH and EU
sign the bilateral overland 
transport agreement 
whereby, among other 
points, Switzerland is 
expected to follow on the 
path of EU rail reforms. It 
is effective (after 
electorate's approval) on 
01/06/2002
01/01/2001 Heavy Vehicle 
Road Toll based on 
utilisation (LSVA): enters 
into force
20/03/1998 SBB Act:
- turning SBB into a public 
law AG (plc)
- separating infrastructure 
and operations, with a single 
holding owning both
- introducing the 
performance goals of the 
four-year Service Level 
Agreement 
SBB is also  re-financed
05/11/1999 Treaty with 
France about the link 
with the TGV network
05/03/2007 Regulation 
about the "Arbitration 
Commission"
19/12/2008 Goods 
Transport Modal Shift Act
20/03/2009 Act on the Future 
Development of the Railways
04/11/2009 Bahnreform 2.1
Regulation on the Promotion of 
Rail Cargo Transport
amending: 
- Railway Act (EBG)
- Railway Access Regulation 
(NZV)
- SBB-Act (introducing the 
strategic goals, which implement 
the deliverables)
11/11/2009 Regulation about 
Compensation in Regional 
Passenger Transport
18/01/2011 Ministerial 
Regulation on the Accounting 
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New entrants in the form of 
joint ventures between 
SBB and foreign RUs for 
international services.
1993: Founding of 




Concessions for cantonal services based on ordering principle (Bestellprinzip)
Concession
open market on own initiative based on EU-CH Treaty
SB
B
The bill for the second rail 
reform, transposing the 
First and Second Railway 
packages is rejected by the 
Parliament. The 
government is to put 
forward in focused 
packages:
1) revision of public 
transport provision
2) interoperability, access 
to the network
3) financing of 
infrastructure 
01/06/2002 the bilateral
CH-EU overland transport 
agreement with the EU,
whereby Switzerland is 
expected to follow on the 
path of EU rail reforms, 
becomes effective
01/01/1996 Revision of the 
Railway Act (EBG):
Introducing the  
"Bestellprinzip"  (Ordering 
Principle) in regional transport; 
all subsidies are based on a 
contract/concession, different 
to the previous  deficit-
coverage-principle
Services are ordered every 
year
Payment is set at breakeven 
level. Possible additional 
profits are given to a deficit 
covering fund
19/12/1997 Heavy Vehicle 
Road Toll based on utilisation 
(LSVA): passing of the law
Trasse CH starts acting 
as capacity allocator for 
most of the normal gauge 
network
24/04/2006: merger of BLS 
Lötschbergbahn AG and  
Regionalverkehr Mittelland 
AG to form BLS AG






The group de Réflexion on 
the future of the Federal 




- create free market in the 
transport sector
- transform SBB so that it 
has managerial freedom
- separation of accounting 
between operations and 
infrastructure
- introduce a management 
contract as a way to 
manage the SBB
20/03/2009 Passenger Transport 
Act
04/11/2009 Passenger Transport 
Regulation
25/11/1998 Railway Access 




The Railway Arbitraion 
Commission (SKE) is set up 
on 1 January
SBB and BLS set up a joint 
office (the One Stop Shop) to 
sell train paths
With the creation of 
Trasse CH, SKE is teaked 
with monitoring capacity 
allocation by the new 
body
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Figure 18. Milestones in the evolution of institutions in the Swiss railway sector, 1988-2011. The full size picture is too large to be included here and is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. The overview has been obtained 
by collecting information from the literature 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based upon: van de Velde (1999), Weibel (2005), Meyer and Meier (2010), CER (2011), websites of actors 
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Rail reform (started Dec 1998) undertaken to improve 
competitiveness and efficiency of railways, and 
customer service , as well as levelling the playing field 
among ground transport means. The reform is set off at 
a time of growing mobility
Milestones in the evolution of the railway sector in S itzerlandProject: Governance of Competition in the Swiss and European
New entrants in the form of joint venture for 
international services between SBB and  foreign RUs.
1993: Founding of Cisalpino, a joint venture of SBB and 
Trenitalia
Revision of the Railway Act (EBG):
Introducing the  "Bestellprinzip"  (Ordering Principle) in 
regional transport; all  subsidies are based on a 
contract/concession
in 2006 BLS AG is set up with the merger of  BLS 
Lötschbergbahn AG and  Regionalverkehr Mittelland AG 
The Arbitration Commission, SKE, is formed in 2000. It 
acts on complaint and its remit covers capacity 
allocation and arbitration of disputes about access 
charges and open access to the network
With a specific act of 1998 SBB is turned into a public 
law AG and its infrastructure and operations are 
separated, while a single holding owns both
SBB is also  re-financed
After the signature of the CH-EU overland transport , in 
1999 Switzerland opens the freight market on own 
initiative
In 2001 BLS Cargo AG is set up as a subsidiary of BLS
In 2001 Bodensee-Toggenburg-Bahn (BT) and SOB 
merge to form Schweizerische Südostbahn AG
Following the transformation of SBB into a public law 
AG, services are provided on concession by SBB and 
according to a Service Level Agreement with the 
government whereby SBB is given performance goals 
In 2006 Trasse CH (co-owned by the three main Rus 
and by the PT association) is set up to allocate 
capacity. It takes over from the One Stop Shop 
previously set up by SBB and BLS and works on the 
timetable drafts prapared by the infrastructure 
managers.
Trasse CH is set up to have capacity  allocated by an 
independent organisation following the CH-EU 
overland transport agreement 
The Swiss Competition Commission (WEKO) has a 
l imited competence on railways  according to the 
federal law on cartels
BLS Infrastruktur
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3.9 Intermediary summary 
This section closes the chapter by summarising the main aspects of the arrangements in each 
country studied and by listing some of the key distinctive characteristics. We proceed then to 
put forward a classification or typology of the institutional arrangements observed. 
France 
Among the five case studies, France is likely the least open to the idea and to the practice of 
competition in the passenger market. In spite of an early reform which saw the separation 
between the IM (Réseau Ferré de France or RFF) and the historical operator (SNCF) in 
1997, there is virtually no competition as of today and few signs that significant competition 
could emerge before a number of years. The French railway market can be basically divided 
in two: regional and high speed (TGV)/long-distance/international lines. The introduction of 
competition in each segment is likely to be treated separately. In fact, whereas the regional 
traffic is heavily subsidized (and could probably not exist without support), long-distance and 
TGV traffic appear on average profitable and could thus lead to an open access system. 
However, there is the need to subsidise certain long distance conventional services. Experts 
caution about the opening of TGV lines to competition. The recent creation of a Regulator 
(ARAF) has brought hopes in certain quarters that the new institutional arrangement would 
move the political debate to more legal aspects and by so doing give a chance to open a 
breach in the dominance of SNCF in the French railway market. The French Competition 
Authority mentioned in 2009 that the incumbent operator must be under scrutiny on both its 
core and related markets, so that new entrants can gain access to the French market under the 
conditions fixed by EU regulation. 
Some key characteristics resulting from the review of the French developments are: 
- There is no competition for passenger services; 
- Reports from committees tasked with exploring possibilities to open passenger markets 
suggest a staged approach (some voluntary tests should be run first). Issues include 
possible misalignment of staff conditions of employment as well as rolling stock and 
maintenance facilities; 
- High speed and long distance profitable service are run by SNCF on own account (and 
many conventional long-distance services have been replaced by TGV ones); 
- Long distance unprofitable services have become the direct responsibility of the Ministry 
since 2010 (TET); 
- Organization of regional services is the responsibility of the Regions since 2002; this has 
led to increase in passenger-km and renewal of rolling stock; 
- Literature on regional operations point to the difficulty for Regions to achieve favourable 
agreement with SNCF due to the lack of choice; 
- Freight open access is in force since 2006; 
- An actual Regulator (ARAF) operates since beginning of 2010. Before its creation the 
Commission had pointed out the lack of independence and powers of the previous 
Regulatory Body; 
112 
- The Economic Regulator ARAF is an independent administrative Authority, with a 
mission to allow non-discriminatory access to network, which has strong enquiry powers 
and can sanction discriminatory behaviour; 
- Opinions in the literature indicate that ARAF powers should increase (eg ex ante on 
network statements); 
- The Competition Authority has been active recently pointing at governance of stations 
(now with SNCF) and at the need for ARAF to review access fees ex ante; 
- The Economic and the Safety Regulator are different bodies; 
- The IM does not have complete control of the production line since key services (traffic 
control, maintenance) are contracted back by law to the national rail undertaking (the 
Commission has voiced its complaints on this); 
- The remuneration of SNCF for maintenance is fixed so there are no incentives at the 
RFF-SNCF interface. 
Key elements determining our characterization of four milestones in the institutional 
evolutions in France are: 
- 1997: setting up of RFF as an IM, beginning of test for regionalization of services; 
- 2002: with the law LOTI, the Regions get in charge local services, to be contracted to 
SNCF; 
- 2006-2007: open access for freight, EPSF (Safety Regulator) and MCAF (regulatory 
office) are set up; 
- 2010: the ARAF (independent Rail Regulator) is established; traffic management is with 
the DCF (independent body within SNCF); the State becomes the procuring Authority 
for long distance services. 
Germany 
Germany has a railway system with complete open access since the reforms of 1993, and 
only regional services are contracted (on a non-exclusive basis) under PSOs. It is a case of a 
very open system. The restructuring of the historical operators in 1994 saw the creation of an 
integrated railway company (DB) with subsidiaries offering different services (e.g., DB Netz 
provides energy, DB Schenker provides logistics services). This major reorganization was 
then followed in 1996 by devolution of regional passenger transport to the Länder and by the 
creation of a multi-sector Regulator (Bundesnetzagentur) in 2006, taking over from the 
function of regulation from the Federal Railway Authority (EBA).  
There are almost 70 passenger operators and around 300 freight operators licensed, only a 
few of the latter actually operating. On long distance transport DB is practically the only 
operator, while on local and regional traffic other operators are responsible for more than 
20% of the traffic (21.8% in 2010, according to the Wettbewerber Report 2010/2011) and DB 
sees them as increasing their presence in the immediate future (several contracts for regional 
traffic will be awarded in the coming years). 
Some key characteristics resulting from the review of the German developments are: 
- Access to the network is open; 
- Long distance passenger services are supplied on a commercial basis; 
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- Regional passenger services are supplied on PSO-based contract (though they are not 
concessions); 
- Since 1996 regional passenger services are the responsibility of the Regions 
(Länder),which receive the necessary funding from the Federal Government and are free 
to contract them with or without public procurement; 
- Experience with regionalization is positive (increase of services and quality for same or 
less funding); 
- Regional services are the only those where there is a presence of new entrants (21.8% of 
train-km according to the Wettbewerber Report 2010/2011); 
- Some Regional Authorities provide rolling stock to run local regional services; 
- The incumbent is now a holding. It was initially set up as a company to be divided and 
privatized (with the infrastructure to remain in public control). The privatization plan has 
been abandoned; 
- The IM, which is responsible also for capacity allocation and traffic control, belongs to 
the same holding as the major passenger and freight operators; 
- In 2009 the Commission complained about lack of safeguards for the independence of 
the IM and insufficient incentives for the IM to reduce costs and access charges; 
- There is a strong and independent Regulator Bundesnetzagentur, dealing also with other 
network industries, with a mission covering market and network regulation; the 
Regulator is in its current form since 2006; it has strong enquiry powers and can sanction 
discriminatory behaviour. Among other remits, the Regulator deals with rail related 
services; 
- It exists also a Monopolies Commission with the mission to advice on policy of several 
industries, among which railways, by issuing bi-annual status reports. 
Key elements determining our characterization of three milestones in the institutional 
evolutions in Germany: 
- 1994-1996: marked by the changes introduced in 1993, notably the opening of the 
network, the merge of Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn into DB, a 
private law AG with a privatisation option, and the transfer (in 1996) of regional 
transport responsibilities to the Regions; 
- 1999: DB becomes a holding company; 
- 2006: marked by the creation of the Bundesnetzagentur. 
Great Britain 
Great Britain is a leading country when it comes to experimenting with railway liberalisation 
and in particular with the introduction of competition in the passenger segment. 
In-depth reforms started in 1993 with the passage of the Railway Act and the creation of 
Railtrack, a State owned company. The handover of the former British Rail infrastructure to 
Railtrack was accompanied by the transfer of infrastructure maintenance and rolling stock 
companies to State owned companies, and later by the sale to private ones. The railway 
institutional landscape was further modified by the introduction of competition via a 
franchising mechanism. In 1996, 25 franchises were awarded to private train operators (the 
incumbent was not allowed to be among them). In 2002 ownership and management of 
infrastructure was transferred to a new entity (Network Rail), which is now set up as not-for-
dividend company. In parallel to the changes in the “market”, important changes took place 
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from a regulatory perspective. The former Office of the Rail Regulator became the Office of 
Rail Regulation (ORR) while the Strategic Rail Authority was merged into the Department 
for Transport, which is now in charge of levels of output. In 2005, ORR’s role and 
responsibilities were reinforced. Whereas the output in passenger-km has constantly been on 
the rise for the past decade overall costs also escalated. The realisation that whole-system 
costs in the United Kingdom are much higher than in other countries has triggered an 
extensive debate around the value for money of the British railway system. The 
recommendations put forward in the McNulty Report (2011) will most likely lead to a further 
round of reforms in areas as diverse as industry objective and outputs, leadership, incentives, 
fares, safety and standards, or asset ownership and private investment. Some of the changes 
already under way include Network Rail’s devolution of business routes (a form of 
decentralisation of network infrastructure). 
Some key characteristics resulting from the review of the British developments are: 
- There is full vertical separation; 
- There is no incumbent operator, the whole sector is privatised; 
- Passenger services are run as franchises awarded by the Department of Transport (with 
some involvement of Local Authorities) or Transport Scotland; 
- There is some very minor open access, and at present it is not likely to increase; 
- The freight market is open; 
- There is an independent Regulator, also responsible for safety, whose remit covers 
railway only and works in cooperation with the Competition Authority; it has strong 
enquiry and sanctioning powers; 
- Safety and economic regulation are with the same organisation; 
- The HLOS/SoFA procedure involving the IM, the Ministry and the Regulator is used to 
set out the output expected of the IM, and its access charges, against the public funds 
available; 
- Some of the changes in regulation have been carried out against a tension between the 
Regulator and the Government, with the latter intending to have more influence on the 
sector; 
- Costs of the system are considered too high, approximately 30% more than they should 
be, this was ascertained by the McNulty Report, issued in 2011 and likely designing some 
of the next changes in the system; 
- The McNulty report identified (i) barriers to efficiency including, (ii) fragmentation of 
structures and interfaces (those do not foster alliances towards efficiencies), (iii) the 
clarification of the roles of the government and industry, (iv) ineffective and misaligned 
incentives (referring not only to RUs being isolated from changes in infrastructure access 
charges, but also to rolling stock: RUs do not have incentives to manage rolling stock 
costs); 
- Still the McNulty Report called for more strategic view, more clarity in rail policy, and 
involvement of the whole industry; 
- The McNulty Report also asked for ORR to become also the Regulator of the franchises, 
still to be issued by the Department for Transport. 
Key elements determining our characterization of four milestones in the institutional 
evolutions in Britain: 
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- 1996: the changes towards privatisation started by the 2003 Railway Act have completed 
a re-shaping of the industry. The railway sector is vertically separated and privatised. 
The ORR and the OPRAF have been established; 
- 2001-2002: Railtrack is put into administration and replaced by Network Rail, a not for 
profit company limited by guarantee; the OPRAF is replaced by the SRA; 
- 2004: the Regulator is replaced by a Board and the ORR becomes the Office of Rail 
Regulation; 
- 2006: the Department of Transport takes over the remit of the SRA; the HLOS/SoFA 
procedure is introduced; the ORR becomes also the Safety Regulator. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands have a railway system divided in two parts from the operational viewpoint: a 
“core” network where national passenger services are run by a single operator on a 
concession awarded by the State, and a number of peripheral lines with local relevance along 
which services are contracted by Local Authorities to operators via public tendering (those 
lines were separated from the main network in 1998-2005 since loss making for NS). Funding 
for services on peripheral lines also comes from the State although they are administered by 
the Local Authorities. Local passenger services have seen much interest from private 
operators, which recently are also suggesting that their role could extend to services on the 
core network. NS, the State owned operator resulting from the reorganisation of the former 
single railway company, has the concession to carry out services on the main network and has 
to operate commercially and be profitable. Freight is an open market since 1996 and it is 
particularly relevant due to the traffic linked to the ports, mostly that of Rotterdam. The 
freight part of the former single railway company has been acquired in 2000 by DB Schenker 
(at the time of the merger this was Railion Nederlands). It is worth noting that NS has several 
interests in other companies. In particular, until recently it was the owner of Strukton, the 
main contractor for rail infrastructure maintenance in the Netherlands. Strukton was sold in 
2010. 
ProRail, State owned, is the IM for almost all the network. ProRail, besides being in charge 
of infrastructure management, is responsible for traffic control and capacity allocation. 
Infrastructure management, including the other responsibilities just mentioned, is carried out 
by ProRail on concession by the State. The current concession runs along the same time span 
of that for NS: from 2005 until the end of 2014. 
Some key characteristics resulting from the review of the Dutch developments are: 
- There is full separation between network management and operations; 
- The whole passenger system is run on concessions, one for the core network, 
administered by the Ministry, and several small ones for peripheral lines, managed by 
Local Authorities; 
- The holder of the concession for the network, NS, receives no financial compensation 
from the State for running services: services on the core network have to be profitable 
overall; 
- The freight market is open; 
- The IM also has a concession for its role, which runs for 10 years, parallel to the 
passenger transport concession for the core network; 
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- All concessions are based on systems of PIs. Those for the core network and for 
infrastructure management are operationalized each year after consultations; 
- There has been a time when traffic management, capacity allocation and infrastructure 
maintenance were with organisations within NS, but the experience has been 
unsatisfactory as for separation from the incumbent, and an independent infrastructure 
manage has been set up; 
- Van de Velde (2010) in recounting the positive outcome of the 2008 official evaluation 
of the railway system in place after 2004 (no radical changes were required) mentioned 
that rather than legislation only the evaluation underlined the importance of cooperation 
among actors in achieving improvements in the rail sector; 
- Decentralisation of responsibilities for public transport was preceded by a test phase; 
- Decentralised operators have a multimodal view (both Authorities and operators are 
interested in rail and bus networks); 
- Decentralised operations are the only point of entrance for companies different from NS, 
although they are now lobbying to have a greater role; 
- van Dijk (2007) reports that experience from the 1998-2006 period shows that Regional 
Authorities have gained quality improvements (extra supply, new rolling stock) or 
savings in operating costs (20-50%) for the same services, which compare with smaller 
savings (0-10%) obtained when contracts have been directly awarded; 
- The same author discusses issues for regional operations among which dependence upon 
NS, the incumbent, for rail ticket integration and revenue-settlements; 
- The Economic Regulator is an independent body with 7 FTE dedicated to rail. It is, part 
of the Competition Authority, working on non-discriminatory access to rail and services 
and on user charges. It has strong enquiry powers and may issue fines and it relates to the 
Parliament with an annual report; 
- Work by the Regulator included an investigation on refuelling stations for diesel engines, 
allocation of capacity allocation by the IM to itself, access agreements, access fees, the 
latter also in relation to a performance scheme;  
- The Economic and the Safety Regulators are separate bodies. 
Key elements determining our characterization of four milestones in the institutional 
evolutions in the Netherlands: 
- 1995-1996: Dutch rail reform and reorganization of NS in commercial and non-
commercial activities (those linked to infrastructure management). Start of the short-
lived and only open access experience in the Netherlands (likely unintended by the 
legislators); 
- 1998: start of experimental regionalization and tendering of services on peripheral lines 
that NS has identified as loss making; 
- 2000: passenger transport act and actual transfer of responsibilities to Provinces for local 
public services. Competition on the rail is no longer possible. Competitive tendering for 
all public transport but it involves railways only starting 2005; 
- 2003-2005: 2004, full institutional separation of NS and ProRail (the newly set up IM); 




Sweden has completely opened to competition all railway services. Opening of passenger 
operations on main lines in October 2010 has completed the liberalisation. While full effects 
are expected from the timetable change of December 2012, two private companies are 
already operating services previously reserved for the incumbent and still major passenger 
operator SJ (State owned but directed to operate commercially). Regional traffic is procured 
by CPTAs since 1988. Unprofitable traffic is procured by the State since 1993, most recently 
via the multimodal Swedish Transport Administration. The freight market is open since 1996. 
Altogether some 25 railway companies operate on the Swedish network, most of which with 
a mother company based out of Sweden. Reforms started in 1988, well before Sweden joined 
the EU in 1995, motivated by the intention of the State to control finances of railways and 
deal effectively with the deficit of the State owned and vertically integrated rail company. 
Other reasons were realising expenditure savings and the will to create a level “playing field” 
across transport modes. Starting points were the division of the operator from the IM, which 
has since received much funding for rail development, and the procurement of rail services 
initially possible only for regional services in the responsibility of County Authorities. 
County Transport Passenger Authorities are in charge of procuring transport services (i.e., 
either by bus or by rail). 
A multimodal approach is one of the main drivers of the most recent round of reforms. Since 
2009 the independent Safety and Economic Regulator for railways is a multimodal Agency, 
Transportstyrelsen. As of 2010 there is no longer a rail IM but a multimodal infrastructure 
planner and manager, Trafikverket, the Swedish Transport Administration, State owned and 
responding to the Ministry of Infrastructure throughout all the recent institutional changes. 
From a policy point of view the distinction between modes is fading. The focus is on 
transport provision: the vision of the Swedish Transport Agency is that “everybody arrives 
smoothly, the green and safe way”. No mention of mode, consistently with current State 
policy while the predecessor of Trafikverket for rail, concerned with rail only, had the 
mission to develop the rail system and rail travel. To complete the picture it should be 
mentioned that Trafikverket is in charge of rail capacity assignment, traffic control, and 
information provision as well as of procurement of long distance traffic. The latter role as 
well as the role of planning the future infrastructure, extends across modes. Over the years, 
rail patronage has increased as well as service levels and investments in infrastructure. 
The overall evolution path has been one of progressive adaptation of the system to changing 
needs, political directions and new challenges. Very different options have been examined at 
times. Most recently the possibility of reducing the role of County Transport Authorities to 
leave much space to the market in determining the services has been shelved to keep PTAs in 
charge of planning the services that may be taken on by commercial companies or procured. 
Further evolutions may be expected, for instance to deal with capacity and its assignment 
with the full opening of the market. There are bottlenecks due to capacity requests, and the 
newest network statement mentions auctioning as a last resort to assign contended paths. 
Some key characteristics resulting from the review of the Swedish developments are: 
- There is full vertical separation between network management and operations; 
- The market for both passenger and freight services is completely open (freight since 
1996, passenger since 2010); 
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- Contracted PSO services may co-exist with commercial services: there is no concern 
about economic equilibrium of PSO services; 
- Long distance PSO services is contracted by public tendering (though not compulsory) 
by an Agency that is now part of the IM; 
- The IM is multimodal; 
- Local/regional PSO services are contracted (not necessarily via public tendering) by 
CPTAs, to be reshaped in Regional Authorities more linked to political decision making 
and able to organize services according to passenger flows rather than administrative 
divisions; 
- CPTAs own rolling stock for the services they contract; 
- There is an independent multimodal Regulator, Transportstyrelsen, covering both 
economic and safety issues; it has a mission to promote an efficient railway market with 
fair competition and equal conditions of access; it has strong information powers and its 
decisions are legally binding, the fines it puts forward have to be confirmed by a court; 
- There are mixed remarks in the literature about the level of competition in the Swedish 
market: in the past the Competition Authority has called it “gentlemanly competition” 
and asked a more liberalized market; 
- The literature points to positive effect of competition on contracted services: innovations 
(in rolling stock, management, ticket systems, working practices), increases in patronage, 
reduced subsidies; 
- Still the literature points to some issues; unfulfilled bids, the predatory behaviour of 
some bidders, and, sometimes, worsened possibilities for passengers to find connecting 
journeys involving several operators (Alexandersson and Hultén, 2009); even SJ risked 
bankruptcy in 2002-2003 after placing optimistic bids; at the beginning of the opening 
there have been issues with strategic behaviour on the part of incumbent, refusing 
coordinate ticketing with other operators or providing lower quality connections with the 
services by another operator; 
- There is not enough experience to evaluate the competition for open access on passenger 
service, though it is notable that the first open access operators have been on one of the 
busiest link of the network (capacity allocation problems are foreseen in the future) but 
on niche market: “low cost” services and luxury transport; 
- The separation between infrastructure and operations in 1988 has been a way for the 
Government to control railway spending especially in infrastructure; this has since 
increased. 
Key elements determining our characterization of six milestones (after the initial status) in 
the institutional evolutions in Sweden: 
- 1988: with the Transport Policy act SJ is vertically separated into an operator and an IM 
(Banverket), but traffic control and capacity allocation remain with SJ; SJ retains a 
monopoly on all lines it does not declare unprofitable; procurement of local/regional 
services is transferred to the CPTAs, along with funds and rolling stock; CPTAs may use 
public procurement; 
- 1992-1993: public procurement allowed on unprofitable long distance services; 
- 1996: open access for freight; capacity allocation and traffic control transferred to 
Banverket; 
- 2001: separation of SJ into several companies, among which SJ (now passenger operator 
only), green cargo (freight operator only); the State negotiation for long distance 
unprofitable services is phased out and replaced by Rikstrafiken, a multimodal Agency; 
- 2004: the Economic and Safety Regulator Järnvägstyrelsen is set up; 
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- 2010-2011: starting 2010 access on the whole network is gradually opened; SJ loses its 
monopoly on profitable long distance services; the IM has merged in 2009 with the 
corresponding road administration becoming multimodal; being multimodal, the new IM 
is also tasked with procuring long distance services and replaces Rikstrafiken; the 
Regulator is reorganized into a multimodal one in 2010. 
Switzerland 
Switzerland has separated accounts of its main Federal railway company SBB as a 
consequence of bilateral agreements and has a railway sector that remains publicly owned, 
even though companies other than SBB are often referred to as private railways. The sector is 
characterised by an integrated public control. Long distance services are provided on 
concession from the State to SBB within the framework of a performance agreement covering 
a period of four years. In the agreement the Federal Council defines the performance 
required. Regional services are provided within a framework that sees each Canton ordering 
the services directly to a company, and then co-finance them with the Federal Office of 
Transport (BAV). While two Cantons have included in their legal provision the possibility to 
tender services, as introduced by the Ordinance on indemnities, loans and financial aids 
according to the railway law (OILFR), none has chosen this option as yet. There is open 
access for freight since 1999. Path allocation on non-discriminatory basis is provided since 
2006 by Trasse Schweiz, a company co-owned by the major railway companies and by the 
association of public transport. There is no fully fledged Economic Regulator, although some 
of its activities are carried out by other bodies. Arbitration of issues regarding access is in the 
remit of SKE, the arbitration commission, which also supervises Trasse Schweiz. Minimum 
path fees are fixed by the Federal Office of Transport, which is also in charge of approving 
the compensations agreed by companies and Cantons when regional services are ordered. 
Particularities of Switzerland are the presence of a Price Supervisor and the fact that the 
Competition Authority has a remit on railways limited by an article of the Cartel Law due to 
railways being set up as a public service. A further Swiss peculiarity is the dense and densely 
used network and the high market share for both passenger and freight services. 
The arrangements outlined above are mostly the result of an on-going set of reforms in fact 
conceived from the outset as a rolling reform and started with the Railway Reform 1 in 
December 1998. By decision of the Federal Assembly the second stage of the Railway 
Reform will be delivered in packages focussing respectively on the revision of public 
transport provision, interoperability and access to the network and on the financing of 
infrastructure. 
Some key characteristics resulting from the review of the Swiss developments are: 
- The Swiss system is run on concessions since 1999; 
- All railway companies are publicly owned: also the private railways are typically owned 
by Cantons; 
- Railway companies are integrated and are both operators and infrastructure manages 
(and control traffic); SBB has separated accounts, BLS, which is the second major 
company, is a holding; 
- Passenger operators work on their own infrastructure (with the exception of SBB and 
BLS, working on each other infrastructure); 
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- Local services are ordered by Cantons to railway companies every two years and co-
financed by the relevant Cantons and the Federal Office of Transport; no tendering has 
taken place although two Cantons have this provision in their legislation; possible profits 
from local services are put into a special fund directed to cover deficits; 
- Freight services are run on open access grounds since 1999; 
- There exist a capacity allocator since 2006, jointly owned by the three main rail 
companies and by the association of public transport; 
- There is no Economic Regulator as in other countries reviewed; 
- There is an arbitration commission (SKE), whose mission covers capacity allocation and 
access charges; since its creation in 2000 it has never had to make decisions; it has legal 
powers in case of network access (for obtaining information and issuing sanctions), it has 
no power towards the capacity allocator; 
- Part of the remit of an Economic Regulator is with the Federal office of Transport: it 
approves minimum access charges and funding of local services; 
- The Federal Office of Transport is the Safety Regulator. 
Key elements determining our characterization of two milestones in the institutional 
evolutions in Switzerland: 
- 1999-2000: marked by the reorganisation of SBB into a public law AG, the signature of 
the Overland Transport agreement between EU and Switzerland, the opening of the 
Swiss freight market, the introduction of concessions for both national traffic and 
regional services, the latter ordered by the Cantons; 
- 2006: Trasse.ch, the capacity allocator, was formed and BLS AG was set up with the 
merger of BLS Lötschbergbahn AG and Regionalverkehr Mittelland AG. 
3.10 Intermediary analysis: the different institutional arrangements in the 
various segments 
Having described the railway sector in the six countries chosen for the analysis in this 
chapter, we now aim to address the first of the research question: we seek to determine a 
typology of institutions for the governance of railways, based on the categories of actors and 
of arrangements explained in 3.1.  
The current institutional arrangements in the six countries examined in this chapter are 
illustrated in Figure 19. This figure may be read by columns, to see which functions are 
covered by each actor. This provides a picture of the current state of things. However, to 
establish a typology we should read it by rows, looking at the characteristics of the actors that 
are responsible for the same function or which set-up is used for the same rail transport 
segment in different countries. To be able to do that, we have extracted Table 44 from Figure 
19. Some of the rows in Table 44 summarise those seen in the charts for each case. We have 
combined the sector arrangements and the procuring Authorities (if any) in the two top lines, 
the lines on operators and infrastructure management have been summarised in the line on 
structure of IM and RUs. We have instead added line to mark where there is a multimodal IM 
and a multimodal/multimarket Regulator. The inclusion of the latter derives from the 
categories actually observed. The categories observed for the item on each line have also 
determined the sub-items for each line. For instance capacity allocation may be with a special 
capacity allocator, with an independent IM or with an IM that is part of a holding including 
an operator. 
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The columns refer to the countries surveyed to note where each case is observed. 
As from the descriptions in the previous sections we note a great amount of heterogeneity. If 
we take a very broad view as the one used in 2.3 (and borrowed from CEC, 2006, as updated 
by Nash, 2008) to select the countries object of the study, we see that the situation still stands 
as it was in 2008. However, looking in greater detail at the arrangements, no State has a 
railway system like any of the others. There seems to be little scope for a typology of 
institutions and arrangements based on a detailed view of the sector. Nonetheless, we may 
characterise the arrangements and type of actors that have emerged in each sector, and we 
proceed to do so in the next sections. The discussion in the next sections may therefore 
constitute a categorisation of the segments of the rail sector in each country. 
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Figure 19. Current (2011) institutional set-up in France, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland 
Rectangles with continuous borders indicate State owned/public bodies; rectangles with dashed borders indicate private bodies. Colours are only used to 
highlight different actors. Rectangles of the same colour indicate the same actor but within each column only. For the top three rows only (market set-ups) 
light yellow indicate monopoly; orange concessions or franchises; light blue open access. 
The full chart is attached as a spreadsheet to this report. 
 
Source: Compiled by authors, based on the country charts included in this report. See each chart for the relevant references used 
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Table 44. A summary of some of salient aspect of the institutional set-ups reviewed. (*) of limited significance since only one operator is allowed 
  FR DE GB NL SE CH 
Long distance 
market set-up 
Monopoly, State as Authority Yes - - - - - 
Concession, State as Authority - - - Yes - Yes 
Franchises, Ministry and Local Authorities - - Yes - - - 
Open access - Yes - - - - 
Open access + PSO contracts with IM as Authority - - - - Yes - 
Regional market 
set-up 
Monopoly, Regional Authorities Yes - - - - - 
Concessions, Regional Authorities - - - Yes - - 
Concessions, Regional and Central Authorities - - - - - Yes 
Franchises, Regional and Central Authorities - - Yes - - - 
PSO contracts+ open access, Regional Authorities - Yes - - Yes - 
Provision/procur
ement of rolling 
stock for 
concessions 
Provided by awarding body - 
In some 
States 
- - Yes - 
Structure of IM 
and RUs 
Integrated company with separation of accounts - - - - - Yes 
Holding system (IM and RU) - Yes - - - Yes 
Independent mixed RU(s) and IM Yes -    - 
Independent RUs (separate pax and freight) and IM  - Yes Yes Yes  
Multimodal IM  - - - - Yes - 
Capacity 
allocation 
with capacity allocator co-owned by operators, 
supervised by arbitration commission 
- - - - - Yes 
Subcontracted to indep. section of the incumbent RU Yes      
with independent IM, supervised by REgulator  - Yes Yes Yes - 
with IM part of holding as major RU, supervised by 
Regulator 
- Yes - - - - 
Traffic Control 
With independent IM - - Yes Yes Yes - 
Subcontracted to indep .section of the incumbent RU Yes - - - - - 
with IM part of holding company as major RU - Yes - - - Yes 
with IM part of same company as major RU - - - - - Yes 
Station 
management 
With major RU for the commercial part and with IM 
for the remainder 
- - - Yes - - 
Tiered system - major stations managed by special 
company, others by IM or local communities 
- - - - Yes - 
Tiered system - major stations managed by a special 
company and other stations by RU using them 
- - Yes - - - 
With IM part same of holding company as major RU - Yes - - - Yes (*) 
With independent part of the incumbent RU Yes - - - - Yes (*) 
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Long distance passenger arrangements 
There are currently five main types of institutional set-up in the States observed: 
- The French mandated monopoly of the national operator with SNCF operating on its own 
account (e.g., high speed services) and with the State as procurer for the TET. The only 
exception to the monopoly is for international services, which are on open access since 
1st January 2010; 
- The concessions, with two variations, i.e.: 
- The British franchises, with the possibility of open access operations as long as they are 
not primarily abstracting revenue from the franchised services (in practice open access 
operations are very limited and serve places with no direct connections offered by 
franchised services). In England services are contracted by the Department for Transport 
with the Passenger Transport Authorities as having a say or as co-signatories (with one 
exception, Merseyside PTE, which is direct and sole responsible for its franchise) and the 
devolved Governments in Scotland and Wales are responsible for franchises on their 
territories; 
- The concessions proper in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, which are awarded by the 
State, in both cases directly, although on a different basis, and establish the operator with 
exclusive right to operate, allowing no open access; 
- The German and Swedish open access, considered as two different types.  
- In the first case with DB, the incumbent, as de facto sole operator with minor exceptions; 
- In the Swedish case with open access very recently enacted has already attracted new 
entrants with new services. In Sweden access to all services was opened recently and 
exists along with contracted services16. The IM (possible a restrictive definition, given 
its role) has recently acquired the remit for contracting long-distance services. Given the 
open access set-up, services contracted are only those unprofitable and run under PSOs. 
Altogether we may characterise five different arrangements as illustrated in Table 45. Again, 
noting five different arrangements among six countries underlines the heterogeneity 
encountered. 




minor open access) 
Open access 
Open access +PSO 
contracts 
State as Authority State as Authority 
State and local 
Authority 
- 
IM + Regional 
Authorities 
France 
The Netherland and 
Switzerland 
Britain Germany Sweden 
                                                 
16
 New entrants are present since 2000 in the market for long distance PSO services. 
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Regional/local passenger arrangements 
The distinction between long distance and regional/local markets is arbitrary, to an extent, 
and surely country dependent. Here it has been included to account for and describe 
separately those services that may fall within the remit of Local Authorities alone or in 
conjunction with national ones. In fact, in the British case the distinction is of little relevance, 
although from the point of view of passenger flow patterns and of the geographical scope of 
train services (the two elements best defining the kind of service) it still stands. 
Three main arrangements have been observed, which are actually five different arrangements 
when looked in the details: 
- The French mandated monopoly of the national operator, with the presence of new 
entrants only as subcontractors for SNCF. Since 2002 in France the Regions negotiate 
services with SNCF. In the whole Ile de France it is however STIF that has the role of 
Transport Authority; 
- The concessions with two variations: 
- Concessions proper, not allowing for open access as in the Netherlands and Switzerland: 
in the Netherlands Local Authorities are responsible and are obliged to tender the 
services; in Switzerland Local Authorities along with a central one (the Federal Office of 




- The British franchises whereby open access is allowed on authorization of the Regulator 
and only if directed at augmenting services without abstracting revenue from the 
franchisee. The Authorities contracting the services are the same as those for what we 
defined above long-distance traffic: in England franchises are contracted by the 
Department for Transport with the Passenger Transport Authorities as having a say or as 
co-signatories (with one exception, Merseyside PTE, which is sole and direct responsible 
for its own franchise) while the devolved Governments in Scotland and Wales are 
responsible in the respective nations; 
- The open access of Germany and the recently established open access in Sweden, which 
go along with PSO contracted services, in fact the only existing services. Open access on 
regional lines in Germany results from the general opening of the railway network. 
Länder contract PSO services but cannot award exclusive use of the network; 
- In Sweden open access is the result of the most recent reforms of 2010, which follow a 
period with concessions for services put to tender or directly awarded
18
 by the CPTA. 
Even with open access, Regional Authorities for transport, as they have recently become, 
will continue to be responsible for providing, typically via contracted operators, PSO 
services. 
Two key developments may be observed from the evolution of regionals services: the success 
of new entrants and the regionalisation of responsibilities, in some cases following test trials. 
We note heterogeneity among States and, recalling the descriptions of the arrangements in the 
case studies, we may find a further element of heterogeneity, this time within each country: 
Transport Authorities use the leeway allowed by national legislation and tend to make 
                                                 
17
 The legal framework for contracting services with a public tender is unclear, as noted in CER (2011), and no 
Canton has made use of this option yet. 
18
 They were initially contracted directly to SJ, the incumbent, while now public tenders are commonplace but 
both options remain open. 
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different choices as to the detailed arrangements for procuring services (e.g., type of contract, 
duration, type of procurement). 
Table 46. Regional/local passenger set-up and the Authority contracting the passenger services 
Monopoly Concessions Concessions 
Franchises 
(concession + 
minor open access) 














France Switzerland The Netherlands Britain Germany, Sweden 
The provision of rolling stock and its maintenance 
This section was mainly compiled to highlight where rolling stock is provided by the 
Authority that awards rail service contracts therefore relieving operators from having to 
provide this asset. Table 47 offers a simple view of a more complex landscape that should 
possibly be investigated separately, given the potential relevance of taking rolling stock 
provision away from operators in case of open access and concessions
19
. Awarding 
Authorities provide rolling stock and related services (workshops and/or heavy maintenance) 
in Sweden and in the case of some Länder in Germany, notably in Lower Saxony. In Sweden 
CPTAs have since long bought a rolling stock company, Transitio, which sources, procures 
and maintains rolling stock for several of them. In other cases rolling stock and its 
maintenance is the responsibility of the operator, whether it chooses to have its own asset or 
to lease it. 
Table 47. Current arrangements for the provision/procurement of rolling stock and 
maintenance for services on concession/franchise 
Provided by operator Provided by Authority 
Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, most of 
Germany, Switzerland, 
Sweden 
Sweden, part of German 
Länder 
Freight market arrangement 
The freight transport market is open in all States on which this research has focused. Full 
market was to be enacted by 1st January 2007 according to Directive 2004/51/EC. Opening 
has actually occurred for different reasons, often for domestic ones, at different points in time 
and with a different phasing. Access to infrastructure was opened as a result of railway 
reforms in 1993 in Germany, and in 1994 in Britain with the six companies in which the 
                                                 
19
 Indeed, rolling stock provision and maintenance allow for mixed solutions, for instance including leased or 
owned rolling stock, heavy maintenance performed by the operator or by the rolling stock makers; these may 
typically provide integrated maintenance contracts. Makers are also present more generally in the maintenance 
market. 
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former BR freight operations had been divided sold between 1995 and 1997. Access for 
freight was opened in 1998 in the Netherlands and in 1999 in Switzerland. France, instead, 
opened access to international freight on the Trans-European Rail Freight network only in 
2003 and to the whole network in 2007. 
Incumbent railway undertakings 
The incumbent RUs have disappeared in Britain due to the actions restructuring the railway 
system in 1994. In all other case States, incumbents have transformed and have remained 
State owned, even though often directed to operate commercially and be profitable, and are 
dominant on the market. A summary of the current ownership and structure is given in Table 
48. 
In the Netherlands and in Sweden the former passenger divisions of the incumbent RU have 
become independent operators devoted to passenger transport only. German railways DB, as 
BLS in Switzerland, are now holdings with companies specialised in the different parts of rail 
infrastructure management and railway operations. SBB and SNCF are companies with 
separated accounts for the different sectors (SBB including also infrastructure management 
and SNCF carrying out by law some of the task of the IM) and are also the only companies 
that have not been exposed to (the threat of) competition. The one incumbent company 
potentially exposed to competition is NS who holds a 10 years’ concession for core network 
rail services in the Netherlands that is likely to be renewed in 2015. DB and SJ are normally 
exposed to competition since they take part in tenders and operate on the long distance open 
access market. 
Looking at the ownership of the freight companies obtained from the reorganisation of the 
incumbents, Britain and the Netherlands are the only case States where the formerly State 
owned freight operator has been sold to third parties. 
A classification of the current arrangements of the RUs and of the IMs resulting from the 
former integrated railway companies is presented in Table 49. 
Table 48. Summary of current ownership situation of incumbents in the case countries 
 IM Passenger sector Freight sector 
France (SNCF) State owned State owned State owned 
Germany (DB) State owned State owned State owned 
Great Britain (BR) Sold to other parties Sold to other parties Sold to other parties 
The Netherlands (NS) State owned State owned Sold to other parties 
Sweden (SJ) State owned State owned State owned 
Switzerland (SBB) State owned State owned State owned 
 
Reading the table by rows, cells with continuous borders indicate complete separation of 
actors (they have become independent organisations) and cells with dashed borders indicate 
that they belong to the same holding company (it is only the case for Germany, among the 




Table 49. IMs and incumbent rail undertakings, current arrangements 
Independent 
separate passenger 





freight RUs part of 
the same holding as 
the IM 
Passenger RU, 
freight RU, and IM 
part of a vertically 
integrated company 
with separation of 








The last column refers particularly to SBB in Switzerland. It should be noted that SBB Cargo 
AG is a separate legal entity but it is run like a division (SBB annual report, 2010). 
Capacity allocation arrangements 
In all cases examined, except two, capacity allocation is the responsibility of the IM, being it 
independent of the major rail operator (as in Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden) or part of 
the same holding (Germany). In all those cases a Regulator exists that may act on compliant 
or ex officio. France stands out as an exception since capacity allocation is nominally with the 
IM but this, by law, has to subcontract key activities to the DCF, the Direction de la 
Circulation Ferroviaire, an independent body within the incumbent operator. The other 
exception is Switzerland with Trasse Schweiz, not an IM but a separate body responsible for 
capacity allocation only, and co-owned by the three major railway companies and by the 
Swiss Public Transport Association. Trasse Schweiz is not supervised by a Regulator similar 
to those present elsewhere but by an Arbitration Commission (SKE). The latter has a remit 
covering access to infrastructure falling within that of the Economic Regulator elsewhere, but 
can act only on complaint. 











of the incumbent 
RU 
with IM part of 

















Switzerland Switzerland France Germany 
 
In the cases of the Netherlands and Sweden, capacity allocation was the responsibility of 
sections of the main railway operator after infrastructure and operations separation and before 
being transferred to the IM. 
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Traffic control arrangements 
Traffic control is the responsibility of the IM except in the case of France where it is with 
DCF, Direction de la Circulation Ferroviaire, part of the operator SNCF but acting 
independently of it. Switzerland includes also small special case where a stretch SBB lines is 
managed by BLS. 
Table 51. Current arrangements for traffic control 
With independent IM 
Subcontracted to 
independent section of 
the incumbent RU 
with IM part of holding 
company as major RU 
with IM part of 
same company as 
major RU 
Britain, the Netherlands, 
Sweden 
France Germany, Switzerland Switzerland 
 
In the Netherlands and in Sweden, similarly to capacity allocation, traffic control was 
handled by the major operator before being moved to the IM. This model, which still applies 
to France, is likely to disappear in the future also following the pressure from the 
Commission (see the discussion in 3.3). 
Station management 
Station management shows a mixed picture. SNCF manages stations in France, German 
railway stations are managed by a company within the DB holding, and Swiss railway 
stations within the remit of SBB Immobilien or BLS infrastruktur, the BLS IM. In the 
Netherlands the commercial parts of the stations are managed by NS Stations and the 
remainder by the IM. There are also two instances of tiered systems: in Britain and in 
Sweden. In Britain major stations are managed by the IM Network Rail, and the others by the 
RU in whose franchise they are. In Sweden Jernhusen owns and manages the major stations 
while the IM owns many other stations, and simpler stops are the responsibility of local 
communities. 
Table 52. Current arrangements for station management 
With major RU for 
the commercial 
part and with IM 
for the remainder 
Tiered system 
- major stations 
managed by special 
company 
- other stations by 
the IM or local 
communities 
Tiered system 
- major stations 
managed by a 
special company 
- other stations 
by RU using 
them 
with IM part 
same of holding 
company as 
major RU 
With section of 
the incumbent 
RU 





Infrastructure management and infrastructure maintenance 
All IMs descend from the former integrated RUs except for the British one. The IMs are 
independent of operators in France, Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden. Sweden has an 
independent and State owned IM and is the first State among those studied that chose such an 
arrangement and that did so for domestic reasons. Also Britain separated infrastructure 
management for domestic reasons and it is the only case, among those reviewed, where the 
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IM has been privatised and now is a not-for-dividend company that has to reinvest its 
possible profits. Germany has a privatisation options for the companies part of the State 
owned DB holding, therefore for the IM DB Netz as well, but it has also a provision to retain 
State control of the IM in case of privatisation. The Dutch IM ProRail is a State owned 
company independent of operations and, if it were to change at the end of its concession (the 
current one is from 2005 to 2015), it must be a Dutch company by parliamentary choice made 
when the law setting up the current organisation was discussed. 
Ownership of IMs is depicted in Table 48 above, while their independence or relation with 
incumbent RUs is illustrated in Table 49.  
Another distinction that can be made is between multimodal and rail-only IMs, as in Table 
53. Note that the only multimodal IM among those examined, the Swedish Banverket, is also 
independent and has wider role than that of a pure IM: it has recently been given the 
responsibility for contracting long distance PSO services, by any mode. 
Table 53. Current modal arrangements of IMs 
Rail only IM Multimodal IM 





The row on infrastructure maintenance on the charts was compiled mainly to note where the 
relevant production unit of the IM has been privatized, which has happened in Britain and 
most recently in the Netherlands (until 2010 the major contractor, Strukton, was part of the 
NS group, rather than of the IM) and in Sweden, where in 2010 Infranord was set up from the 
privatisation of the production unit of the rail infrastructure Banverket. A more detailed look 
at this part of the railway industry would require a separate investigation. 
The new entrants in passenger operations 
New entrants in passenger operations have appeared in all States examined except in 
Switzerland, where they are not admitted (unless we count joint ventures of SBB and foreign 
companies). Britain has a market covered only by new entrants. In France, new entrants may 
only work as sub-contractors of SNCF, while in the Netherlands they may operate only if 
they place the winning bid for a line of regional interest, out of the core network. New 
entrants may operate practically anywhere and on any service in Sweden and in Germany. In 
Sweden they may work on contracted or open access long distance transport and have been 
present since 1990 in contracts for regional PSO services (most recently local services may 
be set up also on open access grounds). In Germany new entrants operate on regional 
transport as PSO transport contractors and have a very minor presence on the long-distance 
market segment even though that market is open. The current arrangements are summarised 
in Table 54. 
Evolutions of new entrants concern mainly the entrance into the PSO services markets first 
(or the franchises in Britain) and then in open access markets. Interestingly, Alexandersson 
and Hultén (2008) note that in Sweden some of the new entrants in the passenger sector come 
from the freight market. Their role is minor in open access so far and confined to niche 
131 
markets (e.g., low cost and luxury services in Sweden), while they claim a larger role in 
concession in the Netherlands. There the extension of the service on the core network 
(currently on concession to NS, the incumbent) is under review and regional operators have 
proposed to split it and tender it separately. 
Table 54. Current arrangements for the entrance of new operators on the national passenger 
markets (this table does not refer to international passenger traffic) 
Long distance 
services 














The Netherlands France Switzerland 
 
The Safety Regulator 
A major distinction with Rail Safety Regulators is about whether they are part of the same 
institution as the Economic Regulator. This is the case in Britain and in Sweden. In France, 
Germany, the Netherlands as well as Switzerland, the Safety Regulator is a separate 
institution focusing on safety. 
Table 55. Current arrangements of Safety Regulators 
Safety Regulator separate from 
Economic one 
Safety Regulator together with the 
Economic one 




It should be mentioned that in Britain part of the Safety Regulator remit has been initially 
delegated to Railtrack (the private IM) and was then returned to the Health and Safety 
Executive before being delegated to the ORR as it was deemed improper that Railtrack could 
decide on the safety arrangements of companies it made business with. 
The Competition Authority and the Rail Economic Regulator 
According to EU law, Regulatory Bodies should play a dual ex post role in ensuring 
competition in the rail market. Firstly, they should act as an appeal body for discriminatory 
treatment related to network statements, allocation process, charging scheme and safety 
certificates. Directive 2001/14/EC sets out the basic requirements. For instance, it contains no 
legal basis for Regulatory Bodies to guarantee fair competition in rail related services. That 
said, Member States can enlarge the Regulator’s scope to encompass rail related services. 
Secondly, Regulatory Bodies shall also have the power to request information. They have to 
decide and take action within two months from receiving information. In order to adequately 
fulfil the above mentioned roles, Regulatory Bodies should be independent from any IM 
and/or RU. 
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In Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, Regulatory Bodies play a strong role and have 
high credibility. They are independent, adequately staffed and competent. They cover also 
rail related services (which is not required by EU law) and have access to a large amount of 
information and data, which enable them to carry out market analysis. It is important to note 
that these countries have a strong market-based business culture backed by a regulatory 
regime. Rail operators negotiate contentious matters and find an agreement amongst them 
before making an appeal to the Regulatory Body. They would rarely dare to refuse to provide 
a service to competing companies, knowing that the case could be referred to the Regulatory 
Body; this also allows them to preserve good commercial relations. In Sweden a new 
Regulator was created in January 2009 to cover rail, road, air and maritime transport and 
ensure a level playing field between all modes. 
In Germany the Regulator plays a very strong role and has more powers than those required 
by EU legislation. It plays both an ex ante role (it can prevent distortion of competition) as 
well as an ex post role (it can solve competition issues). In addition it has powers of ex officio 
investigation, i.e. it can act even if no complaint has been filed. The Regulator dealt with 
several cases of distortion of competition caused by preferential treatment to DB’s 
subsidiaries. 
In France, the Regulatory Body was until recently poorly staffed and had very weak powers 
and competences. In order to solve those issues, a law was passed in December 2009 to set up 
a new Regulator, which has started operations in 2010 and is fully independent. 
Switzerland has an Arbitration Commission that deals with capacity allocation on appeal 
whilst the Federal Office of Transport has some of the remits of a Regulator, such as 
minimum pricing of paths. However, there is no Regulator as encountered in the other case 
countries. 
The bodies responsible for economic regulation seem to be going in a similar direction, given 
the EU Directives recalled above: they have all become independent Authorities and there is 
no case where the Regulator is part of the State or was a former Safety Authority entrusted 
also with economic regulation. The evolution is summarised in Figure 20, which pictures the 
evolution of the regulatory arrangements in the case countries against the classification of 
railway systems by Nash (2008). The picture does not include Switzerland, where part of the 
remit of the Regulator is with the Federal Office of Transport and part with the Arbitration 













Figure 20. Evolution of the Railway Regulators in the case countries 
 
Source: Compiled by authors 
 
Again Figure 20 shows the point made in the previous paragraph: some Economic Regulators 
are also concerned with safety, and it can also be read that some Regulators cover more 
markets or more modes. This categorisation is further reported in Table 56 below. 
Table 56. Multimarket remit of Railway Economic Regulators 
Regulator focuses on rail 
Regulator covers other markets or 
transport modes 
France, Great Britain Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden 
 
A comparison of the characteristics of the Regulators, including SKE for Switzerland, is 
given in Table 57. 
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Table 57. Summary of regulatory arrangements 
Regulatory 
Authority 
France Germany The Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom Switzerland 
Name 
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Source: Compiled by authors 
 
 
                                                 
20
 As of 1st January, 2010 ARAF replaced MCAF (Mission de Contrôle des Activités Ferroviaires). 
21
 Etablissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire. 
22
 Président de l’Assemblée nationale, le président du Sénat et le président du Conseil économique, social et environnemental. 
23
 16 members from Bundestag and 16 members from Bundesrat. 
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3.11 Conclusions 
From the extensive review of institutional arrangements and dynamics carried out in this 
chapter we conclude with a number of points. 
Each country is a type 
A first striking point from the presentation above is the variety of approaches developed by 
the different countries and the fact that, after more than 10 years in most cases, and up to 
twenty in one, they have not converged. Developments continue and so far no country has 
reversed its transformations, even partially (except in the political debate, where further 
reaching changes have been discussed at times). Also, over time no country seems entirely 
settled. All this leads to the intermediary conclusion that each country actually constitutes a 
type in itself and that it is very difficult to group countries into similar types. 
If we look back at the very high level typology we used to choose the countries to be 
reviewed (which was previously used in CEC, 2006, and Nash, 2008), it is immediate to see 
that it still stands, and the countries we have surveyed fall in the same category as they would 
in 2008. That typology is based on the degree of vertical separation of railway industries: 
- Complete separation, still referring to Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands; 
- The holding model, still applying to Germany; 
- The separation of key powers, still relevant for France. 
We may propose a typology for each segment of the rail sector as in the previous section, but 
in several cases the types are almost as numerous as the States. There is however 
convergence on the freight segment arrangements and, to an extent, on the regulation, in 
keeping with the push from the Commission Directives. However, these Directives aim at a 
number of core functions of the Regulators but debate is still open on other as important 
functions such as the regulation of rail related services, which some Regulators cover. 
Importance of local drivers and context in the reforms 
It is also important to note how many changes have happened for entirely domestic reasons, 
among which the inception of the Swedish and British reforms: the EU Directive are pressing 
but have not necessarily been the driving force. 
Reforms have often been introduced in stages, but developments continue 
In most cases the reforms have been introduced in stages: tests of regionalisation have taken 
place in France, the Netherlands, and Sweden before the reforms were generalised, and the 
Dutch core network concessionaire was given a transition period to become profitable, during 
which there were no access charges. Moreover, at a later stage of the Dutch developments, a 
transition period was set so that both passenger operator and IM would adapt to work with 
performance objectives. The Swiss railway reform was even conceived as a “rolling” reform. 
The continuing developments, also for reforms preceded by tests, demonstrate that no 
solution may be defined at the outset and that adjustments will need to happen. 
136 
Need to perfect interfaces 
It is also interesting to note that after many years of changes the governance of the interfaces 
still needs to develop, and it is likely to go along this way, given that Britain still tries to 
perfect the incentive mechanisms, and that Regulators and Competition Authorities have 
taken much action in all countries. Others have interfaces with no incentives as in France, 
where the IM pays a fixed sum for the services it obtains from SNCF. 
This demonstrates how complex a railway system is, possibly even more if national 
particularities (as the interfaces with national and local Governments) are considered. 
It is complex also in terms of new relationships among actors and among public actors, and 
the elected as well as the nominated ones. The experience of the frictions among the 
Regulator, the Government, and the SRA in Britain stresses this item. 
More focus on public involvement 
Liberalisation, and possibly privatisation, of the railway system at any level of unbundling 
are far from implying disengagement of public powers from the sector. It seems they imply 
instead clearer involvement and more focus. Systems to govern interfaces need to be put in 
place and controlled, services to subsidise need to be identified, and funds need to be clearly 
channelled to them. Similarly, choices on infrastructure development and maintenance need 
to be made. Unbundling has been a way for the Swedish Government to direct its funds 
especially to infrastructure. Looking at infrastructure beside funding, it is clear that public 
powers intend to continue having a strong influence: in the Netherlands the infrastructure 
concessionaire has to be a Dutch company (as mandated by the Parliament), and the German 
Parliament, working towards the 1993 reforms, voted for the State to remain the majority 
shareholder of the infrastructure, if the privatisation option were even chosen. 
Regionalisation, a widespread trend with satisfactory results 
The developments of the railway sector have come along with regionalisation of 
responsibilities. These have happened independently in each local administrative area, as 
demonstrated by the variety of approaches in all countries, except Britain. This has implied a 
new role for the public bodies, which leads to overcoming administrative boundaries, if the 
cooperation among PTAs in the Netherlands and in Sweden is to be taken as an example. 
Sweden is very advanced this perspective. The latest legislative developments established 
that PTAs are to be formed at regional level (above the previous level) to account for 
passenger flows rather than administrative divisions. 
Regionalisation has gone along with public tendering in the Netherlands, Sweden, and partly 
in Germany, while this is not possible in France due to SNCF being the only operator. Again, 
each country developed regionalisation in its own way and Transport Authorities have their 
local methodology to set up contracts with operators. While exchange of best practice is 
promoted in the Netherlands, this is an indication neither of an intention nor of the need to 
have convergence of methods. Experience reported is broadly positive, with higher 
patronage, more passenger satisfaction, new rolling stock, better integration with other 
transport services, reduced subsidies (in case of public procurement). However there have 
also been issues with unfulfilled bids, predatory behaviour of bidders, coordination of 
timetables, and ticketing. 
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Multimodality 
We have noted recent developments towards a multimodal view for public Agencies. Sweden 
stands out in this respect, with a multimodal IM and a multimodal Regulator. The IM also 
took up the role of procurer of PSO services by any transport mode which was previously 
allocated to a multimodal Agency. Also in the Netherlands there is interest from the 
Provinces towards taking more important a multimodal role. 
New entrants are in PSO services, open access is still of little relevance 
Services in the responsibilities of Local Authorities, financed as PSO services, are those were 
new entrants have developed an increasing presence on the passenger market, sometimes 
coming from freight services (as there have been some cases in Sweden) or from the bus 
services (as in the Netherlands). 
Open access per se, for the limited existing experience, does not imply more services and 
more operators. The German experience with short-lived developments seems to point in this 
direction. The small Dutch experience could have been more successful if the new entrant 
had found a more favourable context. Still it had problems due to the short stretch of line 
served. The Swedish experience with open access, begun only very recently, suggests that 
limited operations may point at niches, low cost or luxury travel, at least in that case. 
Partially converging regulatory systems 
Regulators are the only actors in the railway systems examined that to some extent 
converged. However, while Rail Regulators have important information powers there are 
several differences as to the enforcing powers and as for the remit. This, for instance, 
includes whether Rail Regulator remits extends to rail related services and, on a different 
matter, whether the same body is in charge of safety as well as economic regulation. 
Regulators sometime have a policy related role. This applies also when they are asked to 
express opinions on proposed changes. 
Moreover, despite a common EU framework for competition policy, Member States appear to 
have found different institutional arrangements as to how they divide the work between 
Competition and Regulatory Authorities in the railway sector. Both the Competition and the 
Regulatory Authorities need to evolve in line with the transformation of the industry. Each 
country studied seems to be on its way to finding the “right” institutional arrangement to 
divide work between both Agencies. Again, the chosen arrangements are heavily influenced 
by the existing institutional history and preferences towards administering the economy (i.e., 
more or less interventionist and with more or less power devolved to the Authorities). 
Great Britain, a distinct case  
The much examined railway system of Great Britain seems to be of relevance for 
comparisons with the others that we have reviewed. The system is different due to the 
absence of an incumbent or a dominant operator, and the important regionalisation that we 
have seen in all other countries did not happen much in Britain, with the central Government 
taking the role of organising Authority for all services. Britain is also the only case where use 
of leased rolling stock has been wide and systematic since the reforms. 
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There are however areas in which the British experience may be of use beyond its 
particularities: the effort to set procedures so as to make the transparent the role of the actors 
in the determination of network charges and the allocation of public funds to the IM
24
, and 
the debate about incentives alignment and behaviour of actors. Both areas relate to one 
broader topic, namely interfaces, and seem still in their infancy, notwithstanding the long 
British experience: the HLOS/SoFA procedure has been used once only while the debate on 
the alignment is a matter much brought up by the recent McNulty Report (2011). 
Britain, to introduce a different point, is also the only case in which a reform with so wide 
immediate effects has been applied very quickly. 
  
                                                 
24
 The unique HLOS/SoFA procedure (see the section on Regulation in Great Britain starting on page 47) to 
manage the requests from the Government to the network manager, the money the Government may spend and 
set the network charges. 
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4 The performance of railways 
The previous chapter provided an exhaustive account of the institutional developments in the 
countries under consideration. Now it is time to look at the flipside of the coin: performance. 
If we are to establish a correlation – or even a causal link – between institutional reforms and 
performance, we need detailed data on both. While our information on the governance of the 
railway sector was qualitative in nature, in this chapter we will present a wealth of 
quantitative data.  
 
Throughout, the purpose is to approach the question of performance as broadly as possible. 
Where scholars have tried to evaluate the consequences of liberalisation in the past, they have 
often tended to use high-powered econometric tools, which set high demands for the 
available data
25
. This, in turn, has led them to focus on those aspects of performance where 
high quality data is most generally available: economic and operational performance. 
However, in many cases industry actors have argued against (further) liberalisation by 
emphasising customer satisfaction and similar social performance aspects
26
. Given that our 
overall analysis is qualitative in nature, there is no reason not to cast the widest possible net.  
 
In what follows, we will begin by summarising the general academic literature on PIs. Then 
we will provide some background on PIs in the railway sector, before moving on to the main 
topic of this chapter: trends in performance. Initially, we will present these trends by category 
of performance, where we distinguish between technical, operational, social economic and 
environmental performance. Subsequently, however, we will also present these trends on a 
per-country basis. Finally, we will present some early conclusions on the link between 
various institutional reforms and performance. 
4.1 Performance indicators 
Before moving on to the actual data on railway performance, we will first briefly discuss 
some of the conceptual and theoretical background of the notion. First of all, this means 
considering the difference between identifying performance purely with outputs or outcomes 
and identifying performance with efficiency or effectiveness, i.e. with the relationship 
between outputs/outcomes and inputs. Secondly, we will take a moment to review the 
literature on performance in general and on working with quantitative performance measures, 
as opposed to a more qualitative approach.  
Generally, public administration literature distinguishes four types of performance 
(Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008): 
- Performance as outputs: the services or products produced; 
- Performance as outcomes: the effects produced by the outputs; 
- Performance as efficiency: the ratio of outputs to inputs; 
- Performance as effectiveness: the ratio of outcomes to inputs. 
                                                 
25
 Cf., for example, Cantos & Maudos (2001), Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes (2008) and Lalive & Schmutzler (2008). 
These studies are discussed further below. 
26
 Cf. for example this opinion article by then-NS chairman Bert Meerstadt: “Reiziger niet gebaat bij gerommel 
in spoorsector”, NRC Handelsblad 6 April 2004, where he argues against further reforms that were proposed at 
the time by emphasising the customer satisfaction performance of NS. 
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While outcomes and effectiveness are at least as important for performance evaluation as 
outputs and efficiency, they stand at a greater remove from the activities being evaluated, 
because the relationship between outputs and outcomes is greatly influenced by the 
environment of the sector. Our choice of performance measures in this chapter is somewhat 
pragmatic: because we are relying on data collected by others, data that was generally 
gathered in order to evaluate the performance of individual actors within the railway sector, 
rather than the performance of the sector as a whole, the data available tends to focus on 
things that individual actors can influence directly
27
: outputs and efficiency. 
A substantial body of literature on performance management has developed since the late 
1970s. The first attempts at performance evaluation and review were associated with the 
failed attempts at large scale strategic planning in the 1970s (Boland & Fowler, 2000)
28
. 
Performance measures can be used for monitoring trends in performances or for comparative 
analysis of companies’ performances on key performance indicators (KPIs). The measures 
can be used to evaluate the companies’ performances and to learn about and improve 
corporate policies and optimize management processes. Through effective communication, 
performance measures can also be used as a marketing tool to enhance corporate reputation 
(Gelders, Galetzka, Verckens, & Seydel, 2008). 
Cole and Cooper (2005) argue that PIs are fraught with problems. For instance, taking the 
case of railways, they criticize the narrow scope of PIs (strongly centred on punctuality and 
reliability whilst focusing only slightly on one aspect of safety
29
). They argue that the use of 
PIs reflects a wider political agenda (the maintenance and support of capitalism). For them, 
the use of railway PIs is an example of “how there is an increasing tendency on the part of 
Government to quantify what cannot be quantified or ‘make the invisible visible’” (Cole & 
Cooper, 2005, p. 199). Whereas the British may have the most sophisticated and transparent 
system of PIs, they argue that the PIs used by Government to render the railways accountable 
are narrow. Di Francesco (1999) identifies various problems relating to performance 
measurement in the public sector (output specification, quality and effectiveness 
measurement, client identification) and suggests some possible ways of coping with them. 
Notwithstanding the criticism voiced, the question remains as to whether the information that 
these PIs transmit to the public gives a realistic impression of the quality of service provided 
to rail users.  
Bouckaert (1995) identified four main performance measurement criteria: validity, reliability, 
functionality and legitimacy. In this analysis, validity and reliability are defined as they 
normally are, while functionality refers to the indicator’s ability to contribute to performance 
improvement and legitimacy refers to the extent to which the indicator is accepted by 
stakeholders. 
In their broad literature review of performance measurements, Micheli and Kennerley (2005) 
point to the differences between private and public sector (for instance in the public sector 
PIs are always subject to political and social choices). Policy makers and managers of rail 
organizations have different interests and require different information. Managers are 
typically interested in performance at an operational level, seeking to improve the technical 
                                                 
27
 This is in line with the literature in principal agency theory, cf. Holmström (1979). 
28
 Boland and Fowler also point to the difference between public and private sector performance. The former 
has to account to several stakeholders while the latter has to respond solely, at least in theory, to its 
shareholders. 
29
 For instance track maintenance or crime levels. 
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efficiency of their operation(s) while policy makers are primarily interested in performance at 
an aggregate level, seeking to improve the performance of the industry as a whole 
(Productivity Commission, 1999). 
Rodriguez et al. (2007) identify a number of performance measures for utilities, including 
commercial efficiency, technical efficiency, financial performance, capital expenditures and 
cost of capital. In many cases, the Government and Regulator seem to address all these 
objectives at the same time with no particular priority. This is not particularly surprising since 
different stakeholders, private and public, with different scope of action (e.g., Competition 
Authority or National Safety Authority) are in charge of a given task which influences 
performance. An additional difficulty comes from the fact that in the past a Ministry of 
Department of Transport would have been in charge of optimizing all these performances. 
Nowadays, the remit of the Ministry has in many ways shrunk: their scope of action and 
authority has been reduced. New Agencies have been created, e.g., slot allocators, 
independent Regulatory Authorities, some as a result of EU-mandated Directives, and some 
as the result of domestic reforms. All these organizations have their own PIs with the risk of 
creating local optima at the cost of a global sub-optimum. 
4.2 Performance indicators in the rail sector 
With these considerations in mind, the next step is to consider PIs in the railway sector 
specifically. In this section, we will discuss some railway-specific literature on performance, 
followed by an overview of the performance frameworks that have been developed for 
practical use.  
One of the major difficulties in evaluating the performance of the railways is that one element 
of the value chain, the infrastructure, is often a natural monopoly, while the rest of the sector 
is also highly concentrated at times. Comparison between different firms operating in the 
same country is therefore essentially impossible. While the use of international benchmarking 
can potentially bring a solution, there are problems of comparability between countries, in 
part because not all countries use the same measures or simply because of access to data 
(either because there are no measure or because they are not public). International 
comparisons are rendered even more difficult given the different network topologies, 
demographics or historical developments of the national sectors. The technical (e.g., ratio of 
high speed/conventional lines) and political (e.g., public policy objectives carried out by the 
Government, timing and mode of liberalization) environment create large asymmetries
30
.  
PIs allow us to empirically assess the technical performance of different transport modes’ 
capacity to “move people around”. Basic technical performance calculations can be useful for 
network’s global performance analysis and for modal comparison, analysis and evaluation by 
bridging both physical attributes (length, distance, configuration, etc.) and time-based 
attributes (punctuality, regularity, reliance, etc.) of networks (Rodriguez et al., 2006). While 
these indicators provide useful information, they suffer from a number of limitations. First, 
achieving consistency of measurement over time can present a challenge. For instance, in the 
case of punctuality, changes in what is considered a delay and how it is measured varies over 
time within countries. This may be the caused by an operator’s attempt to “smooth” 
degradation of service but it may also be the result of a change in legislation or a change in 
                                                 
30
 For this reason, the present study focuses on changes in performance within a single country rather than 
comparisons between countries at the same time. 
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the market’s demands. Second, the aggregate nature of PIs often masks large differences by 
type of activity. To take the case of punctuality again, it is much harder to run trains on time 
in a dense network than in the countryside. One also has to question how to weight 
punctuality across services offerings. For instance, should punctuality of a rural train with 
few passengers be considered identical to a long-distance train running at peak hours? If not, 
how to determine the weighing of both services?  
Some of the most commonly used indicators are provided in Table 58 below. 
Table 58. Common performance indicators in rail transport 
Indicator Measure Description 
Passenger density Passenger-km/km Standard measure of transport 
efficiency 
Mean distance travelled Passenger-km/passenger Measure of ground-covering 
capacity 
Mean number of trips per 
capita 
Passengers/population Relative performance of 
transport modes 
Mean occupation coefficient Number of passengers 
aboard/total carrying capacity 
(%) 
 
Source: Adapted from (Rodriguez et al., 2006) 
 
Most indicators tend to focus on straightforward efficiency, i.e. single input-output 
relationships (Wolff, 2011). There are, however, authors who have considered both efficiency 
and effectiveness. For instance, Martin (2008) proposes to combine technological and 
economical effectiveness with economic and ecological efficiency. Unfortunately those KPIs 
only indirectly capture customer satisfaction (itself a result of punctuality, level of service, 
accessibility, prices, etc.). Lan and Lin (2006) propose similar KPIs in the form of technical 
efficiency (ratio of inputs to outputs), technical effectiveness (ratio of inputs to outcomes) 
and service effectiveness (ratio of outputs to outcomes). While rather crude, these KPIs do 
nonetheless provide some quantifiable indicators.  
While there is abundant literature on “individual” performance (e.g., technical efficiency or 
economic efficiency), few authors have addressed the issue of multiple regulatory objectives. 
For instance, Campos & Cantos (2000) identify a number of regulatory scenarios based on 
different modes of unbundling and match them with multiple performance objectives: fiscal, 
internal efficiency, dynamic efficiency, risk minimizing, capacity allocation and equity. Not 
surprisingly, the resulting matrix shows that no single scenario is able to fulfil all objectives 
at the national level, let alone at the EU level. For the OECD (2006) “the general objective of 
Governments with respect to the rail sector is to force the end-user prices to be at an efficient 
level (taking into account the price of substitute services) with an optimal level of service 
quality and variety, a high level of productive efficiency (and therefore a minimum level of 
subsidy), and an on-going efficient level of investment and innovation in the rail sector”. As 
we will see in the following sub-sections, regulation can be linked specifically to operational 
performance, for example via measures to incentivize operators to improve punctuality 
(Gibson, 2005; Vromans, Dekker, & Kroon, 2006). In many countries punctuality is the main 
PI
31
. It can also be aimed at social performance (Héritier & Schmidt, 2000). In fact, railways 
tend to be under constant surveillance from their stakeholders (Gelders, et al., 2008). Finally, 
                                                 
31
 Cf. below. Other important measures are information supply in trains and stations and cleanliness of trains 
and stations (Gelders, et al., 2008). 
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one can regulate for technical performance (Janic, 2008; Yu, 2008). While regulation can be 
geared towards improving all these forms of performance, most of it seems to aim for 
economic efficiency
32
. This emphasis on financial regulation can be attributed to the history 
of financial distress that plagued the railway sector during the past decades. 
Generic models and data sources 
 
Figure 21. InteGRail KPI 
 
Source: InterGRail (2010) 
 
Figure 22. The Ding et al. model 
 
Source: Ding et al. (2008) 
 
                                                 
32
 Regulation is defined here as a specific form of governance, a set of authoritative rules, often accompanied by 
some administrative Agency, for monitoring and enforcing compliance (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004). 
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In order to move beyond these limitations, academics have worked with industry practitioners 
to develop more advanced models of performance. Throughout, the purpose of these models 
is to exploit the interrelationships between the different relevant aspects of performance. 
Among them, the InteGRail (2010) consortium provides a standard railway high-level KPI 
structure encompassing rolling stock, operations, infrastructure and traffic management along 
a number of criteria. A second, more complex model has been developed by Ding et al. 
(2008). 
The most important source of railway data at a global level is the UIC, which publishes a 
number of statistics related to KPIs. They include staff, train-km, gross train-ton km (for both 
passenger and freight), passenger-km and ton-km (for freight). 




- Employment;  
- Financial health;  
- Rolling stock;  
- The quality of service and comparison with regard to ticket prices; and  
- Safety.  
For Europe, Eurostat publishes similar data to the UIC
34
. In particular, the data on transport 
include the series about modal split and about the ratio of pkm or tkm to GDP. Moreover, the 
data tables on rail transport are clustered in seven groups: 
- Railway transport infrastructure; 
- Railway transport equipment; 
- Railway transport – enterprises, economic performances and employment; 
- Railway traffic measurement – passengers; 
- Railway transport measurement – goods (detailed data based on Directive 80/1177/EC or 
Regulation (EC) 91/2003); 
- Railway transport – accidents. 
The first three groups refer to general statistics and input (notwithstanding the “economic 
performances” qualification of part of the third category) while the latter three refer to output. 
Additional data, geographically more refined and referring to equipment or origin or 
destination of goods and passengers are available as part of the regional statistic on transport. 
Country level 
In contrast to the “holistic” models, National Regulatory Authorities and RUs tend to provide 
only scarce information regarding performance, except maybe for the United Kingdom’s 
elaborated performance regime monitoring by ORR. In recent years, a few more European 
countries have introduced performance contracts for their railway industries. In considering 
the choices made by these Authorities, it is important to remember that the optimal choice of 
PIs for a performance contract is not the same problem as the optimal choice of PIs. After all, 
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 Cf. Jost (2011). 
34
 The lack of consistency between the two data sets for certain years or indicators is troublesome. 
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only the former focuses on the incentives created by this choice for industry actors, which in 
turn depends on the areas where sufficient incentives are lacking absent Government 
intervention.  
In the UK, the Office of Rail Regulation gathers data on myriad PIs in order to inform their 
decision making. Of particular importance, however, are the indicators singled out in the 
High-Level Output Specification (HLOS), the statement from the Secretary of State for 
Transport outlining the performance he expects from the railway industry. The current HLOS, 
which concerns the period of 2008-2012, contains the following PIs: 
- Safety of passengers and employees35;  
- Reliability, which is measured primarily by the so-called “Public Performance Measure”, 
the percentage of trains arriving within 5 minutes of their scheduled arrival time (10 
minutes for long-distance trains) 
- A secondary measure adopted by the HLOS is the number of trains that arrive at 
their final destination with a delay of 30 minutes or more, or are cancelled; 
- The HLOS also refers to the gap between the poorest performing lines and the best. 
- Capacity is measured primarily in terms of the number of passenger-km offered on a 
given line  
- Load factor, i.e. the ratio of forecast passenger demand to train capacity, is a 
secondary measure of capacity. It is explicitly based on the total capacity of the 
train, sitting or standing
36
; 
- Capacity is also measured in terms of the demand that has to be accommodated for a 
given city or London terminus
37
.  
In the Netherlands, the concessions of both the main passenger transport company NS and the 
IM ProRail contain a number of performance goals, which are to be operationalized by the 
companies themselves after extensive consultation with other industry actors in annual 
transport and track management plans. The current concessions identify the following 
performance goals for NS: 
- Security; 
- Punctuality; 
- Availability of Seats; 
- Information provision; 
- Cleanliness. 
And for ProRail: 
- The availability and reliability of the rail infrastructure; 
- The cleanliness, accessibility and security of the railway stations; 
- The quality of ProRail’s intervention in case of disruptions; 
- The quality of the capacity allocation; 
- The quality of information supply. 
                                                 
35
 Cf. Department for Transport (2007), White Paper on Delivering a Sustainable Railway, Schedule to 
Appendix A, p. 148. 
36
 Cf. Department for Transport (2007), op cit, Schedule to Appendix A, p. 153. 
37
 Cf. Department for Transport (2007), op cit, Schedule to Appendix A, p. 151-152. 
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For each of these goals, the purpose is to identify measurable and achievable performance 
targets, which can then be used to judge the company’s performance ex post. 
In Germany, there is a Leistungs- und Finanzierungsverereinbarung, a performance and 
financing agreement, but it applies only to the infrastructure companies, i.e. to DB Netz, to 
DB Station & Service and to DB Energie. The current agreement, covering the period of 
2009-2013, is the first of its kind. For the infrastructure companies, it gives seven main PIs 
(art. 13.2): 
- DB Netz: Theoretic loss in travel time38; 
- DB Netz: Number of “infrastructure shortcomings”; 
- DB Netz: Functionality of Platforms (DB RegioNetz); 
- DB Netz: Assessment of Station Quality (DB RegioNetz);  
- DB Station & Service: Functionality of Platform; 
- DB Station & Service: Assessment of Station Quality; 
- DB Energy: Reliability of Supply. 
Switzerland, finally, has the longest history of performance contracts, with the earliest 
Leistungsauftrag being decided in 1979. However, these “performance instructions” focused 
mostly on financial goals. The same was true for the first performance agreement concluded 
between the Federal Government and SBB under the reformed regime in 1999. From 2003 
onwards, however, measurable indicators were defined in the agreement, according to the 
following four categories: 
- Safety; 
- Usability of the network; 
- Optimal use of the network; 
- Productivity. 
The exact indicators used vary significantly from contract to contract. For the current 
Leistungsvereinbarung, which covers the period of 2011-2012, there are nineteen, although 
not all of them have a specific target defined
39
. 
In other European countries, data on performance are generally collected by Transport 
Ministries or official statistics Agencies, as well as by Eurostat and the UIC. However, in 
those countries this data is not used for railway governance purposes. 
On the whole, it is clear from this overview that most of the PIs available are not systemic, 
but focus on the performance of individual actors, be it operators or IMs. In the next section, 
we will explore the available data in further detail so as to select the indicators we will use for 
our study. 
                                                 
38
 Cf. Annex 13.2.1 par. 1of the 2009-2013 agreement. This indicator is calculated as the additional travel time 
caused by an “infrastructure shortcoming” that lasts for more than 180 days, added over the entire network. This 
indicator does not depend on the number of trains or the number of passengers on the affected part of the 
network. 
39
 Fifteen do. The current performance agreement between the Government and SBB also lists eight goals where 
SBB is to report its performance in a qualitative manner. 
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Performance indicators in this study: availability and quality 
In order to evaluate the performance of the railway industry in different countries and under 
different institutional arrangements, it is necessary to select a number of indicators that 
satisfy as much as possible three requirements. Firstly, and most importantly, there need to be 
data available for the indicator for the entire period covered by the study, and the data for that 
period need to be based on a consistent definition of the indicator. Secondly, there need to be 
data available for the indicator for as many of the countries considered in this study as 
possible, so as to facilitate also cross-country comparisons as well as comparisons over time. 
Again, the definition of the indicator needs to be as similar as possible between different 
countries. Thirdly, the indicators chosen need to measure as many different kinds of 
performance as possible. A narrow focus on economic and operational indicators is 
undesirable.  
A good starting point are the five categories of performance proposed by Finger et al. (2010) 
for network industries generally: 
- Technical performance (e.g., resilience, robustness, geographical accessibility); 
- Operational performance (e.g., accidents, incidents, punctuality); 
- Social performance (e.g., consumer satisfaction, accessibility for the mobility impaired); 
- Environmental performance (e.g., GHG emissions, noise production); 
- Economic performance (e.g., number of passenger-km and ton-km produced, revenue). 
These five types of indicators will be used as a framework when describing below the 
performance of the railway sectors of the selected countries. First, however, we will examine 
in further detail in Table 59 and Table 60 which basic indicators are available. 
Table 59. Input indicators and general statistics available, along with source and description 
Indicator Source Description 
Length of line [km] Transport in 
Figures 2011 (EC, 
2011) 
Line of communication made up by rail exclusively 
for the use of railway vehicles.  
(Eurostat UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Length of high speed lines [km] Transport in 
Figures 2011 (EC, 
2011) 
A high speed line is a line specially built to allow 
traffic at speeds generally equal to or greater than 
250 km/h for the main segments.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Expenditure in rolling stock in 
principal railway enterprises (in 
million euros from 01.01.1999) 
Eurostat Expenditure by the principal railway enterprises on 
railway vehicles.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Expenditure in infrastructure in 
principal railway enterprises (in 
million euros from 01.01.1999) 
Eurostat Expenditure by the principal railway enterprises on 
new construction and extension of existing 
infrastructure, including reconstruction, renewal and 
major repairs of infrastructure. Infrastructure 
includes land, permanent way constructions, 
buildings, bridges and tunnels, as well as immovable 
fixtures, fittings and installations connected with 
them (signalisation, telecommunications, catenaries, 
electricity sub-stations, etc.) as opposed to rolling 
stock.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Rail infrastructure gross 
investment spending (in million 
euros at current prices) 
OECD ITF Expenditure on new construction and extension of 
existing infrastructure, including reconstruction, 
renewal and major repairs of infrastructure. 
Infrastructure includes land, permanent way 
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constructions, buildings, bridges and tunnels, as well 
as immovable fixtures, fittings and installations 
connected with them (signalisation, 
telecommunications, catenaries, electricity sub-
stations, etc.) as opposed to rolling stock.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Maintenance expenditures in rail 
infrastructure (in million euros at 
current prices) 
OECD ITF Expenditure for keeping infrastructure in working 
order. Expressed in million euros at current prices. 
(Eurostat, UNECD, ITF, 2010) 
Employment (number of 
employees) 
Eurostat Average number of persons working during a given 
period in a railway enterprise, as well as persons 
working outside the enterprise but who belong to it 
and are directly paid by it. Statistics should include 
all full-time equivalent employees performing all 
principal and ancillary activities of the railway 
(operation, renewal, new construction, road and 
shipping services, electricity generation, hotels and 
restaurants, etc.).  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
No of enterprises [no.] Eurostat Any private or public enterprise acting mainly as a 
railway transport operator, an IM or as an integrated 
company. An enterprise whose main business is not 
related to railways should be included if it has a 
railway market share that is not marginal. Only the 
activities related to railways should be reported.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the sources listed in the table 
Table 60. Table of performance indicators considered, along with their source and description 
Performance indicator Source Description 
Total train km Eurostat Unit of measurement representing the movement of a 
train over one kilometre. The distance to be considered 
is the distance actually travelled.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Passengers train km Eurostat Unit of measurement representing the movement of a 
passenger train over one kilometre. The distance to be 
considered is the distance actually travelled.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Rail modal split 
(passengers) [%] 
Eurostat This indicator is defined as the percentage of trains in 
total inland passenger transport performance measured 
in passenger-km.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Rail passenger-km [pkm] Transport in Figures 
2011 (EC, 2011) 
Unit of measurement representing the transport of one 
rail passenger by rail over a distance of one kilometre. 
The distance to be taken into consideration should be 
the distance actually travelled by the passenger on the 
network. To avoid double counting each country should 
count only the pkm performed on its territory. If this is 
not available, then the distance charged or estimated 
should be used.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
High speed rail passenger-
km [pkm] 
Transport in Figures 
2011 (EC, 2011) 
Unit of measurement representing the transport of one 
high speed rail passenger by high speed rail over a 
distance of one kilometre.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Share of high speed rail on 
total pkm [%] 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Transport in 
Figures 2011 (EC, 
2011) 
Proportion [%] of high speed rail passenger-km from 
the total rail passenger-km.  
149 
Volume of passenger 
transport relative to GDP 
Eurostat This indicator is defined as the ratio between passenger-
km (by passenger cars, buses, coaches and trains) and 
GDP (chain-linked volumes, at 2000 exchange rates). It 
is indexed on 2000.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Rail modal split (freight) 
[%] 
Eurostat This indicator is defined as the percentage of rail in 
total inland freight transport performance measured in 
tonne-km. 
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Freight on rail (inland and 
international) [tkm] 
Transport in Figures 
2011 (EC, 2011) 
Tonne-km means the unit of measure of goods transport 
which represents the transport of one tonne (1,000 
kilograms) of goods by rail over a distance of one 
kilometre. Eurostat rounds the figure to million tkm. 
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Volume of freight transport 
relative to GDP 
Eurostat This indicator is defined as the ratio between tonne-km 
(by road, rail and inland waterways) and GDP (chain-
linked volumes, at 2000 exchange rates). It is indexed 
on 2000.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Number of railway 
passengers killed in 
accidents involving railways 
[no.] 
Transport in Figures 
2011 (EC, 2011) 
Any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days 
as a result of an accident. 
It includes passengers, employees and other specified or 
unspecified persons involved in a rail injury accident.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Annual number of victims, 
total [no.] 
Eurostat Railway accidents are accidents in which at least one 
moving rail vehicle is involved. The number of total 
victims includes killed and injured people.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Annual number of 
accidents, total [no.] 
Eurostat Railway accidents are accidents in which at least one 
moving rail vehicle is involved. Total number of 
accidents, including collision (excluding level-crossing 
accidents), derailments, accidents involving level-
crossing, accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in 
motion, fire in rolling stock and others.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
Annual number of accidents 
involving the transport of 
dangerous goods, total [no.] 
Eurostat Numbers of accidents in which dangerous goods are 
released and number of accidents in which dangerous 
goods are not released.  
(Eurostat, UNECE, ITF, 2010) 
CO2 from fuel combustion 
[Mt] 
OECD ITF Data on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion in the railway sector. Measured in 
Megatonne.  
(OECD ITF) 
CO2 emissions [Mt] European 
Environment Agency 
Annual emissions of CO2 in the railway sector of the 
case countries.  
NO2 emissions [Mt] European 
Environment Agency 
Annual emissions of NO2 in the railway sector of the 
case countries.  
CH4 emissions [Mt] European 
Environment Agency 
Annual emissions of CH4 in the railway sector of the 
case countries.  
Annual average indices for 
transport prices: passenger 
transport by railway 
Eurostat Data represents the Harmonised Indices of Consumer 
Prices, which give comparable measures of inflation for 
the case countries. In this case they measure the change 
over time of the prices of railway transport services 
acquired by households. The indices are normed with 
the year 2005 as a base year.  
(Eurostat)  
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the sources listed in the table 
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Having the above mentioned categories of performance and indicators in mind, we have 
chosen the following indicators as the main focus of the remainder of this chapter. The goal 
was not only to select indicators for which high-quality data were available, but also to select 
at least one indicator for every category of performance distinguished by Finger at al. (2010). 
The indicators can be classified as follows: technical, operational, social, economic and 
environmental performance (more details in the following table).  
Table 61. Classification of the available performance indicators according to the framework by 
Finger et al. (2010) 
Criteria Performance indicators 
Technical performance Rail km per km
2
 
Operational performance Train km 
Passenger train-km 
Number of railway passengers killed in accidents involving railways 
[no.] 
Annual number of victims, total [no.] 
Annual number of accidents, total [no.] 
Annual number of accidents involving the transport of dangerous 
goods, total [no.] 
Social performance Customer Satisfaction 
harmonised index of consumer prices: passenger transport 
Economic performance Rail passenger-km [pkm] 
High speed rail passenger-km [pkm] 
Share of high speed rail on total pkm [%] 
Volume of passenger transport relative to GDP 
Freight on rail (inland and international) [tkm] 
Volume of freight transport relative to GDP 
Environmental performance Rail modal split (passengers) [%] 
Rail modal split (freight) [%] 
CO2 from fuel combustion [Mt] 
NO2 from fuel combustion [Mt] 
CH4 from fuel combustion [Mt] 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
In the next section, we will examine the data for each of these measures of performance. 
4.3 Trends in performance 
The trends of the available indicators listed in Table 61 are plotted in the following figures. 
The plots are first given without looking at the data to offer a first idea of the extent or 
limitations of the data series available.  
However, before we will get to those we will present some data on the differences between 
the countries under consideration and on the inputs deployed to obtain performance in each 
country. In the remainder of the section indicators are again clustered according to the 
classification of what is measured discussed by Finger et al. (2010).  
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Background statistics 
Before looking at the trends it is worth noting the differences among the countries shown by 
some key indicators. Only with that information in mind can we make sense of the 
performance data that will be presented subsequently.  
Figure 23 shows the important differences in network length among the countries and most 
notably the differences in intensity of use calculated as the ratio of reported total train-km and 
the length of the lines. The two countries with the smallest networks, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, have the highest intensity of use with Switzerland showing the highest and a 
very large value. France has a very large network, consistently with its geographical 
extension, but shows the second lowest intensity of use. Sweden is seen to have the mildest 
intensity of use among the networks surveyed. 
Figure 23. Length of rail lines in km and intensity of use in train-km/km of lines 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations based on Eurostat data. Data for 2008 except for intensity of use in 
France and Germany which refers to 2009 due to data availability 
 
The data in Figure 24 show how all network are mostly used by passenger trains, however the 
share of the network in the overall mobility of each country is somewhat limited: only in 
Switzerland the modal split reaches 16.5%, more than twice the corresponding value of Great 
Britain. 
 
Contrasting freight and passenger modal split in  
Figure 25, it is interesting to note the high percentage of freight on rail in Switzerland (a 
transit country) despite the high level of passenger traffic usage of the network seen before. 
Also Sweden has a very high percentage of freight traffic on rail, while the Netherlands is the 





Figure 24. Percentage of passenger train-km on the total and modal split 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations based on Eurostat data. Data for 2008 except for % of passenger train-km 
in France and Germany which refers to 2009 due to data availability 
 
Figure 25. Modal split for passenger and freight on rail 
 
Source: Eurostat. Data for 2008 
 
Finally, by looking at  
Figure 26, it is interesting to note the different relative importance of the extension of the 
high speed networks in France, Germany and Great Britain, and observe the large differences 
in the percentage relevance of the passenger-km recorded. In France about 60% of the 
passenger-km is on high speed rail, which is just over 6% of the network. Germany has high 
speed lines for 3.8% of the network and the relative value of passenger-km amounts to 28.3% 
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of the total. In Great Britain, the limited extension of high speed lines corresponds to less 
than 2% of passenger-km. 
 
Figure 26. Relevance of high speed lines with respect to whole network length and importance 
of high speed passenger transport over the data for the whole network 
 
Source: Eurostat. Data for 2008 
 
These comparisons demonstrate the differences in both technical characteristics and traffic 
patterns in the different countries surveyed, underlining the importance of country specific 
situations. A longitudinal analysis for each country obviously accounts for such specificities. 
Comparisons across countries need keep into account differences and therefore likely 
difficulties with generalising local experiences.  
Inputs 
To recall, and as detailed in Table 59, input indicators available from Eurostat and considered 
here are: 
- Length of line [km]: trends reported in Figure 27; 
- Length of high speed lines [km]: trends reported in Figure 28; 
- Expenditure in rolling stock in principal railway enterprises (in million euros from 
01.01.1999): trends reported in Figure 29; 
- Expenditure in infrastructure in principal railway enterprises (in million euros from 
01.01.1999): trends reported in Figure 30; 
- Rail infrastructure gross investment spending (in million euros at current prices): trends 
reported in Figure 31; 
- Maintenance expenditures in rail infrastructure (in million euros at current prices): trends 
reported in Figure 32; 
- Employment [number of employees]: trends reported in Figure 33; 





Figure 27. Length of railway lines 
 
Note: plots based on Eurostat data 
 
Figure 28. Length of high speed lines 
 








Figure 29. Expenditure of principal railway enterprises in rolling stock, in euros at 1999 price 
level 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data 
 
Figure 30. Expenditure of principal railway enterprises in infrasturcture, in euros at 1999 price 
level 
 








Figure 31. Gross investment spending in rail infrastructure, in euros at current prices 
 
Note: plot based on OECD, ITF data 
 
Figure 32. Maintenance expenditures spending in rail infrastructure, in euros at current prices 
 








Figure 33. Number of employed people in the railway sector 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data 
 
Figure 34. Number of enterprises in the railway sector 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data 
Technical performance indicators 
The only technical PI considered here is rail km per km
2
, obtained by dividing the length of 
rail lines by the surface area of each State. The trends are plotted in figure 35. 
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Figure 35. Length of railway lines relative to national surface area 
 
Note: based on Eurostat data 
Operational performance indicators 
As detailed in Table 61operational PIs available from Eurostat and UIC and considered here 
are: 
- Train km: trends reported in Figure 36; 
- Passenger train-km reported in Figure 37; 
- Annual number of victims, total [no.]: trends reported in Figure 38; 
- Annual number of accidents, total [no.]: trends reported in Figure 39; 
- Annual number of accidents involving the transport of dangerous goods, total [no.]: 
trends reported in Figure 40. 
In order to include data on accidents in the analysis, they would need to be related to 
exposure (i.e., train-km), which they are not. Therefore it was not possible to include these PI 
in the analysis. 
Data on punctuality would have fallen into this category and would have been interesting to 









Figure 36. Total train kilometers, including passengers, goods and other trains 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data 
 
UIC and Eurostat offer different figures for train kilometres, and within Eurostat there are 
different specifications. This report is based on the Eurostat data for reasons of reliability and 
length of the observation period.  
Figure 37. Passengers train kilometers 
 





Figure 38. Annual number of victims in an accident involving railways 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data 
 
Figure 39. Annual number of accident involving railways 
 








Figure 40. Number of accidents involving the transport of dangerous goods 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data 
Social performance indicators 
As detailed in Table 61, social PIs available from Eurostat and considered here are: 
- Customer Satisfaction (available only for certain countries and not plotted here); 
- Harmonised index of consumer prices: passenger transport, charted in Figure 41. 
Figure 41. Annual average indices for transport prices: passenger transport by railway in Case 
States and Switzerland. The base year is 2005 
 
Note: Plot based on Eurostat data 
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Economic performance indicators 
As detailed in Table 61, environmental PIs available from Eurostat and considered here are: 
- Rail passenger-km [pkm]: trends reported in Figure 42; 
- High speed rail passenger-km [pkm]: trends reported in Figure 43; 
- Share of high speed rail on total pkm [%]: trends reported in Figure 44; 
- Volume of passenger transport relative to GDP: trends reported in Figure 45; 
- Freight on rail [tkm] : trends reported in Figure 46 and Figure 47; 
- Volume of freight transport relative to GDP: trends reported in Figure 48.  
 

















Figure 43. Passenger traffic on high speed rail 
  
Note: UIC data; according to Eurostat’s definition Sweden has no high speed railway lines.  
However, the report “Transport in Figures” (EC, 2011) relies on UIC data to measure passenger kilometres. This 
UIC data includes figures for Swedish high speed rail passenger kilometres, without any further explanations 
 
Figure 44. Share of high speed rail in passenger traffic 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Transport in Figures (EC, 2011) 
Note: according to Eurostat’s definition Sweden has no high speed railway lines. However, these calculations 







Figure 45. Normed ratio passenger transport (passenger-km) to GDP, with 2000 as base year 
 
Note: Eurostat data: the data set starts in 1995 and does not include information for Switzerland 
 
Figure 46. Freight rail traffic. Plot including data for EU15 and EU27 
 










Figure 47. Freight rail traffic. Focus on the Case States 
 
Source: Eurostat data 
 
Figure 48. Normed ratio freigth transport (tonne-km) to GDP, with 2000 as base year 
 
Note: plot based on Eurostat data; data set starts in 1995 and does not include information for Switzerland 
Environmental performance indicators 
As detailed in Table 61, economic PIs available from Eurostat and considered here are: 
- Rail modal split (passengers) [%]: trends reported in Figure 49; 
- Rail modal split (freight) [%]:trends reported in Figure 50; 
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- Figure 50CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in rail transport [Mt]: trends reported in 
Figure 51;  
- NO2 emissions [Mt]: trends reported in Figure 52; 
- CH4 emissions [Mt]: trends reported in Figure 53. 












Figure 51. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in rail transport [million t] 
 
Source: European Environment Agency 
Note: The Swiss Statistic Office offers aggregated emission data for all transport modes, though not 
for the individual subgroups, like rail transport. 
 
Figure 52. NO2 emissions from fuel combustion in rail transport [million t] 
 
Source: European Environment Agency 
Note: The Swiss Statistic Office offers aggregated emission data for all transport modes, though not 





Figure 53. CH4 emissions from fuel combustion in rail transport [million t] 
 
Source: European Environment Agency 
Note: The Swiss Statistic Office offers aggregated emission data for all transport modes, though not 
for the individual subgroups, like rail transport 
4.4 Trends per country 
Following this graphical presentation of the data, we will now look at the evolutions of the 
indicators in each country comprised in this study separately, but for all categories of 
performance together. The goal is particularly to observe the overall trend, and to check 
whether there are discontinuities in that trend that indicate a possible successful or 
unsuccessful reform.  
For plots and to contrast pairs of data series the reader is referred to the spread sheets 
attached to this report. 
On the spread sheets, above the chart depicting the institutional evolution in each country, 
there is an interactive graph to plot together two indicators among those collected and 
contrast them directly. The indicators may be chosen from two drop-drown menus above the 
chart. Each indicator refers to a different axis and scale which are automatically updated. The 
drop-down menus, the axis and the trend of each indicator are coded with the same colour as 
are the entries in the legend. These are automatically updated as well and report which are the 
indicators plotted, their source, and the unit of measure.  
France 
France had a reduction in the total length of lines in 1999, two years after RFF was set up as 
IM, from 31,735 km to 29,113 km, while the length of high speed lines was constant. The 
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total length of line has slightly increased since, while the length of conventional lines has 
remained substantially constant. The openings of the high speed lines marks their increase 
from 419 km in 1988 when the observation period started to 1996 km in 2010 (6.3% of the 
total), the last year for which Eurostat supplies data. French high speed lines were almost 
70% of those existing in Europe in 1990 while, with the following developments in other 
countries; they are now about 29% of the total in Europe. 
Figure 54. France: length of lines (km). The rectangles placed vertically across the chart 
characterise the milestones of the institutional evolution indicated in the previous chapter 
 
Source: Eurostat 
While total train-km has been slightly on the increase in the period 1996-2002, they generally 
decreased later (but there is a gap in the data we have: 2006-2008). The limited time span 
covered by the analogous UIC data we could inspect shows a similar trend. The share of 
passenger train-km is constantly on the rise (the same as their value) in the period observed 
while the value of freight train-km is constantly diminishing, also after the opening of the 
freight market. In fact rail tkm have dropped from 57,700 mio in the year 2000 to 29,600 mio 
in the year 2010. The total freight data available seem to contain an inconsistency, while the 











Figure 55. France: total train km (1000 train km). The rectangles placed vertically across the 




Figure 56. France: tonne kilometres (100 mio tkm). The rectangles placed vertically across the 






The ratio of the volume of freight transport with respect to the GDP (normalized to the year 
2000) is seen to decrease after 1999 and was 71.4 in 1999, while analogous decrease has been 
less pronounced for passenger transport, at 92.3 in 2008. Contrasted with the concurrent 
modest increases in GDP, the data for passenger transport may be interpreted as a lower 
availability of resources to travel. It should also be noted that the average index for transport 
prices referred to rail has been increasing constantly, similarly to the corresponding index for 
EU15 and EU27. 
The aggregate data from Eurostat do not allow appreciating the increase in production on 
regional lines that was noted by other observers, as recalled in the previous chapter. The 
trends of pkm, instead allow us to note the stable increase throughout the period of 
observation of the traffic of passengers on high speed trains, which was about 60% of the 
national total in 2010. The total had a decrease until 2005 and is on the rise since, amounting 
to 86,000 pkm in 2009 (of which 60% on the 1996 km of high speed lines, 6% of the 
network). The constant increase in the share of pkm on high speed is consistent with the 
overall trend observed for the EU27 over the same time period. Also passenger modal split 
has been rising almost constantly since 1995, when it was 7.5%; in 2009 the rail modal split 
for passengers is 9.9%. The road modal split is substantially constant, with a marginal 
decrease observed recently coupled with a marginal increase of public rad transport. 
Figure 56. France: passenger kilometres (1000 mio pkm). The rectangles placed vertically 





The usage of the network (train-km/km of lines) has been increasing slightly until 2002 and 
marginally decreasing afterwards, which is consistent with a substantially constant length of 
the network and the reduction in train-km observed. 
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Eurostat data on annual number of accidents show a negative leap in correspondence with a 
discontinuity in data availability in 2002-2003, indicating very likely a change in data 
collection procedures. Otherwise the number of accidents (and its ratio to train-km) is largely 
constant, with the exception of a peak in 2007. The annual number of victims is largely 
constant over the period 2004-2010 for which we have data. Along the same time period the 
number of accidents involving dangerous goods never exceeds 5. 
Data on emission of gases show generally decreasing trends, also when contrasted with the 
train-km data. 
There is an almost constant decrease in the number of people employed in the sector. The 
number of enterprises is constant and equal to one until 2005. The only following data point 
reflects the opening of the freight sector and indicates the presence of 26 railway enterprises. 
Eurostat data on expenditure in rolling stock and infrastructure has too few data points to 
infer trends. 
OECD data on rail infrastructure gross-investment spending has seen an increase year after 
year after 2002 and until 2009 (the last year for which we have data) and so has maintenance 
expenditure in rail infrastructure (with a reduction in 2006-2007). Data from COM (2008) 54 
final show that financial contributions provided by Government for infrastructure have 
almost doubled from 1996 to 2006. 
Figure 57. Rail Infrastructure Gross Investment Spending (million euro, current prices). The 
rectangles placed vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional 





In Germany, on the other hand, performance seems to have improved significantly on a 
number of metrics in the last 20 years. However, in order to ascertain to what extent this 
improvement is linked to institutional changes in the railway sector, as opposed to the one-
time effect of reunification, we have to look at the trends more closely. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the German railway network was reduced by almost 20%. A 
review of the full list of sections that were shut down indicates that this reduction was by no 
means limited to the territory of the former East Germany; some of the biggest shutdowns 
were in Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia. At the same time Germany embarked on 
a process of high speed rail construction, with the number of km of high speed infrastructure 
available steadily increasing throughout the relevant period. Finally, looking at inputs, we see 
that railway employment was reduced by about half between 1991 and 1998, while spending 
on maintenance and infrastructure increased significantly. 
Figure 58. Germany: total length of lines (km) and length of high speed lines (km). The 
rectangles placed vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional 
evolution indicated in the previous chapter 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Moving on to outputs, we have to note that these line closures do imply a reduction in 
technical performance. When it comes to operational performance, the German railway 
system has improved a lot on all variables: the number of train-kms and train-km in 
passenger transport has more than doubled, while the number of victims involved in railway 
accidents has been reduced by 23% since 2004, the earliest year for which we have data. At 
the same time, however, there has been a steady increase in passenger ticket prices, with an 




Figure 59. Germany: total train kilometres (1000 train km). The rectangles placed vertically 





The economic performance of the German railway system has overall been excellent. Its 
output in terms of passenger-km generally increased, except in 2000-2001, while high speed 
has managed to win a share of 28% of total passenger-km. In the freight market, too, traffic 
has generally increased, at least until the onset of the current economic crisis. It is interesting 
to see how the volume of traffic is related to the growth of GDP; like in all other countries 
under consideration, passenger traffic decreased when GDP grew, but Germany is the only 
country that displays a pronounced increase of freight traffic relative to GDP, at least 
between 1995 and 2008. We might speculate that this is because so much of German GDP 












Figure 60. Germany: passenger kilometres (1000 mio pkm). The rectangles placed vertically 





Figure 61. Germany: tonne kilometres (1000 mio tkm). The rectangles placed vertically across 







The share of rail transport in the overall passenger transport market improved steadily in 
Germany, albeit with temporary declines in 1994 and 2002, while the modal split in freight 
declined in the early 1990s, was around 19% in the rest of the decade before increasing to 
22.2% between 2002 and 2008. When it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, the most 
noteworthy trend is the steady decline in CO2-emissions, an overall reduction of 57%. 
Figure 62. Germany: % of passenger and freight traffic on rail. The rectangles placed vertically 





The most remarkable thing about the British railway sector is that it has surprisingly little 
high speed rail, when compared with countries like France or Germany. The only section of 
high speed in the UK is the London-Channel Tunnel link. Otherwise, high speed is essentially 
not a factor in Great Britain.  
When it comes to railway spending, it is useful to note that spending was increasing even 
before the famous Hatfield accident in 2000. Infrastructure gross investment, for example, 
was at its lowest in 1993. From that year until 2000, it increased by 11% per year, on average. 
After 2000, it continued to increase until a peak in 2008, implying an average annual growth 
rate of 7.6%.  
Due to missing data, it is difficult to identify any clear trends in operational performance. It is 
clear, though, that fare prices increased every year since 2000, by an average of 5.4% per 
year.  
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Figure 63. Great Britain: Rail Infrastructure Gross Investment Spending (million euro, current 
prices). The rectangles placed vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the 
institutional evolution indicated in the previous chapter 
 
Source: OECD 
Turning to economic performance, there was a clear change in trend in 1993-1994, which is 
when passenger volumes started to increase. Since then, the number of passenger-km is up by 
82.5%. For freight, the increase between 1994 and 2006 was 110.5%, but since then volume 
has dropped again by 23%. For both passengers and freight, transport volume growth was 
















Figure 64. Great Britain: passenger kilometres (1000 mio pkm). The rectangles placed vertically 





Figure 65. Great Britain: tonne kilometres (1000 mio tkm). The rectangles placed vertically 






For environmental performance, finally, we note a steady increase in the modal split of rail 
for both passengers and freight since the low point in 1994. These gains have, however, come 
at the expense of a significant increase in CO2 and NO2 emissions. This is due to the fact that 
large parts of the British network are still not electrified
40
. 
Figure 66. Great Britain: % of passenger and freight traffic on rail. The rectangles placed 
vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional evolution indicated in 




As noted, what make the Netherlands stand out among the case study countries are the fact 
that its railway network is so intensely used and the fact that it is the only country that has a 
higher modal split for rail in passenger transport than in freight. As far as high speed rail is 
concerned, the only piece of track that has been finished so far is the connection Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-Brussels-Paris (i.e. the HSL-South), which was opened in December 2009. 
Expenditure on rail appears to have trended steadily upward. 
On operational performance, it is again difficult to identify clear trends, although we can 
tentatively say that not a lot has changed over the last 20 years. One exception is the 
railways’ safety record. The number of victims of railway accidents has more than halved 
since 2000, for example. 
  
                                                 
40
 Cf. Department for Transport White Paper CM 7176, “Delivering a Sustainable Railway”, dated 1st August 
2007. 
180 
Figure 67. The Netherlands: Annual number of victims. The rectangles placed vertically across 





As in every other country under consideration except Sweden ticket prices have increased 
steadily. For the Netherlands the average increase amounts to about 3.7%.  
During the relevant period, passenger volumes measured in passenger-km has been fairly 
constant, with the 1993 level of 15.25 bn pkm not matched again until 2006. For freight, there 
has been some steady growth: from a low of 2.68 bn tkm in 1993 freight volume grew to 7.22 












                                                 
41
 Note that the Betuweroute dedicated freight rail line between Rotterdam and the German Ruhe Area was not 
opened until 2007, and therefore did not contribute to this growth. 
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Figure 68. The Netherlands: passenger kilometres (1000 mio pkm). The rectangles placed 
vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional evolution indicated in 




Figure 69. The Netherlands: tonne kilometres (1000 mio tkm). The rectangles placed vertically 






The modal share of rail in passenger transport has been fairly constant at about 9%, while the 
share in freight increased from a low of 2.7% in 1994 to a maximum 5.5% in 2007. Given the 
high and increasing degree of electrification of the Dutch network, greenhouse gas emissions 
were low and falling throughout the last 20 years. 
Figure 70. The Netherlands: % of passenger and freight traffic on rail. The rectangles placed 
vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional evolution indicated in 




The length of the lines over the period of observation has varied very little. No high speed 
lines have been built in Sweden, though Eurostat records some recent passenger operations as 
under high speed regime. 
Looking at the train-km series we may observe the difference in magnitude and trends 
between UIC and Eurostat data. Looking at the latter we note an overall increase, particularly 
after 1999. Considering the time covered by the data series (1998-2010), the increase in train-
km is about 30%. The number of passenger train-km has followed a trend similar to that of 
the total train-km, and its percentage importance has been largely constant over time with 
minor fluctuation, showing an increase from about 6% to about 7% over the time of 
observation. Train-km for freight trains show a decrease in 2009, in correspondence with the 
international economic downturn, which contrasts with a previous increase over several 
years. 
The overall intensity of use of the network has increased over time from about 9,000 train-
km/km to almost 13,000 train-km/km in 2008 (with a reduction in 2009, the last year for 
which we have data). 
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Total passenger transport pkm in Sweden has increased from 1990 to 2009 by about 17% 
overall and the amount of rail pkm has followed the trend but showed overall increase of 
about 70%. The increase in rail passenger transport in Sweden has continued also in 2009, 
when there was a reduction in EU27. Also the passenger modal split for railways has shown 
an increasing trend, reaching 9.3% in 2008, though data show it much lower the next year.  
Figure 71. Sweden: passenger kilometres (1000 mio pkm). The rectangles placed vertically 



















Figure 72. Sweden: % of passenger and freight traffic on rail. The rectangles placed vertically 





The normalized ratio of passenger transport relative to GDP is decreasing for the whole 
extent of the data set 1995-2008, with the exception of the period 2000-2003 when it was 
constant. When looking at the normalized index for railway passenger prices, the trend is 
generally increasing over the years, albeit with a reduction in 2007-2008. 
Freight on rail in Sweden has been increasing over the recent years, particularly after 2002, 
when it was 19.2 mio tkm, until reaching 23.5 mio tkm in 2006. After a reduction in 2009, 
which went along with a reduction in total freight transport in Sweden, in 2010 rail tkm had 
gone up beyond the previous 2006 peak. Total tkm for Sweden present a jump in value 
between 1994 and 1995, which should likely not be attributed to actual changes. Freight rail 
modal split has been decreasing from beyond 44% in 1992 to 37.5% in 2008, which is more 
than twice the corresponding EU27 value and indeed 2.6 times the EU15 one. The 
normalized ratio of freight transport to GDP shows a reduction in 2009, after several years 









Figure 73. Sweden: tonne kilometres (1000 mio tkm). The rectangles placed vertically across the 




Safety statistics, for the years available, show a limited number of passengers killed (2 in 
1997 and 2004, with no other casualty during the years 1997-2009) and a peak in the total 
number of victims in 2010. The time 2004-2009 shows a reduction in the number of 
accidents, followed by an increase for the only next data point (when referred to the number 
of train-km we obtain a similar trend). The reduction happened after Jänvägstryrelsen became 
the Safety Regulator, but it is hard to make a connection. 
The EEA data on CO2 emissions show a decreasing trend, with the exception of the years 
1998-1999, also when the data are referred to the train-km. Analogous trends may be 
observed for NO2 and CH4. 
Employees in the railway sector are less than half than they were in 1998, although an 
increase of employees in the sector in recent years may be observed. We note an increasing 
trend in the number of railway enterprises reported by Eurostat. 
The 1991-1999 expenditures in rolling stock refer to SJ only (since it is for principal railway 
enterprises) and for one year only is below 200 mio euro. The expenditure in infrastructure 
can be safely assumed to refer to the whole network and data show expenditures more than 
doubling in 1990-1995, just after the vertical separation of SJ and Banverket, which we know 
was intended to bring about State control of public funds in rail infrastructure. Expenditures 
have been reduced in the following years and until 2001, while the increase that followed has 
led the 2010 level of infrastructure expenditures to more than twice the 2002 value. The 
OECD data on maintenance show a trend generally increasing over the years and still OECD 
shows a steep increase in infrastructure investments after 2001. A previous important 
increase in infrastructure investments is shown by the data for 1994-1996. 
186 
Swedish data on Government support to services and infrastructure as well as on 
infrastructure renewals and enhancements show a trend similar to each other, with a reduction 
in 1998-2001 and an important increase afterwards. While we have characterized 2001 as a 
milestone due to the separation of SJ into passenger and transport operators, the milestone 
can hardly be linked to the trend change. For the overlapping years, the Eurostat trend on 
expenditure infrastructure and the Swedish trend on infrastructure renewals and 
enhancements are generally in accordance. 
The little data available show an increasing turnover for the railway sector. 
Switzerland 
The characteristics of the Swiss railway network mostly have to do with its position as a hub 
for transalpine goods’ transport. With the second shortest network of the countries under 
consideration, it has by far the highest intensity of use. As can be seen from Figures 24 and 
25, this is not only due to cargo transport. For passenger transport too, the Swiss network is 
intensely used. As of yet
42
, there is no high speed passenger transport in Switzerland. Finally, 
it is important to note that Switzerland has always had some 50 different railway companies, 
with the State owned SBB operating merely as the first among equals. This has not changed, 
even though some new companies have entered the market in recent years. 
In the last 20 years, Switzerland has engaged in an intensive programme of railway 
investments. A detailed discussion of the various projects is outside the scope of this report, 
but it is clear that these investments show up in the data presented here. Expenditures were 
high and the length of the network increased. 
  
                                                 
42
 In 2005, the Swiss Government decided to build connections to the high speed networks of France and 
Germany. However, these links are not yet finished. Cf. Federal Statute SR 742.140.3, Bundesgesetz über den 
Anschluss der Ost- und der Westschweiz an das europäische Eisenbahn-Hochleistungsnetz.  
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Figure 74. Switzerland: Rail Infrastructure Gross Investment Spending (million euro, current 
prices). The rectangles placed vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the 




Over the same time period, operational performance improved. The number of train-km 
increased while the number of accidents dropped steadily. As for social performance, since 
2000 prices increased every year.  
Passenger volumes dropped in 1995, but otherwise steadily rose. From that year until 2009, 
the most recent year for which we have data, the total increase in passenger-km is 56%. For 
freight, there was a similar drop in the mid-1990s, as well as another decrease in volume in 
recent years, presumably due to the economic crisis. Between 1996 and 2006, however, the 












Figure 75. Switzerland: passenger kilometres (1000 million pkm). The rectangles placed 
vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional evolution indicated in 




Figure 76. Switzerland: tonne kilometres (1000 million tkm). The rectangles placed vertically 






When it comes to modal split, the Swiss railway sector appears to outperform every other 
country under consideration, at least when it comes to passengers. Moreover, the passenger 
modal split in Switzerland has been steadily increasing since 1995. Where the cargo transport 
market is concerned, the Swiss modal split has been fairly constant at about 40%, which is 
better than any other Case State except, in some years, Sweden. 
Figure 77. Switzerland: % of passenger and freight traffic on rail. The rectangles placed 
vertically across the chart characterise the milestones of the institutional evolution indicated in 
the previous chapter 
 
Source: Eurostat 
4.5 Performance and institutional reform: interim conclusion 
In the previous section we discussed the trends in performance in each of the six countries 
under consideration. While we noted the years in which trends started or ended, we did not 
yet link these trends to the institutional changes discussed in chapter 1. In order to do this, we 
need to proceed by phases. We will present here our interim conclusions, interim in that they 
are not yet based on our interviews with stakeholders, but only on our analysis of the data 
discussed so far. Chapter 5 will then be devoted to the completion of the analysis that we will 
be able to draw thanks to the interviews we have been taking. 
In what follows, we will first briefly summarise some of the existing literature on the link 
between institutional reforms in the railway sector and the performance of the sector. As we 
have already seen in section 2.2 above, this literature usually focuses on a more narrow 
understanding of performance than what we have chosen, but it is still useful to take into 
account the results obtained. 
Following that summary, we will consider each of our six countries once again to see whether 
the timing of institutional reforms and changes in performance trends is such that we can 
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draw conclusions about their correlation or even causation. On the whole, we will conclude 
that such a link can only rarely be deduced from the data presented so far. 
Performance and institutional reform: some existing literature 
Many empirical studies have looked at performance under de-regulation, most of them 
attempting to establish a link between reforms and efficiency in railways
43
. Among others, 
studies looked at the impact on firms’ financial condition (i.e. revenue vs. cost control), 
productivity and cost efficiency. Studies were also conducted to analyse the impact on 
customers and shippers.  
There seems to be relatively little consensus about the effect of reforms on efficiency. In an 
early paper aimed at studying the effect of Government ownership on efficiency, Caves & 
Christensen (1980) took advantage of the fact that Canada had both a large private and a 
public railway company at the time, companies that competed head-to-head offering many of 
the same connections. They concluded that the publicly owned company (Canadian National 
Railroads) was not less efficient than its privately held competitor. The authors speculated 
that in that case any inefficiency that might result from Government ownership had been 
prevented by the existence of competition. 
Cowie (1999) did a similar study looking at private and public railway companies in 
Switzerland. Perhaps because there is no competition in the market there, he estimated that 
private railways had a significantly higher level of technical, managerial and organisational 
efficiency. 
Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2003) looked at unbundling and found that full separation of 
infrastructure from operations is not a necessary condition for improving railroad efficiency. 
Similarly, Wolff (2011) tested four hypotheses regarding unbundling: effectiveness of 
production and resources, efficiency of production, perceived customer satisfaction and 
overall performance, and accepted none of them. He concluded that “altering the structure of 
a railway sector is clearly no guarantee for overall performance improvement per se”. 
In a later paper, Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2008) found efficiency increases when reforms 
such as third-party network access, introduction of an independent Regulator and vertical 
separation are implemented
44
. At the same time, reforms have been found to positively 
impact the railway’s technical efficiency: higher reform intensity does not necessarily 
increase technical efficiency, which rather depends on the sequencing of reforms. In fact, 
railway is sensitive to changes in the regulatory framework, and one-size-fits-all may not be a 
fruitful way to enhance efficiency. 
Driessen, Lijesen, & Mulder (2006) looked specifically at competitive tendering and 
concluded that it improves productive efficiency; they also estimated that free entry lowers 
productive efficiency. A possible explanation for this result could be that free entry may 
disable railway operators to reap economies of density. Finally they showed that more 
                                                 
43
 An increasing number of econometric studies are looking at railway efficiency and performance (Growitsch & 
Wetzel, 2009; Jupe & Crompton, 2006; Smith, 2005; Yu, 2008). 
44
 While reforms seem to impact positively technical efficiency, higher reform intensity does not necessarily 
increase technical efficiency, which depends more on the sequencing of reforms. This last finding is similar to 
what Wallsten (2002) finds in the telecommunication sector. 
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autonomy of management lowers productive efficiency implying that increased independence 




In summing up the experience of 20 years of European railway reform, Nash (2012) 
concluded that there was still much uncertainty. While costs had gone down and traffic up, 
there is still a lot of uncertainty about the best approach to liberalisation for any given set of 
circumstances. 
Performance and institutional reform: our data 
Turning now to the data presented in the current chapter, as well as the information on 
railway reform discussed in chapter 1, the key question is one of timing. If these reforms 
were beneficial, they must have been followed by some noticeable improvement in 
performance. While correlation by no means proves causation, correlation is a necessary 
condition. 
In France, we observe that both institutional reform and performance improvements have 
been slow. We notice that the earliest reforms, in 1997, were followed by a marked decline in 
the railways’ modal share in passengers, but it is difficult to see how there could be a causal 
link, given the small difference between the price increases for rail and for transport generally 
and the lack of any evidence suggesting a deterioration in service quality.  
Germany saw a significant improvement in operational and economic performance in the 
wake of the 1994 railway reform: more passengers and more freight being transported on 
more trains over longer distances with fewer accidents. A big question mark is, however, to 
what extent these improvements should be ascribed to the kinds of reforms we are interested 
in here: more autonomy for DB, competitive tendering for regional rail, a measure of 
unbundling within DB, etc. Instead, much of this improvement might be the result of the 
kinds of reforms that were already carried out in other countries much earlier, like the track 
closures carried out in Great Britain following the 1963 Beeching report
46
. We cannot answer 
this question based on our data alone. 
In Britain we also observe a significant correlation between volume growth in both 
passengers and freight and the reforms of 1993-1994. It seems plausible to ascribe at least 
some of that improvement in economic performance, as well as the concomitant 
improvement in modal split, to the privatisation and liberalisation of British Rail. The flipside 
of that coin, however, is the growth in costs and the deterioration in safety. There is 
significant evidence that privatisation caused various actors to neglect or mismanage 
infrastructure maintenance leading to accidents and inefficiencies
47
. Whether the net effect of 
greater economic and operational performance but also higher costs has been worth is a 
question that we cannot answer. 
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 These results are consistent with those obtained earlier in a simpler study by (Oum & Yu, 1994), except that 
they found a positive relationship between managerial independence and efficiency. Also (Cantos, Pastor, & 
Serrano, 1999), on the other hand, obtained the same result as Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder (2006) on the 
question of the relationship between autonomy and efficiency. 
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 Note, however, that it is possible that reforms of this nature were impossible in Germany absent greater 
autonomy for DB.  
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 Cf. Wolmar, C. (2007). 
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The Dutch case is an interesting one for present purposes, since it combines some drastic 
institutional reforms (most importantly the full unbundling of NS) with somewhat 
disappointing performance trends. The only clear beneficiary of the reforms seems to be the 
freight sector, where performance started improving even before NS was privatised in 1995 
and before the cargo market was opened up in 1998.  
Sweden has seen impressive increases in rail traffic, in passenger and freight rail traffic (the 
latter is about 2.6 times the EU15 average), as well as large increases in infrastructure 
expenses, more than doubling over two time spans. While we may recognise that the first 
increase in infrastructure spending follows the vertical separation of the Swedish railways, 
inspection of the data series we have collected does not allow us to establish a connection 
with the evolution of the railway sector. 
In Switzerland, finally, performance continues to improve according to many different 
metrics. However, there is no clear sign of any change in trends that might suggest the 
beneficial influence of institutional reform. The same goes for the inputs side of the equation, 
where the large spending programmes undertaken obscure any efficiency gains that might 
have been achieved through reform. 
Performance and institutional reform: interim conclusion 
It is clear from the previous section that at times it is certainly possible to recognise 
improvements in performance trends that coincide with institutional reforms. However, such 
instances are much less common than they would have to be in order to count as clear, 
unequivocal evidence of the beneficial effect of the reforms in question: for every reform that 
correlated with a performance improvement, there is another that had no obvious effect.  
As long as we rely on quantitative performance data alone, we can do no better than speculate 
about the reasons why the correlation is so weak. Perhaps the indicators used were poorly 
chosen or simply too general to expose the underlying causal relationships. Or maybe the 
causal relationships exist only over a longer time horizon, meaning that we might not be able 
to observe them using only 20 years of data, or that we might not be able to detect them 
among the short-term effects of other developments. This is not something that can be 
corrected by gathering better quantitative data; the data we would need very likely do not 
exist, and even if they did there would be no way to tease the effects we are interested in out 
of the overall confusion.  
Instead, the solution lies in a return to qualitative methods. Specifically, we decided to carry 
out interviews with various railway stakeholders in our case countries, in order to further 
investigate the connection between institutional reforms and system performance. The results 
of these interviews will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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5 Performance and the railway system 
In chapter 3 we have identified the main institutional transformations for each of the six 
countries studied. We have concluded that, even though substantial institutional changes can 
be observed in each of the countries studied, each of them remains very much a type of its 
own. A certain convergence can be observed though when it comes to regionalisation and 
tendering of PSO obligations. The problem of the interfaces between the RUs and the 
infrastructure remains problematic and no country seems to have come to a satisfactory 
solution so far, thus raising the questions of the systemic nature and of the systemic approach 
to railways. 
In chapter 4 we studied the various performance changes of the different national railways 
and at times railway systems. We regrettably had to conclude that it was difficult to establish 
a correlation, let alone a causal relationship, between the institutional changes in each country 
and the PIs that were measured. This is in part due to the fact that the indicators of 
performance are often not the relevant ones and this is especially true since these indicators 
do not measure the performance of a railway system as influenced by the institutional 
arrangements. It is also due to the fact that institutional changes produce long-term effects, 
owing to the complex interactions among the various actors affected by an institutional 
change. In any case, so far most of the institutional changes observed led to the institutional 
fragmentation of the national railway system (e.g., growing number of involved actors). In 
the absence of an overall system’s perspective and corresponding actor, this, in turn, leads to 
the fact that each actor is incentivised to define and then pursue its own performance 
objectives without consideration of what such a pursuit does to the overall railway system.  
In this chapter, we thus want to test some of these intermediary conclusions with the main 
actors in the selected countries. A series of questions were thus submitted to several key 
persons in: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Sweden. Interviews have 
not been carried out in Switzerland as this report is mainly intended for the Swiss actors. 
After a presentation of the main questions asked, the results of the interviews are summarised 
in the following sections. Summaries are in alphabetical order by country. 
5.1 Structure and purpose of the interviews 
Semi-structured interviews have been conducted in person, by telephone and, in a limited 
number of cases, via email. Face to face interviews were scheduled to last up to 90 minutes, 
although this was not always possible. We interviewed the main stakeholders (operators, 
regulators and public administrators) in each of the five countries. The interviewees were 
encouraged, among other things, to reflect back on the evolution of the national institutional 
evolution and to link, if possible this institutional evolution to performance. However, the 
interviews were not fact-finding, in that we tried to check whether understanding of the 
institutional changes in a given country corresponded to the reality. Unfortunately, 
interviewees’ knowledge did not always span as far back as the scope of this project. 
Our questions were divided into three sections. In particular, we wanted to know about: 
- The systemic approach to the railway sector, considering the growing fragmentation of 
actors in every country; 
- The perspectives on performance for different stakeholders; and 
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- The various functions and drivers of performance including institutional ones, as 
perceived by the different stakeholders. 
The first four questions of section 1 on “systemic approach to the railway sector” had been 
designed so as to obtain a solid understanding of whether railways were actually perceived as 
a system or not: 
- Who “speaks for the system” in your country? 
- In your opinion, who is the ideal person to have a “systemic view”?  
- Who has the interest at heart for the entire system?  
- Who understands and defends the system in its entirety? 
Question 1 was designed to see how important the different actors in the system are and it 
enables us to have official and unofficial views. In some cases there is no single actor who is 
officially in the position of speaking for the system but some actors out of legacy factors or 
scope/importance of current role are actually in the position of speaking for the system. This 
question was intended also to have the respondents explicating this possible point. 
Question 2, a normative question, explored the ideal view of the person interviewed. 
The aim of question 3 was getting a description of the role and strength of different 
stakeholders in influencing the system, caring about the state of the system. It is telling to see 
whether operators, Governments or travellers are those who have the system at heart. 
Question 4 may seem a somewhat slightly different nuance of question 2 but, besides re-
approaching the subject, was intended to explore the item of how complex the system is. 
The next question “In your view what are the 5 most important PIs for the railway sector seen 
from a system’s perspective?” was intended to understand what different stakeholders in 
different countries consider as KPIs when they look at the entire railway system. This was a 
particularly important question, as we wanted to understand whether the different 
stakeholders were actually seeing the need for performance measure of the entire railway 
system. 
From there, we tried to identify what performance actually meant for the different 
stakeholders, as evidenced by the following questions: 
- How would you describe the mission of your organization? 
- From the perspective of your organization, how would you describe the concept of 
performance? 
- What are the drivers behind your definition of performance? 
- Since when have PIs appeared in your organization? How have they evolved over time in 
terms of number of things to measure and targets to achieve? 
- Who sets the PIs and targets? 
- What room is there for negotiation in setting the type of PIs as well as the targets to 
reach? 
- In your experience, what is their effect on the organization and its managers? 
The change in viewpoint (from system to single stakeholder) was also intended to allow a 
cross comparison of replies with those to question 5, thus providing an understanding of 
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whether system performance’s KPIs (an performance areas) and individual organization’s 
objectives are aligned and to what extent. That is how consistent they are.  
Finally, we wanted to know which functions and drivers in the railway system are required to 
obtain performance. And the last three questions were actually intended to obtain the current 
KPIs of each stakeholder interviewed, where relevant. 
- In your opinion, what are the key functions needed to achieve performance? 
- What are the drivers for performance? 
- What are your KPIs?  
- Who sets the KPIs?  
- How often are they checked against targets or thresholds? 
In the following sections we summarize the answers to these three types of questions for each 
country, highlighting also if other, unexpected information came up during the interviews. 
5.2 France48 
The system’s perspective 
In France, nobody seems to speak for the system. While SNCF does not have the legitimacy 
to speak for the system, its history and economic weight make it speak for the system by 
default (“RFF is not competent, the Ministry is not capable and ARAF is too new”). In fact, 
nobody is institutionally in the position to speak for the system. That said, SNCF claims this 
position, as it is the only actor with the knowledge, experience and history of the sector. The 
position is actually not contested by other operators: SNCF is the one (and only) being 
listened to as the speaker of the system. It is the historical monopoly in France. 
Despite the dominance of SNCF, some view the organization and governance of the French 
rail industry as being fragmented: on the one hand, SNCF has a legal monopoly over the 
transportation of passengers by train as far as domestic travels are concerned (freight and 
international transport being open to competition). On the other hand, RFF owns the network, 
but it is legally bound to delegate the maintenance and renewal operations of the French rail 
network to the SNCF Infra. Besides, RFF is in charge of capacity allocation, but traffic 
management is performed by the DCF, which belongs to the SNCF but acts on behalf of 
RFF. Stations are owned by SNCF. 
The State is in charge of defining the public transport policy. More precisely, it is in charge 
of the “Schéma National des Infrastructures de Transport”, which gives orientations on what 
future investments should be. It also acts as a Transport Authority for long distance trains 
with PSOs (TET, i.e., not high speed trains). The 22 administrative Regions are also in charge 
of defining some areas of the rail policy in France since they define and contract with SNCF 
for the regional transport (TER). They receive public funding from the State to pay the 
unprofitable lines operated by SNCF. The French Rail Regulator (ARAF) is rather young 
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 Interviews with stakeholders carried out with Elise Aloy (Chargée de mission régulation et concurrence, 
RFF), Pierre Messulam (Director of Railway Strategy and Regulation, SNCF), Michel Quidort (Manager for 
External Relations and European Affairs, VeoliaTransdev). 
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(created in December 2010). Its competencies are broadly related to the access of the network 
and it is supposed to incentivize the IM, in charge of the network. In addition, security issues 
are within the scope of another Agency, EPSF.  
This fragmentation and complexity leads to two main difficulties for RFF when it comes to 
the management of infrastructure: (1) efficient planning of works and train paths allocation 
on the network is complex, and (2) since RFF does not have an entire control over its 
production, neither the State nor the Regulator can give an efficiency objective
49
. 
Harmonization of the sector does not resolve the problem of knowing how to run a railway 
system. There are several layered dimensions: in the railway sector, the planning and the pre-
operational program are structuring (something required by mixed traffic). This dimension of 
planning is only perceived by those who have many trains: “only they have an understanding 
of the ‘marginal’ train and only they understand thoroughly the physical characteristics of 
the network, the material (e.g., the trains that speed up quickly and the others) or what the 
management of passenger flows entails”. Neither the IM, nor the Regulator or the Ministry of 
Transport have this knowledge. Finally, the operator active on a marginal part of the network 
does not understand the problem.  
As far as the ideal organization to have a systemic view is concerned, the opinions diverge. 
For some, it is ARAF, maybe not only by itself. The role should be devoted to the Ministry of 
Transport but it appears not to be able to carry such a role in its current configuration. In fact, 
the systemic view is just appearing. Paradoxically, the systemic view is defended by ARAF, 
whereas it should be the Ministry of Transport given its guardianship of safety, of the 
historical operator and of the IM. 
One can also hear the view that the French rail industry should be organized in order to give 
each actor its full and complete responsibility. The European framework sets minimal 
requirements on the governance; especially a complete and full vertical integration of the 
network manager by the dominant railway operator is clearly excluded.  
It is also noted that there are no references in Europe: each country has developed its own 
model, and France should find its own way.  
RFF holds the view that a full and complete network manager should be set up. The body 
should be in charge of the consistency of the exploitation, of the management and of the 
enhancement of the network. It should operate four key functions: (1) capacity allocation 
between circulation and intervention; (2) setting and collecting track access charges, under 
the supervision of the Regulator; (3) management of the network (maintenance and 
circulation); and (4) ownership of investment projects on the network. In order to give the 
network manager the necessary control over the performance levers of the network, RFF 
defends the idea that it should be “merged” with SNCF Infra.  
One operator holds the view that the compartmentalization of the system is rather useful in 
the perspective of an opening to competition: the Regulatory Authority (ARAF) is there to put 
back together and police the relationships between the various actors, be it via its views on 
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 The recent Assises Ferroviaires held in 2011 on governance of the system concluded that (1) the IM should 
encompass all the essential facilities, but the stations and that (2) the IM (RFF) and the Delegate IM (SNCF 
Infra) should be grouped. The debate is open on where this “unified” IM should be located (i.e. unbundled from 
SNCF or merged with the SNCF).  
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network statements, the current management of the network or its view on the opening of the 
market. ARAF, together with the Ministry, should evolve in its role – one that coordinates 
rather than provide arbitrage or send back to back the opposing parties (RFF and SNCF).  
The newly set up Agency is seen as having rendered decisions that show a systemic 
understanding of the railway system (e.g., on stations, confirmed by the Competition 
Authority). It may be in the process of learning the “tricks of the trade” but its youth may 
guarantee a fresh view on the system (i.e., not burdened by the historical operators). For the 
new entrants, ARAF is of course welcome in the process of establishing a new governance 
framework. SNCF will continue to play an important role, but ARAF is central in establishing 
a clear separation of roles. In fact, new entrants hope that SNCF does not remain the systemic 
reference for the railway system. 
Like in other countries with an incumbent operator, some view that SNCF is the only operator 
with people who have enough experience and who have spent time in the various operational 
and planning functions: “Rail is all about managing interfaces as it is impossible to optimize 
the system globally (think of fuses and of the vision of the system). SNCF has the global 
knowledge of the system”. The IM does not speak with clients so it does not have a systemic 
view. As to the UK (where the IM plays a central role), it functions relatively well but the 
network is actually a group of regional “monopolies”. As to the other operators, “they do not 
understand the infrastructure”. The rigidity of the infrastructure entails that a certain level 
cannot be reached. In railways, one needs to know how to manage the flow of passengers: 
“Only the dominant operator knows how to do this since he has the most trains”. The same 
applies to construction of the network. 
The view is not shared by everybody. ARAF and the operators (all together) were confident to 
have a global vision of the system and defenders, without reference to bundling or 
unbundling. Operators also think about infrastructure management. Actually, this is 
independent of the organizational structure of the railway system (integrated or unbundled). 
There seems also to be little consensus as to who has the railway’s industry interests at heart 
and as to who understands and defends the industry. For some, end user of trains, being it a 
passenger or a freight client, should be the focus of the whole industry. But given the 
importance of PSOs and public funds, the taxpayer is also a concern. As a Transport 
Authority, the State is seen as defining some public services of transportation, but Regions do 
the same for regional transport. As the owner of RFF and SNCF, the State makes arbitration 
between the sometimes conflicting interests of these two entities. Political pressures 
sometimes shape the routings of trains, but public funds are not always planned to cover the 
unprofitable routes.  
The issue of financing RFF is also raised (it shows its growing debt). Some wish that the 
commitment of the State to support the transport policy could be translated into a multiannual 
commitment on public funds.  
The Regulator monitors the access to the network and ensures that the monopoly over the 
network conducts its missions in an efficient way. But, this economic regulation is supposed 
to take place in a framework given by the State. 
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System’s performance 
The overall picture of the French railway sector was greatly modified by a number of changes 
in the network: the opening of the “grandes lignes” has brought a jump in volume (i.e., 
increase in volume produced and decrease in unit cost) and the generalization of the RER (in 
1988). In addition, the demographic (dense urban zones vs. diffuse zones) and topographic 
structures make the notion of punctuality hardly comparable across countries. For instance, 
Germany is a meshed network whereas France is a star network (hub). As a result, a delay 
will propagate very differently across the two networks. 
The question of performance is complex, as it is difficult to make a link between money spent 
and performance. In fact, the global pressure to improve performance does not work out. It is 
also very difficult to aggregate indicators, as the local situations are very different. In other 
words, there are technical and political asymmetries that make the comparison between 
international aggregates largely meaningless.  
Even at the domestic level there are issues. For instance between SNCF and RFF there is a 
problem of KPI consistency: the ratio of rail replacement varies from 1 to 5 between building 
site. Some of the most important KPIs are quality, security and finances. 
Surprisingly, RFF has no official position on this subject. Nonetheless, any indicator giving 
an idea of the weight of rail as a mode of transport should be preferred. After all, the share of 
rail in the intermodal competition should rise, be it for passengers or freight. Besides, 
indicators aimed at assessing the value for money of the rail should also be selected. This is 
especially true in the context of tense public finances. 
For one new entrant, the most important PIs at the system’s level are: value for money (see 
the experience of the UK or DE where 15 years of tendering has brought 48% more 
passengers and 25% less subsidies), cost (compensation train-km for contractualized services, 
two to three times more expensive in France than in Germany), cost of structure (DB costs 
much less than SNCF for contractualized services); if looked more to the operational side, 
there is quality (punctuality and reliability). 
For the dominant operator, the five KPIs are: technology (aging and loss of substance), 
security, cost (public finances for infrastructure and PSOs and passenger price), regularity 
and punctuality (frequency and delays). 
Stakeholder’s performance indicators 
For the contractualized operators (e.g., Veolia or SNCF in certain cases) the idea is to answer 
the demands of the end user and of the community buying the service either at the Regional 
or at the State level (in 2010, SNCF entered in contracts with local administrations for the 
planning of 40 lines). In practice, the KPIs are passenger-km and train-km cost, rate of 
occupancy. One operator mentioned that in order to be able to “act within the contracts, the 
PIs are defined when negotiating the contract itself. As a result, we do not have ‘universal’ 
PIs since they can vary contract by contract”. In other words, the PIs are defined contract by 
contract, including the compensation. PIs often include reliability, punctuality, cleanliness, or 
even customer service: it actually depends on the contracting parties and can be as detailed as 
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the contracting party wants or depending on a dialogue between the operator and its 
contracting Authority.  
PIs for regional/contractualized operators are set by the Authorities (Local, Regional or 
National). Given the heterogeneity of the contracts, there are many potential scenarios for the 
negotiation of PIs. In many contracts the objectives and the PIs are fixed. The difference 
comes from tenders in which there is more room to achieve the PIs. For contractualized 
services (public service), it is the Authorities who fix them. For open access, it is the 
operator. 
For one operator, the key functions needed to achieve performance in the railway system are 
empowerment and quality of local managers (decentralization requires competent staff): this 
means autonomy and presence of a manager driving the zone. 
Performance for the railway infrastructure is fundamentally about delivering the output 
valued by customers, funders and other key stakeholders in a sustainable way, for the lowest 
life cycle cost. The objective is to tailor the performance of the network (delays, availability, 
reliability, safety, among others) according to the market needs. A route approach is thus 
necessary. Maintenance and renewals policy should be optimized at the relevant geographic 
level of the network (homogeneous sub-networks delineated according to their main usages), 
while commercial and maintenance policies should be aligned. Unfortunately, the fragmented 
governance of the rail industry is major hurdle to this implementation.  
In 2008, a performance contract, called “contrat de performance”, was signed between RFF 
and the French State (at the initiative of RFF): 33 engagements covered the period 2008-
2012. Since 2010, annual objectives, deriving from the multi-annual contract, are internally 
set up for RFF: each objective has one or several (quantitative or qualitative) PIs
50
. With 
time, the number of objectives has been reduced (18 in 2010, 12 in 2011 and 4 in 2012).  
At RFF, targets to achieve and KPIs have become more and more accurate. A report on the 
33 engagements of the performance contract is issued twice a year. Implementation and 
achievement of the objectives by national units (corporate services) and regional units 
(regional offices) are checked twice a year (May and November) during reviews organized by 
a dedicated team within the corporate governance and strategy unit (objectives/resources 
reviews). This team also assists the concerned entities in steering and enforcing their 
objectives. Each national and regional unit is checking the progress in the objectives’ 
achievement whether monthly or on a quarterly basis. The executive committee is doing so 
each month. 
Additional points made in interviews 
A railway system is not only defined by physical characteristics. The name of the game is to 
make the flow of trains and the flow of passengers coincide. The time constant to manage 
those two flows is not identical. The “gestion fine” is not identical: in operational matters, 
one has to anticipate problems. At the same time, the way infrastructure is conceived has an 
impact on the flow. 
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 All management levels define objectives to monitor its activity: the executive committee, the management 
committees in the Regions and the management committees in the head office. 
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The State heavily participates in the rail sector since public spending amounts to 11 billion 
euros in 2009 (euros value 2000). The State is the owner of RFF and SNCF, and it also 
arbitrates some of the debates between these two public firms. 
For the infrastructure, the French rail situation can be sketched as an “extreme” 
principal/agent situation where expertise and information are located within the agent. For the 
principal, setting efficiency objectives and negotiating contracts is almost impossible. This 
situation should be changed, and a minimum reform should at least encompass transferring to 
RFF the necessary competencies (e.g., maintenance engineering, capacity planning plus the 
information systems). Furthermore, an appropriate “conseil de surveillance” should be set up.  
One of the effects in the contractualized services is decentralization and autonomy 
(empowerment to local operators as it is closer to the market and the Authorities), which 
allows flexibility and resilience. DB has acquired this after fretting with competition but this 
is not the case for all the analysed countries. In Germany, Veolia has a subsidiary for almost 
every contract. 
Summary 
The key points emerged from the interviews are as follows: 
System perspective: 
- SNCF speaks for the system in France, but new entrants hope it does not remain the 
systemic reference for the system; 
- It is claimed that system knowledge may only be with an operator working on large scale 
on a network with main passenger and train flows to manage. This does not suit the IM 
nor the Ministry or companies operating on small parts of the network; 
- It was also stated that SNCF has experienced staff and that the IM does not speak with 
the client, so it does not have a systemic view. “Rail is about managing interfaces as it is 
impossible to optimize the system globally”; 
- Public policy on railways is determined by the State and, for regional transport, by the 
Regions; 
- For some, ARAF (the Economic Regulator) should possibly be the body having the 
systems view. While it might be seen as too “young” (it started operations in 2010) even 
though its decisions have shown a systemic understanding of the railway system. it is 
also deemed that ARAF may guarantee a fresh view of the system (not burdened by the 
historical operator); 
- Some point to the Ministry as the ideal body with a system view but also remark that it is 
currently unable to have this role; 
- The system is seen as fragmented: path allocation is complex and RFF does not have 
complete control over its own production (but would like to have it). A full and complete 
network manager should be set up; 
- Some see fragmentation useful to open to competition and think the system should be 
held together by ARAF, the Regulator; 
- It was indicated that ARAF and the Ministry should evolve their role to one that 
coordinates rather than provide arbitrage or send back to back the opposing parties (RFF 
and SNCF). The Regulator monitors the access to the network and ensures that the 
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monopoly over the network conducts its missions in an efficient way. But, this economic 
regulation is supposed to take place in a framework given by the State; 
- There seems to be little consensus as to who has the railway’s industry interests at heart 
and as to who understands and defends the industry. However, all have a global vision of 
the system and defenders, without reference to bundling or unbundling; 
- There is a dual focus that should be balanced: on end users and on taxpayers (also given 
the importance of PSOs); 
- The State has multiple roles. As the owner of RFF and SNCF, the State makes arbitration 
between the sometimes conflicting interests of these two entities. Political pressures 
sometimes shape the routings of trains but public funds are not always planned to cover 
the unprofitable routes. 
System performance: 
- It is deemed difficult to make system comparisons across networks. For instance, 
Germany is a meshed network whereas France is a star network (hub). As a result, a 
delay will propagate very differently across the two networks; 
- It is also deemed very difficult to compare aggregate indicators, as the local situations 
are very different. Even at the domestic level there are issues; 
- Key performance areas at system level are: quality, security and financing; 
- KPIs for the system characterized by stakeholders include: punctuality, 
reliability/regularity and cost to the State; 
- Other KPIs mentioned include: price of tickets, cost of operators’ structure (it was noted 
that DB costs less than SNCF on contracted services), security and ageing and loss of 
substance of technology. 
Stakeholder’s performance: 
- KPIs are defined differently in the various contracts, though they usually refer to 
passenger-km and train-km cost, rate of occupancy, punctuality, some qualitative PIs less 
easy to measure: in some contracts, one PI can be to increase revenues but also to reduce 
fraud; 
- For the IM the PIs are the 33 listed in the contrat de performance signed with the State 
and on which they report twice a year. Moreover, RFF has internal objectives, whose 
number has been narrowing with the years; 
- For the infrastructure, the French rail situation can be sketched as an extreme 
principal/agent situation, where expertise and information are located within the agent. 
For the principal, setting efficiency objectives and negotiating contracts is almost 
impossible. This situation should be changed, and a minimum reform should at least 
encompass transferring to RFF the necessary competencies (e.g., maintenance 
engineering, capacity planning plus the information systems); 
- One of the effects in the contractualized services is decentralization and autonomy 
(empowerment to local operators as it is closer to the market and the Authorities), which 





The system’s perspective 
Given the set-up of the German railway system, it is no surprise that the views as to who 
speaks for the system diverge. On one hand, there is the view that Government Agencies (the 
Ministry of Transport and the Regulator) as well as the Association of German Transport 
companies (Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen - VDV) speak for the system. The 
Federal Ministry of Transport speaks for the system as the main financer and political shaper 
(have more traffic on railway system). The Ministry oversees the whole transportation 
scenery in Germany and in Europe, and has the different transport modes function together. 
BNetzA also promotes fair access rules to the system: sect. 1 of the law mentions the need to 
promote competition on the network to make railway more attractive. EBA is another 
stakeholder in charge of safety of the system and planning. It is in charge of safety in the 
infrastructure (new infrastructure and decommissioning) and in the rolling stock. Then there 
are also various associations, traffic, consumers, RUs (private competitors) association: all 
could be grouped together to speak for the system but there is no single entity.  
On the other hand, the incumbent operator (DB), while acknowledging the variety of 
stakeholders (private and public actors), is considered as the entity speaking for the system. A 
number of reasons are brought forward: in spite of the opening of the railway market to 
competition, DB manages nearly the entire network and has the largest shares in the 
passenger (and freight) segments. In other words, it covers the whole value chain. In addition, 
there is the perception that DB is in charge of the system’s responsibility: in the public sphere 
(e.g., the media), DB is addressed if there is something to say. DB is also blamed if there is an 
issue. In short, even if there is a competitive landscape, it is still DB, as largest company, to 
be seen as the responsible party by the public, especially when there is a crisis (e.g., winter 
problems, security issues). DB also coordinates processes between the railway industry, 
Ministries and Regulators in such cases. For instance, a major problem for RUs in the past 
has been the degree of detail required by the EBA when issuing homologation of rolling 
stock. This caused delays in some cases. The Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and 
Urban Affairs, EBA and DB devised the “‏Rolling Stock Manual” on 1st March 2011 to 
eliminate problems in the homologation process. DB had the role of speaking for all German 
RUs in the streamlining of the homologation process. A similar central role can be witnessed 
in the development of guidelines describing the process of how railway manufacturing should 
be organized (from processes homologations). Not surprisingly, DB holds the view that it 
may be an efficient market structure to have one or two companies covering the whole 
network and having an integrator view. The rationale behind being that one needs a clear 
design of regulatory principles to safeguard competition and that competitors are also 
profiting from having an integrator pushing the system forward. The opposite fragmented 
model (UK) can be coordinated externally by the market actors (i.e., there is no designated 
integrator) but it requires complex arrangements to organize the integration of the system, 
leading to an increase of the overall cost.  
In summary, there is no single entity in Germany speaking for the system but different 
stakeholders promote the system. DB Group is the first big stakeholder. For instance, DB 
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 Interviews to stakeholders carried out with Frank Miram (Leiter Regulierungsmanagement Konzern, DB), 
Karsten Otte (Head of the Railway Department, Bundesnetzagentur), Martin Ochs (Eisenbahn Bundesamt),the 
latter via email. 
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Netz is very strong as IM with about 37,000 km of lines. There are also other infrastructure 
sister companies (like DB Station and DB Service) in the DB Group. DB Group is very 
strong, powerful and influential. It has the specific and expert knowledge: finance, technical 
development, etc. One cannot replace their expert knowledge, neither in the Ministry of 
Transport or the BNetzA. 
As to the ideal organization, there is the view that it is advisable to have a system integrator 
able to cover the full value chain and have the resources to invest in R&D. While Veolia has 
considerable market shares in certain markets, it does not cover the whole system, only DB 
does (as the largest train operator in passenger and freight markets and manager of nearly the 
entire rail infrastructure in Germany). This makes DB responsible for a major part of the 
economic value chain in the railway system. DB also spends a large amount on R&D in order 
to increase the efficiency of the value chain. Because of this and its integrated structure, DB 
is thought to have the broadest knowledge and understanding of the system as a whole and to 
be in the best position to defend the entire system. This view of DB of a system integrator 
(i.e., having the company operating the largest part of the railway value chain driving forward 
the interests of the railway sector) is seen by some as an efficient way to organize the market.  
As to Authorities or the public sector, the German Government sets out the interests and 
goals of the railway system, a duty enshrined in the constitution. Public Authorities do not 
have the whole knowledge: EBA focuses on safety and financing, while BNetzA focuses on 
regulation, so they both have only a partial view of a system. DB is the vehicle used to 
achieve those goals. For instance, DB Netz has the interest to deliver a functioning railway 
system and to earn money as they regard themselves as a normal economic enterprise (which 
is actually what it is, from a constitutional point of view).  
As to having the interest of the system at heart, views are that the “heart needs to be sliced 
into several parts”. The DB Group, as the integrated company, has the interest at heart for the 
entire system. Even in non-DB quarters, it is believed that “DB really wants that the 
operations work well on the infrastructure, even though they are sub-divided into IM and 
railway undertaking”. The Ministry of Transport could be considered as a supporter of the 
integrated group. It is still official policy that an integrated system pursues economic interests 
best, delivers the best quality, and frees the State from the financial burden best. Each year 
the State is financing with several billion euros of public money infrastructure (maintenance 
and expansion), passenger traffic and scientific developments. The State considers it as a 
public obligation. . The Ministry of Transport main objective is to guarantee supply from a 
public viewpoint, while the BNetzA focuses on enforcing competition. 
In a nutshell, a balance has to be found between the companies mainly thinking of earning 
money and the Public Authorities thinking of delivering basic public transport services as a 
backbone to the industry/country at an affordable price (but diminishing in the long-run). 
Railway tracks are an expensive infrastructure that intrinsically does not have the potential 
for fundamental innovation, as, for instance, the telecom sector has, which is expensive as 
well yet it holds by its very nature room for continuous development. Railway tracks will 
remain a natural monopoly (no duplication of the infrastructure) and it is very costly. Having 
the users pay all the costs would be too expensive, making the railway sector losing modal 
shares to other modes of transport. It is considered to be a public task, also from a 
constitutional point of view (Art 87e), which is incidentally another reason why the 
infrastructure cannot be privatized. The Federal railway is the property of the Federal State. 
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The State has to be the majority owner of the railway infrastructure and has the constitutional 
task to support it. 
Having an actor-pivot should not take away the need to have a proper regulatory environment 
to organize the benefits of the system
52
. The question remains as whether such a system 
integrator precludes having competition. Both regulation and competition are necessary to 
drive innovation, requiring an effective regulatory regime.  
It is noted that, as an integrated company, DB defends the system in its entirety, for example 
by efficiently solving conflicts between the IM and the leading train operating company. In a 
separated rail system, conflicts can be solved and coordination can also be reached, but at 
much higher transaction costs. The finger-pointing taking place in the United Kingdom and 
Netherlands as a consequence of quality problems shows that there is no party defending the 
entire system. 
System’s performance 
It is noted that the big reform of the state railways in the early 1990s had positive effects: 
traffic performance was increased, efficiency of public contributions, modal split, quality, etc. 
People have a short memory when it comes to performance. Looking at data, service quality 
has increased since the privatization process. It was a positive step in the right direction.  
For the Ministry of Transport, the five system-wide PIs fall within the usual, i.e., quality 
(understood as punctuality and reliability), sales/turnover, number of people and goods 
transported, accidents (a remit of EBA) and the length of the route network operated (in km). 
For one operator, performance system-wide relates to: traffic performance (passenger-km and 
ton-km)
53
, modal split of rail, efficiency of public contribution (e.g., how much the tax payer 
pays for train services), quality (e.g., punctuality
54
, cleanliness) and safety indicators (e.g., 
number of accidents) and customer satisfaction (which should be reflected in traffic 
performance and the modal split of rail). 
The Regulator considers as first and foremost PI the transport performance: timeliness, 
capacity access on the lines (A corridor), no disruptions/disturbances, supply of transport 
services to passengers on a regular basis, the result of the interplay between passenger traffic 
(loops in densely populated areas) and freight, whose interests, in the end, are colliding
55
. 
Secondly, prices (to the RU and the end customers) and revenues (interest of the capital 
employed). Thirdly, the subsidy requirements. Fourth, the costs. Fifth, competition. 
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 Attention is drawn to the difference between SBB and DB in this function of system integrator. Germany has 
unbundled the system (with separate legal entities). The steering body (DB Holding) is holding the system 
together and taking over the systemic function from the Ministry, whereas SBB is a completely integrated 
company – the EC splits the world in integrated and unbundled. 
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 Since 1994, freight performance has increased by 52%, passenger performance by 27%. 
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 Punctuality statistics are published on an aggregated, monthly basis for long-distance and regional trains since 
2011. 
55
 See additional points for a discussion on priority. 
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Stakeholder’s performance indicators 
Actors’ PIs differ somewhat from system’s PIs. For one operator, PIs include economic 
indicators (i.e., cover costs and capital costs, be able to re-invest). Concepts like return of 
capital are employed (10% of return of investment for the group), ratio of financial debt to 
equity, ratio of operating cash flows to net financial debts; each business unit (BU) has 
financial targets which are different depending on the segment (e.g., infrastructure vs. 
logistics depending on the risk profile). There are other missions like CSR, high customer 
satisfaction (covering punctuality, cleanliness of trains and stations; BU are monitored in that 
respect; the statistics are published monthly on the Internet), and sustainability
56
.  
Publication of statistics was a big public debate in Germany as it was considered very non-
transparent. DB is now publishing ex post the last month. The whole issue is very 
complicated since it is not only a simple figure, the network is complex and there are many 
external effects. One also has to remember that “the client is only interested in his individual 
train”. Overall though, the attitude has changed and transparency is now considered as 
positive.  
For one operator, the most important drivers of performance of the railway system are: 
maintaining the incentives of a private sector company, competition and effective regulation, 
a clear separation between public and private tasks, allowing an integrated company structure 
to lower transaction costs and sufficient level of public investment into infrastructure. A 
factor out of scope is the public investment in the infrastructure. For instance, DB sees 
systems like high speed lines in France and Spain (investment in new tracks and trains) with 
no competition. This comes from the specific investment in high speed lines and no 
specifically well-organized management. 
At the operator’s level, performance is divided by internally and externally set performance. 
The CEO of DB Group is responsible vis-à-vis the supervisory board four times a year. There 
are also representatives of the Government. In the centre of the reporting system, there are 
financial and commercial indicators. There are also multi-annual contracts defining a lot of 
PIs measured every year. For instance the network manager has to deliver many performance 
reports and it is penalized if targets are missed. There are many specific incentives to improve 
conditions on the network. 
In Germany, the Regulator is monitoring the railway sector via the development of PIs. It 
publishes a market survey since 2007. For every year, there are market surveys on how the 
sector is monitored. BNetzA does not have its own indicators or targets. It only monitors PI 
designed in the market itself. 
There is also a performance system that the Regulator wants to see (e.g., every IM is legally 
obliged to apply a performance regime to increase its performance). The performance regime 
is something else. Every operator has to calculate the punctuality parameters between RU and 
IM (bonus-malus system) and it has limited impact on the performance of the system. 
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 For instance, DB is trying to increase the amount of green energy used in the railway system. DB Energy is 
acquiring shares of power stations and they did long-term water contracts to increase the share of renewable 
energy. 
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Some PIs are set by DB. The Government is taking a dividend from DB (first time in 2010, it 
took 500 million euros from DB revenues and they are partially re-investing in the network).  
EBA has PIs as to safety (laid down in railway and technical laws).  
For the Regulator, it boils down to the performance of the IMs, i.e., render services to the 
RU, free of discrimination, giving access with affordable charges, deliver good and regular 
scheduling (work cycle), deliver agreeable stations, enhancing capacity, diminishing 
disruptions, etc. In fact, the basic measurements for how attractive the railway system is for 
the end users are the total revenue, tonne- and passengers-km, adequate path supply and their 
change year-on-year. The drivers are also good scheduling and good work cycle. 
PIs can be negotiated as it happened for the 2.5 billion euros multi-annual contract. After a 
long discussion, various PIs came out, and they were negotiated with the Ministry of 
Transport. As to cost efficiency (if it becomes a law), it is likely that BNetzA would have to 
negotiate with the IM. It would not be a top-down decision, without having discussed it with 
the IM. This is the way the Regulator works in the other regulated industries. After some 
time, they are set but they can be challenged in courts (not so rare). In other sectors there are 
ruling chambers setting PI after proceedings similar to court rulings; they can be challenged 
in court. There are no ruling chambers in the railway sector. It was proposed to the lawmaker 
and it may be set. 
The Regulator is not really satisfied by the PIs. The current PIs are not applicable to BNetzA’s 
mission, who only takes action if an IM violates rules. In the current context BNetzA solely 
inspects whether the prices reflect actual costs, yet it would be much better to have a PI 
which focuses on cost efficiency. BNetzA would have to deliver a notion of efficiency but it is 
not laid down in law currently (as it is done in the telecom, energy and postal sector). Those 
are either designed from scratch or by comparison with other sectors or companies within the 
sector (benchmarking). The Ministry does not have the tools or ideas to set the cost efficiency 
schemes by benchmarking (comparable IM in the country or abroad) or an analytical method. 
It is very hard to compare IM across countries. BNetzA would focus on certain cost elements 
or services rendered and ask within the sector whether there are similar providers than can 
offer services more efficiently. For sidings, DB and private companies can do it.  
The lack of adequate PIs is attributed to good lobbying. For instance, in 2009, the Federal 
State entered into a multi-annual contract with DB Netz, DB Station and DB Energy to 
maintain the existing infrastructure (2.5 billion euros). This contract does not contain any 
efficiency scheme but, since the sum is not indexed on inflation, it forces the IM to behave 
slowly but efficiently to meet those tasks listed in the contract (given that the contract obliges 
the IM to fulfil certain PI followed by EBA). 
Germany is also thinking of revising the law but there is no idea as when it will be allowed to 
have efficiency schemes as to the costs (maybe on an annual basis or every second or third 
year). 
Additional points made in interviews 
It is noted that Germany may have been late in starting reforms in the early 1990s due to the 
reunification (500.000 workers at the peak) but the French have somewhat missed the mark 
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with the unions and the strong notion of public service. There was no structural means 
(introduction of competition). Reunification was a lucky political coincidence. With reference 
to other EU States, the EU Directives give clear impact/pressure to reform things. The 
financial crises of the Member States lead to reforms. Pressures on the transport budget will 
increase heavily due to the debt crisis. 
As to priority between passenger and freight: if you have a request for a path, there are rules: 
for instance, according to EU law, if you have an application, the trains that are integrated 
into the net or those organized on a regular basis (clock-face schedule) have priority over 
cross-border traffic. Both have priority over freight traffic. EU Regulation 913 (2010) 
proposes a different scheme: there needs to be a corridor along which a certain capacity needs 
to be reserved for freight trains.  
Some further points on performance and its governance at DB: the Supervisory Board, which 
consists of representatives of the shareholders (i.e., the German Government), monitors the 
performance of the Management Board. Compensation of members of the Management 
Board is linked to the level of success in attaining business goals set by corporate planning. 
Performance targets for each business unit are set by the Management Board. Business-unit-
specific PIs are used to monitor operating performance such as load factors, capacity 
utilisation (e.g., tonnes or passengers per train) or volume sold. These operational PIs are 
produced on a monthly basis. For example, the operating value drivers “volume produced” 
and “station stops” are used to monitor DB Netze tracks and DB Netze stations.  
Multiannual contracts such as the “Service and Financing Agreement” (LuFV), between the 
German state and the infrastructure provider are also based on performance targets, which the 
network manager has to deliver. In case of failure, he is penalised.  
Promotion of competition in the railway sector is seen as a means of creating an ideal railway 
system for users as to access and charges: the underlying purpose is not only to support the 
RU as users but also the end-users (forwarders, passengers). Competition is a tool to pursue 
the interests of the end-users. 
There is a consensus that railway infrastructure by nature tends to be a monopolistic market. 
Building alternative tracks or service facilities is usually not economically viable. As the IMs 
therefore lack a market-driven need to enhance their performance it is necessary to have a 
regulatory system in place that ensures that the IMs do not abuse their monopolistic powers. 
Performance could be achieved by extension of infrastructure. Therefore much money is 
needed.   
Summary 
The key points emerged from the interviews are as follows: 
System perspective: 
- There were diverging views on who speaks for the system; 
- Some indicated Government Agencies: Ministry of Transport, the Rail Regulator and the 
association of German Transport Companies (VDV); 
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- However, Deutsche Bahn is seen as speaking for the system, since it manages nearly the 
entire network, it covers the whole value chain and there is a perception that DB is in 
charge; 
- DB Group is very strong and very powerful at influencing. It has the specific and expert 
knowledge: finance, technical development, etc. One cannot replace their expert 
knowledge, neither the Ministry of Transport nor the Regulator (BNetzA); 
- The media address and blame DB if there is an issue; 
- German Government sets out the interests and goals of the railway system, but Public 
Authorities do not have the whole knowledge; 
- As to the ideal organization, there is the view that it is advisable to have an “actor-pivot” 
or a system integrator able to cover the full value chain and have the resources to invest 
in R&D; 
- DB holds the view that it may be an efficient market structure to have one or two 
companies covering the whole network and having an integrator view. The rationale 
behind being that one needs a clear design of regulatory principles to safeguard 
competition and that competitors are also profiting from having an integrator pushing the 
system forward. This view of DB of a system integrator (i.e., having the company 
operating the largest part of the railway value chain driving forward the interests of the 
railway sector) is seen by some as an efficient way to organize the market; 
- The question remains as whether such a system integrator precludes having competition; 
- The DB group as the integrated company has the interest at heart for the entire system. 
Even in non-DB quarters, it is believed that “DB really wants that the operations work 
well on the infrastructure, even though they are sub-divided into IM and railway 
undertaking”;  
- The Ministry is also seen as having the system at heart; it wants a functioning supply of 
transport throughout the country. It is also noted that the Ministry of Transport could be 
considered as a supporter of the integrated trust. DB is a vehicle of Ministry policy; 
- It is a systemic problem: an expensive infrastructure without the potential of 
development that was similarly achieved in the telecom sector. 
System performance: 
- It is noted that the reform had positive effects: traffic performance was increased, 
efficiency of public contributions, modal, quality, etc; 
- Looking at data, service quality has increased since the privatization process. It was a 
positive step in the right direction; 
- Most mentioned system wide PIs include: overall production ones (passenger-km and 
ton-km), modal split, subsidy requirements/efficiency of public contributions, safety 
indicators, but also indicators related to quality and customer satisfaction; 
- Several corresponding indicators are pointed out by the Ministry and by an operator 
(quality, customer satisfaction, people and goods transported); 
- The Regulator pointed to financial elements (prices, revenues, subsidies, costs) as well as 
operational ones in terms of capacity allocation against conflicting requests. However, 
the Regulator would like, as to cost control, to have PI as to efficient cost, while now it 
just checks whether prices reflect the existing costs. 
Stakeholders’ performance: 
- The Safety Regulator has indicators relating to safety; 
209 
- The Economic Regulator monitors the railway sector and publishes a market survey 
since 2007. However, the Regulator does not have special indicators and monitors those 
designed in the market: every IM is legally obliged to apply a performance regime to 
increase its performance; 
- The Regulator would like to see indicators referred to efficient costs rather than checking 
whether prices reflect existing costs. However the notion of efficiency is not currently 
laid down in the law; 
- There is a belief that adequate PIs often lack, as in a multiannual contract among the 
Federal State and DB Netz, DB Station and DB Energy for network maintenance is 
attributed to good lobbying; 
- For one operator, the most important performance drivers of the railway system are: 
maintaining the incentives of a private sector company, competition and effective 
regulation, a clear separation between public and private tasks, allowing an integrated 






Like in other countries, no single organisation detains or claims a systemic view of railways. 
In fact, the existing institutional arrangement (i.e., one IM, multiple operators, one Economic 
Regulator and the Department for Transport) almost precludes by definition a systemic view. 
Industry has to take care of its own affairs (politically driven). 
A common view is that the DfT is expected to have a good overview of the system (not the 
Minister but the people in DfT) as it sets the HLOS, provides funding for railways (GBP 5 
million out of the GBP 12 billion annual cost) and manages railway franchises. The increased 
involvement of the Government into more operational aspects of railways (e.g., technical 
regulation) draws some criticism.  
A difference is made between the use of the system and the system itself. 
Some believe that the systemic view of the railway system falls naturally on the shoulders of 
Network Rail, but that the IM takes too much of a narrow view of the industry. At the same 
time, when one stakeholder (e.g., DfT) speaks or acts in the name of the entire industry, some 
feel that their interests are not well represented (e.g., public statements that are not balanced 
can be made on behalf of the industry yet they might not represent the entire interest of the 
industry). 
Having a systemic view is extremely hard to achieve given the sheer complexity of the 
railway system. In practice, the multiple tasks to run the railway have been allocated to 
several actors with an oversight of either the Regulator (ORR), the Ministry (DfT) or both 
(e.g., the Government sets the framework within which open access and franchise operators 
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 Interviews carried out with with Peter Foot (Network Utilisation Manager, National Networks, Department 
for Transport), Sarah Mountford (Network Rail), Paul McMahon (Deputy Director, Railway Markets and 
Economics, ORR) and Annette Egginton, (Head of Competition & Consumer Policy, ORR), Philip Meikle 
(Head of Performance, CrossCountry Trains), Alec McTavish (Director Policy and Operations, ATOC). 
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work but open access operators are also subject to passenger license from ORR, including an 
obligation to participate in arrangements, which deliver whole-network benefits to 
passengers). 
The railway system is complex beast and many people claim to understand it. One body 
closest to understanding it is ORR. While not knowing the details of what makes TOCs’ 
business logic ORR has a fair understanding and can pick up and interpret what TOCs are 
saying very quickly. 
The current structure prevents a systemic view: the Government will always take the political 
view. Both Network Rail and the TOCs will try to protect their situation. In other words, there 
is no natural objective voice. Many conflicting interests need to convey, but the lack of an 
ideal organization is not the result of liberalization, rather the result of the structure of the 
system. Some share the view that it could be useful to have an objective and sensible body 
who sees the needs of rail users and groups operating franchises (“these companies do need 
to make money and Network Rail doesn’t”). Given that all parties try to give a strategic shape 
to the industry while providing a service (value for money, infrastructure maintenance, etc.), 
somebody overseeing this effectively is quite important.  
Not surprisingly, many stakeholders share the view that who speaks for the system also 
depends on the issue at stake. There are a number of actors with a systemic view: 
Government, Regulators, Network Rail (in their role as a system’s Authority). It is in the 
interest of everyone to have some things dealt with on a system-wide basis, but the question 
is to differentiate system-issues from non-systemic ones.  
Interviewees tend to share the views expressed in the McNulty Report on leadership: there 
may be room for an additional leadership group, but its remits ought to be clearly defined. 
For instance, the leadership body could be entrusted with setting up an architecture to have a 
say on systematic planning issues.  
There is however a difference between leadership and accountability. Responsibility needs to 
be embedded in Government strategy. In addition, a competitive industry may not need a 
leader (e.g., see other sectors).  
The views range from both extremes: either, nobody or everybody has the entire system at 
heart. Some actors (e.g., DfT) may have a lot of knowledge (it is staffed with many ex-
railway industry people) and the tools, but they end up with getting too much into details 
rather than giving strategic directions. It is widely acknowledged that, within the confines of 
funding, DfT does a good job. In other words, DfT may be the guiding mind but not the 
delivery hand. The Economic Regulator (ORR) is perceived as being somewhat reactive but 
central to the system.  
On the supply-side, vested interests may prevent an objective view of the system. 
The notion of systemic view is also influenced by the fact that one can see railways as a set of 





When asked to enumerate the five most important PIs from a system-wide perspective, views 
tended to be influenced by the respondents’ organisational perspective (even though the 
question was formulated at a system-wide level). For instance, on the supply-side, customer 
needs come first together with number of passenger transported (including modal shift) and 
financial aspects. Some of these needs are either expressed in terms of punctuality (e.g., “are 
trains on time?”) or service level (e.g., “do customers get what they pay for?”) either on the 
train or at the stations. That said, issues like timetabling, path allocation and charging (i.e. 
those underlying the provision of the service) were mentioned. Notions of operational 
performance of the railway system are thus often brought forward: reliability, availability and 
punctuality (understood either as delays in minutes or cancellations)
59
 and capacity (e.g., path 
routes and seats on trains). 
It was also noted that it is very difficult to gage the behaviours driving performance. For 
instance when Network Rail was measured solely on delay minutes, it was better off 
cancelling trains (zero minute delay). Now Network Rail is measured loosely on cancellations 
as well. Another issue lays in the circular arguments with the concept of performance and in 
particular the interaction of operators and IM.  
The economic benefit brought to the country, in terms of amount of revenue to be gained 
from the network as well as subsidy level, are also considered as KPI. The “market” approach 
emerging from the interviews reflects of course very much the institutional arrangements of 
the railways (private operators can simply not afford to make losses over a long period). In 
other words, the railway sector needs to be an attractive proposition for investors and 
companies to work in. There again, the “value for money” drive seems to have informed 
answers. 
Interestingly enough, the environment is never or very seldom mentioned. Nor is safety, 
although, when asked, all respondents appear to take it for granted. 
There are hopes among respondents for increased collaboration between railway actors (in 
particular TOCs and Network Rail) to work towards cost reduction, including via the 
devolution to the local level of responsibilities to be more in phase with local circumstances. 
One recurrent reckoning is that incentives must be designed to reflect the overall objective 
from the network, but aligning incentives within the organizations and across the system is 
probably the hardest thing to do. 
Stakeholder’s performance indicators 
Not surprisingly, the drivers behind the various organisations’ definition of performance vary 
to a great extent. Performance drivers are either financially or customer-driven, depending on 
which side of the sector one sits. 
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 See also Appendix VI. 
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 For the record, the operational performance in the UK is measured through the Public Performance Measure 
(PPM). As usual, the devil is in the details. For instance, a cancelled train and a train 5 minutes late score the 
same, although the disruption to passengers created by a cancellation (e.g., during rush hour) is likely to be 
greater. 
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For the Regulator and Government, the HLOS are part of the 5-year rail strategy and 
embedded in the wider transport strategy, so is a high level of PPM (in the basic 90). Other 
drivers include exogenous events (e.g., the Hatfield accident that led the whole sector to 
reconsider safety) or the political short-term cycle. PPM remains the single most used 
performance measure but it is not exempt of tensions (e.g., process of delay attribution).  
On the supply side, firms are interested in meeting revenue and growth targets. At the same 
time part of the contracts with DfT are based on train/operation performance (i.e., delay 
minutes, cancellations and capacity)
60
. That said, in the words of a TOC performance 
manager: “My job is to work with the management team and engineers to keep cancellations 
low (meeting operational performance targets set by Dft). The other side of my job is to 
contract-manage Network Rail”. Performance can also be driven by a reputation factor. 
Operators do not like to be at the bottom of the list. In fact, operators make investments not 
required by the Government. 
One has to remember that franchises “force” operators to work within a framework where 
there are many obligations (e.g., deliver outputs for passengers). Within that framework 
operators try be as profitable as possible (e.g., by attracting as many passengers as possible 
by offering them fares they are willing to pay, train that run on time and all days of the week 
and network availability).In other words, for franchises it is about turning a profit and 
respecting the contract.  
Operators look at passenger satisfaction (regularly monitored), physical measures (errors 
made in processes), and provision of impartial information (studies of stations impartial 
advice). In fact, there is a wide range of quantified measures that are publicly available. 
PIs are reported 4-weekly (responding questions such as “are trains running on time?”, “are 
they always running?”). All statistics are collected 4-weekly and are publicly available. This 
is a very transparent process, even if operators tend to spend a lot of time dealing with 
Network Rail rather than with their own internal operations
61
. 
PIs evolve over time. For instance, network availability is the latest PI introduced. The big 
change is that performance is now a very precise business: there is absolute clarity on what is 
measured because it is so important for TOCs. TOCs are given targets for the whole of their 
franchise (every year improvements, etc.)
62
. 
PIs and targets are negotiated between DfT and ORR together with the operators and Network 
Rail. The performance regime is based on the HLOS and made by ORR (it includes train 
performance, capacity and safety). The recurrent performance regime renegotiation tends to 
create tensions between the Regulator and the Government. In practice, the IM comes up with 
money needed and performance. 
The UK uses a Joint Performance Improvement Plan (JPIP). In fact, one way to look at the 
process is that the Government wants to buy a given level of PPM from the industry, which 
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 There is an annual moving average that needs to be below a benchmark. 
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 The proportion of route-caused delays is generally Network Rail-caused. The majority of a particular operator 
delays is caused by Network Rail or said to be within their remit. 
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 A key thing is setting the targets, another is to decide what happens if there are not met (e.g., ending the 
franchise). There is a range of measures available to the Government going from penalties to non-renewing of 
the franchise). 
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leads to certain performance targets. Operators tend to have wrestling matches with Network 
Rail over targets and responsibilities, whereas negotiation appears less a hard thing with DfT.  
In terms of room for negotiation (type of PIs and targets to reach), the parties tend to agree on 
what is feasible and desirable for the industry. As pointed out, there is certainly a dialogue 
about the best way to measure things. At the end of the day the Regulator and the 
Government make the ultimate decision. In other words, TOCs are involved in the decision-
making process but it is ultimately the Government who decides what it wants from the 
franchise. Given the structure of the British railway systems with private actors, the 
Government needs to carefully weigh the cost of doing things: if its demands are too high 
there will not be any bidder. For franchise operators, it is not necessarily a negotiation but 
more about influencing. As all actors have different ideas, the control period/HLOS is useful 
because the Government can have a conversation about what they want (input comes from 
the TOCs and Network Rail). It is thus a useful tool for all the stakeholders to flag particular 
issues. 
Not surprisingly, the contractual part (i.e. performance targets set in the franchise agreement) 
coexists with TOCs setting internally their own PIs. For instance, one operator looks at the 
number of operational incidents caused in a day
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. Levers to improve performance also 
evolve over time. Since franchises are measured mainly by minutes by the Government and 
the performance and cash regimes between TOCs and Network Rail, TOCs tend to put the 
money in fleet engineering to improve reliability and make savings (to have a high return in 
terms of operational performance) at the beginning of the franchise. Contracts with train 
drivers and the conductors may also undergo renegotiation for more flexibility. Once the “big 
engineering” is in place, operators may be looking at system/process improvements with 
local managers. 
Additional points made in interviews 
In addition to the parties interviewed, other actors play an important (even if limited) role in 
the British railway system. For instance, Passenger Focus is the consumer representative 
body. It conducts regularly the National Passenger Survey. Passenger Focus is Government-
funded and studies passenger satisfaction, time to address complaints, how many complaints, 
how well they are addressed, i.e. what passengers think of operators. 
One of the current issues with the institutional arrangement regarding competition is to strike 
the right balance between ex ante and ex post regulation. In addition, there is the issue of case 
allocation between the various Agencies with power to look at competition (OFT). 
While Network Rail is said to be responsible for 70% of failings on the network, it is at times 
difficult to fault Network Rail (some new equipment has proven unsatisfactory). 
DfT franchise managers spend 70% of time on finance and only 30% on quality issues. They 
have less trouble with operators because they tend to reach their targets. 
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 An error at a different point of the network or at a different time can have completely different impacts on the 
network in terms of delays and cancellations. In other words, repercussions of an identical mistake depend on 
density. 
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Safety is monitored very closely up to reach the status of being taken for granted. “No matter 
how you organize railways, safety is fundamental and comes first”. All the studies show that 
there is no trade-off between different ways in organizing a railway sector and safety. 
One of the present issues is whether checking a TOC is delivering is ORR’s job or DfT’s (as 
currently). 
Finally, a very important issue that is not addressed is about fares and the big distortion 
within the UK. 
Summary 
The key points emerged from the interviews are as follows: 
System perspective: 
- There is no single organisation that detains or claims a systemic view of railways. In fact, 
the existing institutional arrangement almost precludes by definition a systemic view. It 
was even noted that having a systemic view is extremely hard to achieve given the sheer 
complexity of the railway system; 
- It was claimed that one body closest to understanding the system is the ORR. While not 
knowing the details of what makes TOCs’ business tick, ORR has a fair understanding 
and can pick up and interpret what TOCs are saying very quickly; 
- Some share the view that it could be useful to have an objective and sensible body that 
sees the needs of rail users and groups operating franchises. All parties try to give a 
strategic shape to the industry while providing a service, therefore somebody overseeing 
this effectively is quite important; 
- It is in the interest of everyone to have some things dealt with on a system-wide basis, 
but the question is to define system-issues from non-systemic ones; 
- The Department for Transport (DfT) is expected to have a good overview of the system 
as it sets the outputs for it; 
- However, when one stakeholder (e.g., DfT) speaks or acts in the name of the entire 
industry, some feel that their interests are not well represented: vested interests may 
prevent an objective view of the system; 
- Many stakeholders share the view that who speaks for the system also depends on the 
issue at stake; 
- Either nobody or everybody has the entire system at heart, the views range from both 
extremes; 
- DfT may be the guiding mind but not the delivery hand. The Economic Regulator (ORR) 
is perceived as being somewhat reactive but central to the system. 
System performance: 
- Even though we asked about the most important PIs from a system-wide perspective, 
views tended to be influenced by the respondents’ organisational perspective; 
- Indicators for performance at system level should reflect:  
- Customer needs and services level;  
- Financial aspects, and whether the railway sector is attractive for investors. The 
financial aspect include revenue from the network;  
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- Operational performance (reliability, availability, capacity, punctuality); 
- The economic benefit brought to the country; 
- Quality of capacity allocation and charges;  
- Interestingly enough, the environment is never or very seldom mentioned. Nor is safety 
although, when asked, all respondents appear to take it for granted; 
- It was also noted that it is very difficult to gage what behaviours performance drives 
(example of measuring delays leading to cancellations); 
- Another issue is the circular arguments with the concept of performance and in particular 
the interaction of operators and IM (the latter is blamed for much diminished 
performance); 
- A recurrent reckoning is that incentives must be designed to reflect the overall objective 
from the network but aligning incentives within the organizations and across the system 
is probably the hardest thing to do. 
Stakeholders’ performance:  
- The drivers behind the various organisations’ definition of performance vary to a great 
extent. Performance drivers are either financially or customer-driven, depending on 
which side of the sector one sits; 
- Performance can also be driven by a reputation factor. Operators do not like to be at the 
bottom of the list. In fact, operators make investments not required by the Government; 
- Indicators for performance at operator’s level reflect 
- Requested performance: PPM remains the single most used performance measure but 
it is not exempt of “tensions” (e.g., process of delay attribution); 
- For franchises the key is about turning a profit and respecting the contract. Therefore 
they look at passenger satisfaction and operational measures (like those summed up in 
the PPM), errors made in processes, provision of impartial information, revenue and 
growth targets; 
- Some of the PIs at operators’ level are the same or close to those indicated at network 
level, although, as noted above, respondents did not seem to take a system view. 
Operational aspects, which are also summarized in the PPM, are present also among 
system relevant indicators, as are revenues, though in one case from the network and in 
the other from own operations; 
- PIs evolve over time. Performance is now a very precise business: it is very important for 
RUs. The contractual part (i.e. performance targets set in the franchise agreement) co-
exists with TOCs setting internally their own PIs; 
- Network performance is negotiated between DfT and ORR together with the operators 
and NR. The recurrent performance regime renegotiation tends to create tensions 
between the Regulator and the Government. In practice, the IM comes up with money 
needed and performance; 
- Given the structure of the British railway systems with private actors, the Government 
needs to carefully weigh the cost of doing things: if its demands are too high there will 
not be any bidders; 
- Operators tend to have “wrestling matches” with BR about performance targets; 
- On franchises and performance it was noted that a key thing is setting the targets, another 
is to decide what happens if there are not met. There is a range of measures available to 
the Government going from penalties to non-renewing of the franchise); 
- Contract performance has effects on driving the operators to spend money on different 






Several respondents explained that, due to the setup of the Dutch railway system, there is no 
single person speaking for the system. However, when asked to indicate which body may 
have the role of “speaking for the system” and which has “a systemic view” they point to the 
Ministry. Only one respondent believes that the IM is the “ideal person/body to have a 
systemic view”. One of the respondent suggested that regional passenger transport operators 
should get together in an association speaking for the industry, as has already happened in the 
freight sector. 
Similarly, all respondents pointed to the Ministry when asked “who has the interest at heart 
for the entire system” and “who understands and defend the system in its entirety”, and it was 
recalled that the position of the Ministry is subject to parliamentary discussion. One 
respondent only believes that the Ministry is possibly losing touch with the system for freight 
since the State is no longer involved in operations. 
Also the IM was cited as having “the interest at heart for the entire system” and 
understanding and defending “the system in its entirety”. The former position was attributed 
to the IM because it is in charge of day to day operations and has an interest to cooperate and 
facilitate traffic growth. For these reasons and for its link to the Ministry, the IM should have 
a stronger voice in speaking for the system, according to some respondents. 
The IM was seen as understanding and defending “the system in its entirety” because, 
according to one respondent, when the Ministry is about to set new rules, ProRail checks 
their feasibility and reports to the Ministry. 
One example of system-wide decision that the central Government is currently preparing to 
take is the future extent of the core network. Respondents explained that Regional Authorities 
would like to have control over more lines as well as combined bus and rail services. There 
is, however, concern on the part of some that detaching some lines from the core network 
might lead to inefficiencies. The same concerns refer to the possibility of mixing trains. 
Currently, there is also a debate about the interfaces between the core network and the local 
lines from 2015 onwards, when the new concession for operating service on the core network 
will be issued (most likely again to NS). Now services from local lines extend on the core 
network only if NS agrees. 
One of the respondents noted that consumer bodies and regional bodies also try to have a role 
in speaking for the system but, according to the law, they may not have it. The same person 
said that when it comes to regional lines, the knowledge is now fully local, although when the 
transfer of responsibilities to local Governments was just at the beginning, Local Authorities 
had assistance from central Government. 
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 Interviews to stakeholders carried out with Kees Harinck (Account Manager, ProRail), Renée Elzinga (Head 
of Regulatory Affairs and Compliance, NS), Jochen Meulman (senior jurist, NMA/VK) and Wouter Montfoort 
(senior member of staff, NMa/VK), Masja Stefanski (senior policy advisor, Department of Transport), Frank 
van Setten (VeoliaTransdev), Loek Dieteren (Province of Limburg), Ton Spaargaren (Province of Gelderland), 
Eric Struch (Province of Zuid Holland, Arriva Nederland - various contributors with response to questionnaire 
coordinated by Akkelien Schaap (via email). 
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The existence of a public transport ambassador (“OV-ambassadeur”, a senior politician was 
in this role 2006-2010) was also mentioned by few, though clarifying that this was a figure to 
give a personal reference to the Parliament and the stakeholders, should promote public 
transport according to Government plans but had not real powers and was to foster informal 
mediation in case of disputes. 
Also most of the respondents concerned with peripheral lines
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 indicate that the 
Ministry/Government speak for the system in the Netherlands, although two of them indicate 
also NS in that role, and one of them associates NS and ProRail as the actors speaking for the 
system.  
One of the people referring to NS as speaking for the system mentioned that it makes 
decisions that cascade onto local lines (a comment intended also in terms of opportunities 
created) so their influence still exists. The need for systemic view is felt not just in terms of 
strategy but simpler, but as important matters, such as ticketing. 
When asked who should speak for the system some pointed to the Ministry or to the IM, as 
the other group of respondents. However, one points to each Region and another indicated the 
need for an independent mobility commission and for an organisation able to speak for the 
passenger transport industry (peripheral railway operators, in the Dutch case, run both bus 
and rail services). 
When asked who has the interest at heart for the system, the stakeholders interested in 
peripheral lines gave replies different from the other group, and among themselves, pointing 
to the operators, the IMs, the Transport Authorities, the passenger and, in one case, to the 
Ministry, which had been the actor indicated by the other group of stakeholders. One of the 
respondents thinks the Minister personally has the interest at heart for the entire system, since 
the Parliament and the public opinion turn to her. 
Similarly, diverse replies were offered when the peripheral line stakeholders were asked who 
understands and defends the system in its entirety. Some point to the Ministry, as the other 
group of interviewee, others to ProRail and the operators, to the PTAs (very likely referring 
to the peripheral line system) and the travellers, while one respondent indicated that nobody 
understands the whole system. Respondents from Provinces also claimed a role in 
understanding the system since they take a multimodal viewpoint and finance infrastructure 
that later is managed by ProRail. 
One of the interviewees, when asked why safety is rarely mentioned in the interviews, 
pointed out that ProRail has it as one of its KPA. 
                                                 
65 Our study of the Netherlands included interviews also to authorities and operators responsible for the services 
on the lines assigned to the Provinces and City Regions after the Railway Act of 2000. The interviews with them 
capture a partly separated system, due to the nature of the services, on lines that spur from the core network, but 
link to it, in terms of division of revenues from fares and sometimes with small overlaps. Most importantly, 
though, during the current discussion on the next core network concessions (2015-2025) the operators of those 
peripheral lines have suggested that they may run services “faster and better” (FMN, 2011) and put forward the 
idea of dividing the core network in several concessions, for which they could compete, while one suggested 
that would be ready to take over the whole network. Given the on-going developments, some interviews were 
conducted also with stakeholders involved also in services contracted by regional authorities. They are reported 




Respondents have pointed to traffic growth as a KPI for the system, as well as to the PIs that 
are part of the concessions of the IM and of the national main line passenger operator. These 
are rather KPAs that are operationalized every year by detailing a set of actual PIs and levels. 
The general KPIs from the IM concession (currently with ProRail) are: 
- The availability and reliability of the rail infrastructure; 
- The cleanliness, accessibility and security with regards to personal safety of the transfer-
infrastructure (platforms, tunnels, stairs, elevators, ramps and walkways at railway 
stations); 
- The quality of ProRail’s intervention in case of disruptions; 
- The quality of the capacity allocation; 
- The quality of information supply. 
The provision of information is presently an issue in the political debate, especially with 
reference to information provided in case of disruption and winter problems. Respondents 
also explained that, as seen in the political debate, punctuality used to be a major issue, while 
the focus has now moved to frequency. 
In fact, it was clarified in the interviews, the political dimension of the Dutch railways is very 
important and the Parliament debates railways every year. 
The KPIs for the main network operations’ concession (currently with NS) are: 
- Personal security of travellers and employees; 
- Punctuality; 
- Availability of seats and general transport capacity; 
- Service level, both in station and on trains, specifically the level of cleanliness of stations 
and trains and the adequacy of the information provided to travellers. 
KPI levels for the core network are checked every three months and bonuses of NS and 
ProRail top management are linked to them. This is not written in the concessions but it is 
part of standard policy for any Dutch publicly owned organisation, one respondent explained. 
It was also explained that the concessions and the indicators therein are the result of a process 
started with a decrease in realised values of previous KPIs (punctuality among others) that led 
the Ministry to micro-regulating. Now the Ministry sets the KPIs, and the operations are left 
to the concessionaires. The most recent change happened in two stages. Immediately after the 
concessions had been issued, the system was input based: the concessionaires were asked 
what they were doing towards improving indicators and performance. More recently the 
focus turned on the output and fines are issued to NS if targets are not met. 
Stakeholder’s performance indicators 
The interviewer was referred to the concessions when asking about PIs for single actors and 
in this respect system-wide and operators’ own KPIs are aligned. The general PIs for the IM 
and for the operator of the core network have already been reported above. As explained, 
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those are more like KPAs and are operationalized each year in a management plan for the IM 
and in a traffic plan for the operator. The plans contain detailed PIs and levels to maintain. 
ProRail and NS conduct consultations with relevant stakeholders during the preparation of 
each year’s plans. The comments emerged during the consultations are also reported on the 
plans. Eventually, the plans are proposed to the Ministry, which agrees upon them. 
ProRail’s own position stems also from benchmarking other IMs. Indeed, the network 
concession requires that ProRail, every four years, benchmarks elements such as costs and 
productivity at least against those of the IMs of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, 
Germany, France and Japan. The benchmarks have to be reported to the Ministry and ProRail 
has to explain possible differences. 
ProRail’s KPIs are checked against targets once a year with the Ministry and every three 
months with the RUs. 
It was also mentioned during the interviews that indicators have been adapted over the 
current, and first, concession period. For instance, KPIs account for services actually run to 
avoid that the operator, in order to meet the punctuality indicator, skips services. Such a 
particular indicator has most recently been included in the KPI on passenger punctuality 
which accounts for services actually run, that have arrived within five minutes of the 
scheduled time and have met the scheduled connections. 
Respondents concerned with service under the remit of the Provinces or City Regions pointed 
much to punctuality, passenger satisfaction/passenger number, and affordability of service. 
The viewpoint of the customers was also remarked when pointing to the attractiveness of the 
services, and to travel information among the most important PIs or areas. They also 
indicated among the five most important PIs reliability (dividing also between reliability of 
service and of infrastructure) and capacity. Safety was also mentioned as well as the 
“happiness of the local Government” and financial elements such as the price of the ticket 
related to subsidy, and the operator’s profit. 
A respondent explained that “quality criteria evolved by asking travellers”. It started at the 
beginning of service provision by Provinces when travellers could make appeals about 
services. Both Regional Authorities and operators have used KPIs since the beginning of rail 
operations. However, changing travellers’ needs has implied changes in priority and setting 
performance criteria and indicators. As an example offered, connections made are now 
measured in relation to the number of travellers making the connections, so as to actually 
weigh the effects of rush hours and lull time.  
The Government of a Province sets the KPIs, and the call for tender gives targets, but the 
operators may offer improvements. In that sense, the operators set the KPIs. After the 
procurement process there is no room for negotiation. In one case, however, it was explained 
that, depending on the contract, there may be negotiations during the contract but the PTA is 
very resilient. KPIs are measured by operators. PTAs check but “they take the operators to be 
trustworthy when supplying information until the contrary is proven”: if they “can no longer 
trust an operator it is a problem”. 
Operators report checking different types of indicators at different intervals: punctuality and 
availability every month and passenger satisfaction twice a year. In other cases most KPIs are 
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checked every three months and once a year. Managers of private operators end of year bonus 
is affected by the indicator level achieved. 
The KPIs for rail services and for all transport services in the Province of Limburg were 
provided as a follow up to one of the interviews (Source: Dieteren, 2012, personal 
communication). Rail services in Limburg have operational indicators on punctuality, 
capacity and replacement service in case availability in case of cancellation. They also have 
to perform against PIs for all transport services relating to customer satisfaction, cost/revenue 
ratio, amount of complaints against the number of passengers. 
However, each Province sets its own and there is no general framework, although there a is 
publication by the Knowledge Centre on Public Transport (KpVV) to provide PTAs with a 
toolbox for contracting services, which suggests also KPIs that could be adopted. One of the 
respondents clarified that the KpVV system could have up to 90 indicators but the Local 
Authority he is concerned with would not need such an extensive set of information and is 
discussing which are the essential indicators they need to focus on. 
When asked which the key functions to achieve performance are, respondents pointed to well 
run and maintained infrastructure and to cooperation among actors (with no single actor in 
the driver’s seat, specified one of the respondents). Cooperation was also mentioned along 
with coordination of actors. One respondent made the point on infrastructure maintenance 
also along with the need for infrastructure availability. 
Cooperation has been described from the viewpoint of the Local contracting Authorities, 
which join forces when travel patterns are interlinked. This is the case for instance in the East 
of the country where several agglomerations cooperate in a single public body.  
The need for cooperation was remarked also with reference to the need for partnerships 
among operators, although one respondent remarked that the passenger operators cooperate in 
providing a connected network but freight companies simply compete to get the best track 
access. 
One example of partnership among operators is the operational control centre (OCCR - 
Operationeel Controle Centrum Rail) recently set up to deal with day to day traffic 
management. This control centre was investigated by the Regulator (NMa/VK) on request by 
the Commission and cleared. To ensure transparency at the OCCR, actions are registered on a 
logbook. The person mentioning this example noted that not everything may be normed (“the 
fine expertise cannot be described”) and it is necessary to work on the basis of mutual trust. It 
was clarified that ProRail has no right to impose a solution in case of conflict; rather they 
work to reach agreed solutions. In traffic control, ProRail takes action only for safety 
reasons; other actions are agreed with operators. 
Respondents explained that the OCCR is staffed by ProRail and, while all operators have 
access to it, only NS is always present. Regional operators do not have enough staff to be 
present in person at the centre (in Utrecht) or attend all the meetings –these are video 
meetings, three times a day. As a result, in the opinion of one of the respondents, they may 
lose touch with the system. On the other hand, since regional operators work on lines that are 
somewhat separated from the rest of the network, they only wish to be involved when 
something goes wrong. 
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Another example of cooperation, described by one of the respondents, is an initiative called 
“tracking together”, whereby actors of the railway system conduct a strategic discussion on 
long term prospects and issues. The interviewee who mentioned this initiative believes that 
unbundling works by cooperation and actors are not simply users of the network, but wish to 
have a role in the public discussion about its development. 
Other key functions that need be in place for the railways system to perform are clear rules. 
These are cited with reference to capacity allocation and day to day operations.  
For the system to thrive as a market, the need of business opportunities was recalled. 
Taking a more operational viewpoint, respondents indicated maintenance as a key function to 
achieve performance. 
One respondent only stated that a key function for the system to work would be managing 
transport, as in the whole of the transport system, not just rail or modes separately. The same 
respondent feels there is a need of somebody in charge of improving the whole transport 
system. 
Respondents concerned with services contracted by Regional Authorities also pointed to 
cooperation and trust. One stated decisively “good management teams, good trains, good 
tracks (a precondition)”. Realistic KPIs are also important for some, as is the control and 
monitoring by the public administration. 
Some also pointed simply to “money”, intended as a lever. In fact it was clarified that 
“transport companies are much smarter than we are at the PTA. They are far better at 
thinking at possibilities, and we do not have the power nor the possibilities to make a 
contract in which everything is written down. There will still be gaps whatever we do. Even 
when learning by doing. It is fine if we may define 80% of the system. In that 80% money is 
an important indicator and we have made contracts where money has an effect. Money hurts 
the transport company, if the service is that bad that they do not have travellers it hurts: the 
company loses, they lose travellers and income.” 
Additional points made in interviews 
Interviewees noted that railways are an emerging market. It was also remarked that, as a 
market, railways cannot be left without Government intervention without risking to have 
undesired effects. The brief experience of competition on the rails for passenger services 
lived in the Netherlands in 1996-1999 (with operator Lovers Rail only) was touched upon in 
the interviews suggesting that a main issue at the time was the lack of clear rules to introduce 
competition. 
The provision of passenger traffic on the core network is moving towards a high frequency 
system, with shorter trains at shorter intervals. Test periods have been run by NS in 2010 (for 
three weeks) and previously. In this framework there has been the suggestion to procure 
intercity and regional trains on the core network separately, but it has been shelved: those 
services are too intertwined. One of the respondents remarked that this is an issue brought up 
only by NS as an argument towards keeping the concession of the core network for the 2015-
2025 period. Regional operators have shown interest in services on the core network, one of 
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them with the intention of becoming responsible for the whole core network, others with the 
idea of seeing it split into several concessions. They state they would do “better for less” and 
would achieve enhanced coordination of bus and rail services as they did when taking over 
services of regional interest. Also Local Authorities have an interest in having a say on those 
services and envisage the possibility of having services of local interest contracted to regional 
operators, with a view to expand the services they offer beyond the current lines. However, 
views are not homogeneous, and one respondent suggested that operations on the core 
network might be too complex for local operators. Part of the reasoning is that private 
companies have short decision lines but also no overheads so, if matters become too complex, 
they may not make it. 
One of the respondents suggested that there might be capacity shortages in the future and that 
the solution would be to build some new stretches of rail and separate freight and passenger 
traffic. 
In local concessions much room is left for innovations/operating decisions by the operator.  
Example brought during the interviews include Wi-Fi on the trains, first introduced by 
Noordned, a concessionaire of regional services, and the request granted by the Authorities to 
run second class only services on regional lines. 
One respondent noted that when new entrants took over regional services, NS was directed to 
accept them by the Ministry. The changeover of operator was a success, the same respondent 
remarked, with savings in costs, introduction of new rolling stock and avoidance of parallel 
bus lines (and consequent reallocation of subsidies). The initiative to put bus and rail together 
came much from the operators, some of which were bus operators beforehand. The same 
respondent remarked “rail receives much more political attention than buses” and that bus 
operations would not have made it, had they not been joined with rail operations. On the 
strategic view of operators, one of the respondents pointed out that “Operators want to make 
money and they may do it either by having income increasing or cutting costs. But they also 
have to believe in their products. To show it, they have to produce plans for the years of 
concession.” It was further clarified that “At the start of competition in Provinces, operators 
decreased costs by cutting staff but staff laid off were often the people able to develop public 
transport. That is why public transport quality was the responsibility of the Authority: 
operators did not have people for it. Nowadays the operators are convinced that they have to 
develop public transport themselves and they have again employees to develop it as well as 
the reserve money needed for the development.” 
PTA may find difficult to collaborate when they have joint responsibilities on lines and one 
has to take the lead. Experience would point to a not too fragmented system of PTAs. 
Another respondent concerned with regional services pointed out that local railways are the 
backbone of a much wider system and structure the territory, attracting investments in real 
estate in a virtuous circle. 
A complaint about the IM and its current mission was that before vertical separation it would 
focus on keeping train running and minimise disruptions, for instance trying to keep 
maintenance at night. Now the IM has also a focus on itself and try to avoid working at night 




The key points which have emerged from the interviews are as follows: 
System’s perspective: 
- Due to the setup of the Dutch railway system, there is no single person speaking for the 
system; 
- The Ministry is the body indicated by most interviewees as the one that may have the 
role of “speaking for the system” and which has “a systemic view”; 
- Also respondents concerned only with peripheral lines indicate the Ministry, as the body 
speaking for the system, although some indicate NS; 
- It is again the Ministry who has the interest at heart for the entire system and who 
understands and defend the system in its entirety, and it was recalled that the position of 
the Ministry is subject to parliamentary discussion; 
- Stakeholders concerned with peripheral lines gave replies different from the other group, 
and among themselves, pointing to the operators, the IMs, the Transport Authorities, the 
passenger and, in one case, to the Ministry; 
- One respondent believes that the Ministry is possibly losing touch with the system for 
freight since the State is no longer involved in operations; 
- Also the IM was cited as having “the interest at heart for the entire system” and 
understanding and defending “the system in its entirety”; 
- The IM defends the system in its entirety because it is in charge of day to day operations 
and has an interest to cooperate and facilitate traffic growth; 
- Diverse replies were offered when the peripheral line stakeholders were asked who 
understands and defends the system in its entirety; 
- Respondents from Provinces also claimed a role in understanding the system since they 
take a multimodal viewpoint and finance infrastructure that later is managed by ProRail; 
- The need for systemic view is felt from stakeholders concerned with peripheral lines not 
just in terms of strategy but simpler but as important matters, such as ticketing. 
System’s performance: 
- PIs for the system are traffic growth and the indicators in the concessions of the IM and 
of the core network operator (NS); 
- Concession indicators for the IM span the areas of availability and reliability of the 
infrastructure, including intervention in case of disruption, quality elements for public 
spaces in stations and information; 
- Concession indicators for the core network operator concern personal security, 
punctuality, capacity, and quality of service as well as information; 
- The provision of information is a key areas for performance of both actors and is 
presently an issue in the political debate; 
- Punctuality used to be a major issue, while the focus has now moved to frequency; 
- The political dimension of the Dutch railways is very important and the Parliament 
debates railways every year; 
- Those performance areas are operationalized each year with indicators and thresholds. 
The Ministry sets the KPIs and the operations are left to the concessionaires; 
- Immediately after the concessions had been issued, the system was input based: the 
concessionaires were asked what they were doing towards improving indicators and 
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performance. More recently the focus turned on the output and fines are issued to NS if 
targets are not met. 
Stakeholders’ performance: 
- PIs for the core network operator and for the IM derive form the concessions, as noted 
above. In this sense they are aligned to system ones; 
- Many of NS indicators derive from customer ratings rather than hard data elaboration 
- ProRail’s own thresholds result also from benchmarking other IMs; 
- Indicators have been adapted over time and have become more sophisticated. KPIs 
account for services actually run to avoid that the operator, in order to meet the 
punctuality indicator, skips services. Such a particular indicator has most recently been 
included in the KPI on passenger punctuality which accounts for services actually run, 
that have arrived within five minutes of the scheduled time and have met the scheduled 
connections; 
- Respondents concerned with peripheral lines point to operational indicators (punctuality, 
reliability, capacity), customer satisfaction (also with information), and financial 
elements such as the price of the ticket related to subsidy, and the operator’s profit; 
- “Quality criteria evolved by asking travellers”. It started at the beginning of service 
provision by Provinces when travellers could make appeals about services; 
- The Government of a Province sets the KPIs, and the call for tender gives targets, but the 
operators may offer improvements. In that sense, the operators set the KPIs; 
- Key functions to achieve performance include well run and maintained infrastructure and 
to cooperation among actors and their coordination. Also clear rules for capacity 
allocation and day to day operations, the need for business opportunities are deemed 
necessary to achieve performance; 
- Cooperation has been described from the viewpoint of the Local Contracting Authorities, 
which join forces when travel patterns are interlinked; 
- The need for cooperation was remarked also with reference to the need for partnerships 
among operators; 
- “The fine expertise cannot be described”, and it is necessary to work on the basis of 
mutual trust; 
- Cooperation and trust were mentioned as necessary to achieve performance by 
stakeholders concerned with peripheral lines; 
- A further driver for performance is money “we have made contracts where money has an 
effect. Money hurts the transport company, if the service is that bad that they do not have 
travellers it hurts: the company loses, they lose travellers and income.”; 
- One respondent remarked that the passenger operators cooperate in providing a 
connected network but freight companies simply compete to get the best track access; 
- Actors of the railway system conduct a strategic discussion on long term prospects and 
issues, they wish to have a role in the public discussion about its development; 
- The initiative to put bus and rail together came much from the operators, some of which 
were bus operators beforehand. The same respondent remarked “rail receives much more 
political attention than buses” and that bus operations would not have made it, had they 
not been joined with rail operations; 
- PTA may find difficult to collaborate when they have joint responsibilities on lines and 
one has to take the lead; 
- Before vertical separation the IM would focus on minimising disruptions, for instance 
trying to keep maintenance at night. Now it has also a focus on itself and try to avoid 
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working at night while preferring cancelling services at weekend, also following more 





According to a group of respondents, in Sweden the Ministry of Enterprise or the State 
owned IM/system planner, Trafikverket, speak for the system, while another group of 
respondents indicated that all actors speak for the system, or have the possibility to do so. 
In fact the Ministry of Infrastructure or Trafikverket, the multimodal IM, speak for the system 
for the majority of respondents. Trafikverket, the Swedish Transport Administration, is an 
Agency that operates at arm’s length of the Ministry of Enterprise and it is an instrument of 
Government transport policy, therefore replies pointing to either or both have been 
considered together in this analysis. One respondent only made the point that the Government 
would not want Trafikverket’s voice to be stronger than the Ministry’s, the former being 
dependent on the latter. 
Indeed, several respondents mentioned directly the Swedish Transport Administration 
(Trafikverket), which, according to most replies, is also the ideal entity to have a systemic 
view.  
Only one of the respondents underlined that, in his opinion, Trafikverket (established in its 
current form in 2010) is still settling into its new role: it is changing from being the body in 
charge of maintenance and construction to being the “general of the system”, therefore 
dealing with coordination and consolidation of the views of the actors as well as having a 
strategic view on the railways (procurement of services being a minor task for this Agency). 
The picture of the “general of the system” has also been used with reference to the 
coordination of operations when winter problems arise. The winters of 2009 and 2010 have 
been particularly critical for the railway system, and the public debate about transport and 
railways attracts much attention, hence the importance of the item. The IM has the 
operational responsibility when it comes to winter problems, but its role is limited to 
coordination of actors also since a reduced plan for operations in winter is agreed in advance 
as are traffic priority rules. 
It was also mentioned that Trafikverket is currently undergoing a change in terms of bringing 
together the cultures of the previous road and rail separate IMs. 
Only one respondent referred to “speaking for the system” in terms of having a public role 
and indicated that, when there are problems, the visible stakeholders to whom the press turns 
are the Swedish Transport Administration, Trafikverket, and the incumbent and still major 
passenger transport operator, SJ. 
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 Interviews to stakeholders carried out with Lars Hellsvik (Senior Advisor, Director General’s Office, 
Trafikverket, Mats Andersson (chief of staff, Transportstyrelsen) and Åke Lewerentz (legal adviser, 
Transportstyrelsen), Lennart Dahlborg (Director General, Statens Järnvägar), Tommy Jonsson (Trafikverket), 
Erik Bech-Jansen (Managing Director, Arriva Sweden), Tomas Wallin (Managing Director, Veolia Transport 
Sweden), Ulla Markström (Contract manager, Commuter Trains, AB Storstockholm Localtrafik). 
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The alternative reply to the “who speaks for the system” question pointed at several 
(potentially all) actors. It was remarked that in a system with a multiplicity of operators, any 
of them has the possibility of speaking for the sector; and they do so in different ways. For 
instance, they may report issues to the IM or to the Ministry, but also disseminate their 
concerns via the press, thus taking them to the public debate. The latter point links to the fact 
that even though many may speak for the system, the Government is the only actor politically 
responsible for it. 
While most respondents believe Trafikverket is the ideal entity to have a system view, other 
respondents believe operators in general (but particularly long distance ones) have a system 
view as “responsibility and activity go well together” while other respondents pointed to 
Trafikanalysis. The role of this Agency, which is really at arm’s length of the Ministry, is to 
provide transport statistics, but also to review the information that State owned Agency 
supply every four months to the Ministry to show how they are working towards their goals. 
Trafikanalysis, for instance, may assess whether the information provided is appropriate to 
address the points made by other Agencies. Its role seems therefore felt within the public 
sector. Most other respondents consider that Trafikanalysis has a minor role and see it simply 
as the body responsible for transport statistics. 
Again, it was mentioned that the system view should be with the Government directly due to 
its political responsibility and to the fact that it spends public money to fund the 
infrastructure.  
The IM and system planner, Trafikverket, is also the body that “has the interest at heart for 
the entire system” and that “understands and defends the system in its entirety” for the large 
majority of the respondents. While the Government should be “understanding the system” 
there was doubt that it actually can, due to some loss of sector knowledge, following the rail 
operations separated from the State a long time ago, and to several different Agencies in 
charge of advising the Government. The important role of the Agencies stems from the 
general structure of the Swedish public sector, based on small Ministries coordinating larger 
Agencies with operational roles. 
There were differing views on the importance of having local people or units having “the 
interest at heart for the entire system”. Some said there should also be a role for local 
stakeholders, especially when it comes to the larger agglomerations. On the other hand there 
was concern that regionalisation of views in Trafikverket may hinder effective system 
optimisation. 
Consistently with the multi-stakeholder view taken for previous questions, some respondent 
explained that there is no single entity that “has the interest at heart for the entire system”, 
and that “understands and defend the system in its entirety”, but rather multiple Government 
layers (State, municipalities), again due to political and financial responsibility. A question, it 
was suggested, would be, whether this distribution of powers is a problem. 
Some answers pointed to the ASTOC (Association of Swedish Train Operating Companies, 
Tågoperatörerna, representing both passenger and freight operators) as the body 
“understanding and defending the system in its entirety”, although there was also concern that 
the voice of ASTOC is not strong enough. 
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System’s performance 
When asked which are the most important KPIs for the railway system, views reflecting the 
different roles of the interviewees have been offered and different priorities have emerged. 
Also, some respondents indicated KPAs, rather than single indicators.  
Interviewees concerned with day to day operation have characterised the two top sets of KPIs 
or KPAs as: 
- Capacity/reliability/actual capacity availability; 
- Punctuality/customer satisfaction. 
The two groups of KPAs are ordered alternatively by different interviewees. From a more 
policy concerned viewpoint, respondents underlined that priority on KPAs change due to the 
political agenda and the public debate. For instance, now punctuality is at the forefront, while 
market share is less important than it was until a few years ago. The latter is partly due to the 
increase in public transport share, partly in accordance with the current multimodal policy. 
In more detail KPIs and KPAs characterised include: 
- Capacity and capacity control, also in terms of used and spare capacity and accounting 
for the fact that the existence of bottlenecks is felt strongly by operators. In the Swedish 
system most lines are single track (3,700 km of railways are double or multiple track out 
of a total of 11,900 km) and the line between Stockholm and Gothenburg (on which the 
first long distance open-access service is already active) is partly congested (another 
major line concerned with capacity limits is Stockholm-Malmö). The indication of speed 
on the system as a KPI in terms of speed that can be normally achieved by services is 
again linked to capacity and the characteristics of the infrastructure. 
- Reliability. One operator underlined that reliability should come before capacity of 
infrastructure, remarking that unavailable capacity is of no use. While some observed 
that the IM is accountable for about half of the problems experienced on the network (as 
pointed out by SJ in its annual report
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), the issue of reliability has been described also 
from the point of view of interaction among different operations. In this context, 
reliability refers to exact operations to avoid ripple effects on a busy system and to 
having each operator responsible to use the system the way it is agreed. Fleet 
maintenance, pointed out as a KPA by the same respondent who underlined the need for 
exact operations, is linked to system reliability in that the correct maintenance of the 
rolling stock allows for higher reliability of the system and minimises impact on one’s 
own as well as other’s operations, and ultimately on the service to the customer. 
- Punctuality. For some, this is the most important indicator, since it is linked to customer 
satisfaction. One respondent, though, thinks that punctuality might be a misleading 
indicator since for different kinds of services the same delay – say in the order of 2 
minutes - might have a different importance also depending on where on the network the 
delay happens. The same respondent noted that the Swedish Transport Administration 
accounts in the same way for the delays of passenger and freight trains. The ideal 
indicator, it was remarked, would show punctuality for the customer (e.g., in the case of 
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 The 2010 annual report of SJ (the main passenger operator) indicates that punctuality is affected, in 
proportion, by the following items (own underlining): 51% infrastructure, 2% traffic management, 16% 
vehicles, 13% operator, 18% other. Underlined items are the responsibility of the IM. 
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freight, the arrival at the end customer, rather than the arrival at the marshalling yard) 
and, widening the scope to a customer satisfaction indicator, it would be useful to trace 
problems back to the actor responsible for them. 
- Provision of information. Mostly the responsibility of the IM and traffic controller 
Trafikverket, provision of information is currently an important KPA linked to customer 
satisfaction. Its current importance is due to the disruptions experienced at the peaks of 
harsh weather during the past winters. 
- Costs have also been characterised as a key indicator in interviews. For many the 
concern is about cost to the State (the Swedish reforms have been driven by the strong 
will of the Government to bring down railway costs and regain control of public money 
usage in railways, and to transfer funding responsibilities to the layer of Government 
directly affected, e.g., counties, municipalities). The cost aspect has been presented as 
well in terms of system production/cost ratio i.e. as value for money. 
Moreover, costs have appeared in the replies also in terms of a particular cost item such as 
effective power usage charging. The respondent who brought up this point explained that it is 
the request of Transport Authorities, who contract out services, to have trains run on energy 
efficiency principles. With diesel trains the operator has also a financial incentive from direct 
fuel savings to require energy saving driving and train drivers accordingly.  
Electric power, instead, is not charged on effective consumption; therefore the operators do 
not have financial returns from energy saving driving. 
Energy and, more generally, the environment are currently important KPAs and drivers of 
policy also due to people’s appreciation of environmental goals. 
Market share has also been indicated as an important indicator as well as accessibility of the 
system both in geographical terms and for the elderly, the children, and the mobility impaired 
users in general. Accessibility to the system is felt as an issue particularly in the North of 
Sweden. 
Output indicators have been mentioned only by a minority of respondents confronted with the 
request for system KPIs/KPAs. Output indicators would include passenger-km, tonne-km 
and, linked to production indicators, the number of people employed by the sector. 
Some respondents also distinguished transparency as a KPA for the system, referring to the 
need to have clear understanding of how slots are assigned and how decisions are taken. With 
full opening of traffic there may be timetabling conflicts between services planned by CPTAs 
and open access services. 
System wide KPAs and KPIs include as well safety, train path applications and infrastructure 
usage. 
Finally, it was suggested that a measure of market opening could account for how long a 
company would need to actually get started with operations on the network. 
Stakeholder’s performance indicators 
The Ministry of Transport, which takes a multimodal view at the transport system, does not 
have PIs used within a structured procedure (except when it sets yearly targets for 
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maintenance since this is linked to appropriations towards infrastructure funding). The 
administrations linked to the Ministry report every four months on their activities and are 
responsible to choose the data they use in discussions. One of the administrations, 
Trafikanalysis, reviews appropriateness of figures used. Much negotiation goes on for setting 
targets, which are very much the outcome of discussions among involved parties. 
Trafikverket, which has the triple role of multimodal transport planner, IM and procuring 
Authority, has the following strategic challenges for the next 10 years (Trafikverket, 2011): 
- An energy efficient transport system; 
- Well adapted transport for passengers and freight in metropolitan areas (contributing to 
development of city environment); 
- Efficient intermodal transport for trade and industry (with a focus on the long distance 
network, in accordance with the recently approved National Transport Plan); 
- A robust a reliable infrastructure (and traffic information during disruptions that is useful 
reliable and easy to find); 
- More value for money; 
- A modern Agency (in terms of working methods and staff attractiveness and retention). 
Within this framework, the main PIs for railways are: 
- Traffic information; 
- Capacity availability; 
- Punctuality; 
- Safety; 
- Exchange of information between operators and traffic control; 
- Rapidity in providing information to customers 
all of which are checked twice a year. 
As for KPIs of CPTAs contracts, operators remarked that the bonus/penalty makes a 
difference in terms of their profitability since most costs are similar or the same e.g., cost of 
staff. However, the weight given to KPIs set in different contracts is different. There was also 
concern that, in setting weights of KPIs in contracts, CPTAs focused on the weaknesses of 
the previous operator. As for room for KPIs negotiation, there is some discussion going on 
before services are tendered and CPTAs may ask the operators for information, but such 
information is public so operators are careful with what they give out. Once the contracts are 
awarded, the expected performance cannot be discussed, except in very special situations, 
such as infrastructure works that reduce punctuality. 
When asked which the key functions to achieve performance are, many respondents returned 
onto the KPAs they had indicated earlier for the system. Some replies referred to the need for 
good infrastructure. Others pointed to the governance system and the provision of incentives. 
Many respondents remarked the need for cooperation among actors, while only one indicated 
that competition for the end customers drives the whole system. 
The importance of cooperation among actors, though within an open market, was positively 
underlined by several actors. It was explained that to be profitable in the long run it is 
important to cooperate. Lack of cooperation leads only to short term profitability. 
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Respondents suggested that while initially the railway actors have looked at optimising 
different parts of the system, they are now looking at optimising the whole system. 
The one respondent putting forward competition for the end customer as key driver to 
achieve performance offered as an example that when SJ was exposed to competition, it had 
to drive down costs, so it started to challenge maintenance practices and now it is putting 
pressures on the IM to enhance infrastructure availability. 
Market opening, in terms of functions and performance, was presented by some respondents 
as an important force to bring in innovation and efficiency. But market opening is not all that 
is needed for the system to function. The key point is getting in place a new system to attract 
new capital and new ideas. It was recalled that CPTAs have procured services using, since 
the beginning, own rolling stock and that the State has later invested in new rolling stock for 
CPTAs. These have acted as operators, deciding service characteristics when contracting 
them out, and their role has evolved, along with the entity and importance of the traffic they 
procure and the way they procure it. They are now procuring services across Counties (with 
no need to ask permission from the Ministry for doing so from 1st January 2012) to account 
for changes in travel patterns. Moreover several responsibilities are transferred to the 
operators, rather than being rigidly defined by the CPTAs, with a change from gross to net 
cost contracts and to bonus/penalty systems. 
Some respondents pointed to the regulatory framework as an element of performance while 
only one suggested that a sector Regulator is not needed and competition rules and judicial 
system suffice. The importance of strong Regulatory Agencies was also underlined. The 
evolution of the Swedish Competition Authority, for instance, has led to a strong body with 
many more resources than it had when it was set up in 1993. 
One respondent underlined the need for a strong Government that can deliver incentives, 
within a coherent framework, to enact its transport policy. Taking a more day-to-day 
viewpoint, respondents indicated maintenance as a key function to achieve performance. 
Additional points made in interviews 
There are still issued to be resolved with the Swedish railway market. Two of them are the 
availability of rolling stock and the presence of operators that may be cross financed by 
foreign State owned railway companies. 
Lack of rolling stock hampers full opening of the passenger market, commented some 
interviewees. This is an important difference between traffic procured by Counties (who 
provide the rolling stock to the operators) and open market traffic. In the political debate, 
there has been the suggestion that ASJ (Statens Järnvägar), the State owned administration 
remaining from the former State railways and in charge of leasing rolling stock, might be the 
actor to provide rolling stock to operators with short leases (e.g., five years). However the 
Government has not decided in that direction. It is now expected that the market and actual 
rolling stock leasing companies provide the necessary assets. 
Part of the difficulties come from the limited interoperability of rolling stock also in terms of 
weather resilience (SJ in its 2010 annual report explains the protection of its existing rolling 
stock from hardening winter conditions). It was suggested during the interviews that 
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operators based in Norway may take advantage of the similarity in rolling stock to enter the 
market. But it was also argued that other operators could purchase assets suitable for Swedish 
traffic and, in case, adapt it to other milder conditions later on. 
Additionally, some respondents argued that long terms contracts for the use of infrastructure 
may help with financing of new assets. 
One further issue felt by some respondents is the presence on the Swedish market of 
competitors that are subsidiaries of companies based elsewhere and owned by home 
Governments. Stakeholders are concerned that they may enjoy support from mother 
companies. This is perceived as possibly leading to unfair competition also since no Swedish 
RU is funded by the State, not even the passenger and freight incumbents, both State owned. 
Indeed part of the drive behind the reforms was to make State owned RUs profitable under 
commercial conditions. 
Some more points on the recent changes on the institutional framework and on the market 
emerged during the interviews. When asked to explain the rationale for recent privatisation of 
the production unit of the IM, which became Infranord in 2010, respondents clarified that it 
is a quest for cost reductions, as much as a political direction of the current Government, and 
a feeling that there should be a separation between the Administration and the production 
sector. The privatisation of the production unit of the IM is seen negatively by some 
respondents who are concerned with loss of know-how and knowledge of the network. Other 
stakeholders have taken a different view and stated that, while initial issues are possible in 
any privatisation process, getting the contacts right solves issues and ensures quality services 
at reduced costs. 
A further point refers to the interface between procured services in regional transport, which 
will continue to be the responsibility of Public Authorities and contracted operators, and 
possible commercial services. Several respondents explained that economic equilibrium of 
publicly procured services interfacing with commercial ones is not of concern in Sweden. 
Capacity of infrastructure, especially on some lines such as Stockholm-Gothenburg and 
Stockholm-Malmö, is a problem and is expected to become more so with possible conflicting 
path requests. If decisions on capacity cannot be reached by consensus, a last resort could be 
to auction for the paths. That is not felt by some as a proper way to deal with the issue since 
smaller operators would not be able to come on the market. 
Summary 
The key points which have emerged from the interviews are: 
System perspective: 
- For the majority of respondents the Ministry of Enterprise or the State owned IM/system 
planner, Trafikverket, speak for the system, while another group of respondents indicated 
that all actors speak for the system, or have the possibility to do so; 
- Even though many may speak for the system, the Government is the only actor 
politically responsible for it, it was noted; 
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- According to most replies Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) is also the 
ideal entity to have a systemic view. Trafikverket is seen by some as a general of the 
system (and has to be so during winter problems, but mostly coordinating actors); 
- The visible stakeholder to whom the press turns is still SJ; 
- While most respondents believe Trafikverket, the IM and system planner, is the ideal 
entity to have a system view, other respondents believe operators in general (but 
particularly long distance ones) have a system view as “responsibility and activity go 
well together”; 
- System view should be with the Government directly due to its political responsibility 
and to the fact that it spends public money to fund the infrastructure; 
- The IM and system planner, Trafikverket, is also the body that “has the interest at heart 
for the entire system” and that “understands and defends the system in its entirety” for 
the large majority of the respondents; 
- However, while the Government should be “understanding the system” there was doubt 
that it actually can; 
- Consistently with the multi-stakeholder view taken for previous questions, some 
respondent explained that there is no single entity that “has the interest at heart for the 
entire system”, and that “understands and defend the system in its entirety”, but rather 
multiple Government layers (State, municipalities); 
- Some answers pointed to the Association of Swedish Train Operating Companies as the 
body “understanding and defending the system in its entirety”. 
System’s performance: 
- PIs for the system relate to capacity/reliability/actual capacity availability, 
punctuality/customer satisfaction and operational indicators. They also include provision 
of information, cost of the system to the State and in value for money; 
- Priority on KPAs change due to the political agenda and the public debate. Now 
punctuality is at the forefront, while market share is less important than it was until a few 
years ago. The latter is partly due to the increase in public transport share, partly in 
accordance with the current multimodal policy; 
- On reliability the IM is blamed for half of the problems experienced on the network but 
reliability refers also to interaction among different operations. In this context, reliability 
refers to exact operations to avoid ripple effects on a busy system and to having each 
operator responsible to use the system the way it is agreed; 
- Energy and, more generally, the environment are currently important KPAs and drivers 
of policy also due to people’s appreciation of environmental goals. 
Stakeholder’s performance: 
- The Ministry of Transport does not have PIs used within a structured procedure. The 
administrations linked to the Ministry report every four months on their activities and are 
responsible to choose the data they use in discussions. One of the administrations, 
Trafikanalysis, reviews appropriateness of figures used; 
- The IM has indicators regarding information, operations, and capacity availability. They 
link to those indicated as system wide indicators although there no indicator on costs, 
which were mention as important system wide; 
- Operators are concerned with PIs in contracts and the weight given to KPIs set in 
different contracts is different; 
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- There is concern that concern that, in setting weights of KPIs in contracts, CPTAs focus 
on the weaknesses of the previous operator; 
- Drivers for performance include good infrastructure, governance system and the 
provision of incentives. However, a strong Government that can deliver incentives within 
a coherent framework is required; 
- Many respondents remarked the need for cooperation among actors. To be profitable in 
the long run it is important to cooperate. Lack of cooperation leads only to short term 
profitability; 
- Also competition for the end customers was indicated as a driver for performance and 
one that drives the whole system; 
- But market opening is not all that is needed for the system to function. The key point is 
getting in place a new system to attract new capital and new ideas; 
- Lack of rolling stock hampers full opening of the passenger market; 
- Some operators on the Swedish market are subsidiaries of companies based elsewhere 
and owned by home Governments. Stakeholders are concerned that they may enjoy 
support from mother companies; 
- Capacity is an issue on the most used Swedish lines. It is foreseen that it will become 
even more so with more conflicting path requests. There is a call for a proper way to deal 
with the issue as an auction for the paths, introduced in the Network Statement, would 
put smaller operators at a disadvantage. 
5.7 Conclusions 
There are three main conclusions that one can draw from the interviews with the relevant 
stakeholders in the five countries. They pertain to the headings of the main interview 
chapters, namely the systemic approach (or lack thereof), the system’s performance, and the 
performance of the stakeholders. 
It is obvious from the interviews that no one speaks for the railway system of a country, let 
alone for the European railways system as a whole. All interviews seem to concur on that. 
However, when asked about who should have the system’s perspective in mind, there are 
three different answers. In the countries where the incumbent still exists and does play a 
significant role, the system’s perspective is naturally attributed to this historical operator, as it 
seems to be the only actor capable of playing should a role. Yet, this role is precisely 
challenged once the historical operator is being unbundled and put into competition with 
other operators or bypassed in some of its functions by Regulators. In Sweden, where the 
infrastructure has been unbundled and integrated into the Ministry, this IM/political actor 
seems to play the role of the “system’s actor”. In the UK, where the railway system is even 
more fragmented, the Regulator (ORR) seems to be taking on this role of the “system’s 
actor”.  
In the interviews we have encountered again the point of distribution of some powers to local 
actors and the ensuing tension between the latter and the national, system-wide actors. This 
applies to several kinds of actor, public and private. Cases in point are the concern, among 
some in Sweden, that the infrastructure manage might lose a general view by allowing much 
local focus, while in Great Britain the McNulty Report advocates some localisation of powers 
on infrastructure and has been preceded along this way by the IM. Another example is the 
English Passenger Transport Executives asking for more involvement in franchises. In the 
Netherlands, Provinces are keen to have their say in national transport policy, also since they 
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pay for infrastructure of national relevance. The levels of governance of the much interlinked 
railway system, whose extension and limits are likely best determined by the travel patterns 
of the passengers, are still exploring how to fit the existing system and their own demands, 
but with much focus on the latter. 
We have seen in chapter 4 that this is a very difficult undertaking. But after the interviews we 
can understand that this difficulty results in great part from the fact that, just as the system’s 
perspective, the system’s PIs are also lacking. To begin with, there seems to be a 
disagreement as to what good system-wide indicators are. Punctuality, reliability, quality, and 
safety are often mentioned but, with the exception of safety, corresponding indicators that 
meet the agreement of the various actors involved are still to emerge and to be measured 
systematically. Other indicators mentioned have less to do with the output of the railway 
system, but rather with the outcomes of a given policy (namely modal split) or with input 
variables (overall financing). 
Such a disagreement about system-wide PIs as highlighted by the interviews in the five 
countries is hardly astonishing. It can be explained by the fact that system-wide PIs will be 
broken down to PIs of the relevant actors involved, which will lead to benchmarking and thus 
competition. It can also be explained by the fact a causal link may be established between the 
outputs (behaviours) of some of the operators and the system-wide PIs, which, in a 
competitive environment, may lead to additional responsibilities, penalties and thus costs. 
This means that the very definition of system-wide indicators will become a firm strategic 
matter and thus controversial. In times of a fragmented system where nobody speaks for the 
entire system anymore, the very process of defining system-wide indicators therefore seems 
to be in jeopardy. 
As a consequence, our interviews show that each actor defines its own PIs, which are most 
likely in the first place suiting the actor itself, and only in the second place the system. These 
stakeholder PIs are also not harmonized, nor integrated nor consolidated, thus leading to a 
multiplication of measurements and ultimately to the impossibility of defining performance 
in a coherent manner. This will be further exacerbated if regulation is introducing incentive 
mechanisms. 
Our interviews with the different stakeholders also show that no clear relationship exist 
between any given institutional arrangement and the performance of the overall railway 
system. This is not astonishing given that, with the exception of the incumbents, no one really 
has a system’s perspective, and that most interviews cannot look back far enough in order to 
establish such a link.  
Finally, we found particularly interesting the comment made by one Dutch stakeholder who 
referred to the railways as an emerging market. Elaborating on that point, we note that the 
longstanding physical existence of railway tracks stands in stark contrast with the maturity of 
the institutional framework required to support a sustainable development of railway markets. 
This situation is all the more surprising given the recent revival of interest (and corresponding 
increase in demand) for carrying people and goods on rails.  
Borrowing the concept from Khanna and Palepu 2010 an emerging market is “anyplace 
where buyers and sellers cannot easily and efficiently do business with each other”. In other 
words, these markets are not restricted to developing countries. They can actually be found in 
developed economies as well. One simply needs to look for institutional voids, i.e., specialist 
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institutions and intermediaries that are either completely absent, or not functioning as well as 
they might (think for instance of the US real estate market and subprime fiasco). One would 
not need to look too far in the railway sector to spot some institutional voids. 
Not surprisingly the institutional voids found in emerging markets carry both opportunities 
and risks. Risks because the matching of demand and offer for rail services requires a number 
of intermediaries (e.g., venture capital to build new lines, finance rolling stock or more 
generally empowered Regulators with a clear remit) without which it would be very difficult 
or very inefficient to conduct business. However, they also offer opportunities since there is 







This report has been structured into three parts: in the first, we have described as precisely as 
possible the evolution of the institutional arrangements of the railway sectors of the six 
selected countries. We concluded that, while the policies and different Directives of the 
European Commission certainly do play a role, the institutional paths of each country are 
unique to the point that still today each country constitutes a unique institutional system. 
There are obviously some indications of convergence among the different national 
institutional systems, but this convergence is less about the core elements of the European 
Commission (e.g., unbundling) than about regionalisation and tendering of PSOs (in the 
Regions). 
In the second part we have examined the performance, and especially the evolution of the 
performance, of the railway systems of the six selected countries. The original aim of the 
research was to establish for every country a relationship between the evolution of the 
performance on the one hand and the evolving institutional arrangements on the other. This 
has proven to be a very difficult undertaking and we have to conclude that the establishment 
of such a relationship is, at this point of our research, impossible. However, this is an 
interesting finding in itself, which basically can mean that performance evolves irrespective 
of the institutional arrangements or that the institutional arrangements will produce their 
effects only with a time lag beyond the scope of this research. Other explanations are that the 
PIs commonly used do not significantly respond to the change in institutional arrangements, 
given that the institutional arrangements are aimed at producing systemic effects whereas 
most of the measured PIs respond to firm behaviour. 
This last explanation is actually supported by the interviews conducted and reported in the 
third part of this document. Here, we tried to understand what performance actually means 
for the main stakeholders of the railway systems of the selected countries (with the exception 
of Switzerland). We concluded that only actors that currently (still) have a system-wide 
approach to railways are the incumbents, at least in the case of France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Emerging alternatives to the incumbents when it comes to caring for the entire 
system seem to be the IM in Sweden or the Office of Rail Regulation in the UK. Together 
with the lack of a common systemic view, it is clear that there are currently no commonly 
agreed indicators that would measure the performance of the entire railway system of a 
country (let alone PIs that would measure the performance of the European railway system as 
a whole). Most PIs available and measure are actor specific indicators which however do not 
necessarily add up to a systemic performance. 
Yet, notwithstanding unbundling, most interviewees point to the need for system view. This 
is in line with the recent call for strategic view in the British rails sector. Where the 
incumbent has still a major role and works on most or the whole of the value chain, it is seen 
as the one with the most systemic view. However, the evolution of the institutional 
arrangements in all the countries studied clearly goes in the direction of an even more 
fragmented system, accompanied, at the same time, by a call for increased coordination 
among the actors. 
Given the call for coordination and strategic vision to be clearly allocated to an institution, we 
may categorise railway systems observed as either bottom-up or top-down depending on 
whether the stakeholders are in a fragmented system or in a system where there is a strong 
actor leading. The latter is the case of France and Germany with SNCF and DB as key actors. 
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Switzerland, of course, would fall in this category as well. The other case relates to the 
Netherlands and Sweden, expecting the IM at arm’s length of the Ministry to be a coordinator 
and in particular Great Britain, which seems to be finding the Regulator increasingly in a 
systemic role. Overall, Ministries do not seem to be able to take on the role of coordinator 
directly for lack of knowledge. 
We have seen that all the institutional arrangements in the different countries are still 
evolving and that none of the countries has actually reversed its course. Yet, as this evolution 
towards growing fragmentation of the different national railway systems continues, the call 
for coordination becomes ever more pressing. In the absence of an actor capable (IM, 
Regulator) or credible (incumbent) to coordinate the system, we think that the definition of 
system-wide PIs from the perspective of users with a long-term time-horizon seems to be the 
only way to actually bring some coherence to the system. The practical challenge, however, 
will then be to break down these system-wide PIs to the level of each operator in the system 
(including the Regulator). The intellectual challenge will be to relate such system-wide 
performance to these institutional arrangements that are most conducive to their achievement. 
To sum up, since we cannot characterise a system or another for best performance, we may 
make use of these conclusions to indicate some points of general interest as well as of interest 
in the Swiss case. 
The relevance of local peculiarities and evolution paths in shaping each system suggest that 
national characteristics and needs should take first place when deciding to what extent a 
reform should be undertaken. The European Commission’s policies and Directives indicate a 
broad course of development that leaves enough space to cater legitimately for domestic 
distinctiveness. 
Voluntary tests of reforms, possibly along with their staged introduction, have proven a 
sensible course of action given the lack of clear link between institutions and system’s 
performance, as far as our work has extended. Also, since a key item that needs sorting in 
carrying out reforms is the introduction or the reshaping of interfaces, the role of actors needs 
to be clear. The interface issue does not relate simply to transaction costs (which may be of 
limited relevance when compared to unbundling advantages, though it is not clear) but also to 
incentives and tensions among the actors. The difficulty in designing incentives speaks again 
in favour of tests and phases, as does the need to clarify the role of actors. The governance of 
railways accounts for more actors than that of other network industries (telecoms, energy) 
given the important involvement of Regional Authorities and the trend for regionalisation 
noted. 
It emerges from our interviews that, whichever the character of the reforms, there is a 
pressing need for an actor of reference with knowledge of the system, strategic outlook, and 
clear perception of users’ needs (whichever level of users is considered). Knowledge and 
credibility are both important points in defining such an actor, and any novel framework 
should also consider the connection between the actor of reference for the system and the 
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Appendix I: Railway actors in selected European countries 
Country Fully legally, organisationally and institutionally independent IM undertaking capacity 
allocation 
United Kingdom IM: Network Rail 
Incumbent RU: no incumbent 
Freight new entrants: Advenza, Colas, DB-Schenker, Direct Rail Services, Fastline, 
Freight Liner (HH and IM), GB Railfreight, Serco, SNCF Freight Europe 
Passenger new entrants: Arriva Trains Wales, c2c, CapitalConnect, Chiltern, 
Crosscountry (Arriva), First East Midlands Trains, First Great Western, Fisrt Scotrail, 
Grand Central, Heathrow Express, Hull Trains, London Midland, London Overground, 
National Express East Coast, National Express East Anglia, Northern Rail, Merseyrail, 
Southern, Southeastern, South West Trains, Transpennine Express, Virgin trains, 
Wrexham & Shropshire 
The Netherlands IM: Pro Rail 
Incumbent RU: NS 
Freight new entrants: Bentheimer Eisenbahn, Crossrail Benelux, CTL rail, ITL Benelux, 
NMBS, DB Schencker, Rail4Chem, Ruhrtalbahn, SNCF, TX Logistik, Veolia Cargo 
Passenger new entrants: Transdev-Connexxion, DB Autozug, Prignitzer Eisenbahn 
(Arriva), Veolia transport, Arriva, Thalys Nederland, Syntus (Keolis) 
Sweden IM: BV 
Incumbent RU: Green Cargo for freight and SJ AB for passenger 
Freight new entrants: CargoNet AB, CargoNet AS, Hector Rail, Mid Cargo, Midwaggon, 
MTAB, Peterson Rail, Railion Scandinavia, TGOJ, TX- Logistik, Tågab, Tågfrakt, Stena 
Recycling 
Passenger new entrants: A-Train, Arriva, Bergslagens Järnvägssällskap, DSB, DVVJ, 
Engelsberg – Norber Järnväg, Inlandsbanan, Kalmar Läns trafik, Kalmar Veterantåg, 
NetRail AB, Norrtåg, Skånetrafiken, Malmbanans vänner, Ötraf, SL, Svenska 
Note: European countries with similar set-up include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Spain, 
Finland, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia 
 
Country Legally (but not institutionally) independent IM undertaking capacity allocation owned by 
a holding company which also owns the incumbent operators 
Germany IM: DB-Netz, other open infrastructures exist (e.g., Arriva/Osthannoversche Eisenbahn 
and Arriva/Prignitzer Eisenbahn with 530 km) 
Incumbent RU: DB Bahn for passengers and DB Schenker for freight 
Freight new entrants: around 300 licenced RUs but only a few really active, e.g., 
Arriva/Osthannoversche Eisenbahn, Arriva/Regentalbahn Cargo, CTL, Rail4Chem, HGK, 
SBB Cargo Deutschland, TX Logistik, Veolia Cargo 
Passengers new entrants (67): Abellio, Arriva (Prignitzer 
Eisenbahn/Regentalbahn/Vogtlandbahn/Metronom, Ostdeutsche Eisenbahngesellschaft), 
Benex, EGP, Eurobahn (Rhenus Keolis), Transregio, Veolia (NWB, NOB, BOB, 
Regiobahn, Interconnex, etc.), and a lot of public-owned local and regional railways with 
and without own infrastructure 
Note: European countries with similar set-up include Austria, Belgium, Italy and Poland 
 
Country Independent IM allocating capacity having delegated certain infrastructure management 
functions (e.g., traffic management, maintenance and renewal) to the incumbent operating 
company 
France IM: RFF 
Incumbent RU: SNCF 
Freight new entrants: Floyd, Gysev, MAV Hajdu Vasutepito Ltd, MMV, Rail4Chem, 
SNCB, Veolia Cargo, ECR, VFLI, Europorte, CFL Cargo, Colas Rail, TSO V 
Passenger new entrants: none 





Appendix II: European Directives relating to competition in railway 
Directive 2001/12/EC (European Parliament and Council, 2001a) 
Whereas (11): Bodies should be established with a sufficient degree of independence to 
regulate competition on the rail services market where there are no entities performing that 
function. 
Article 10(7): Without prejudice to Community and national regulations concerning 
competition policy and the institutions with responsibility in that area, the regulatory body 
established pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2000/14/EC, or any other body enjoying the 
same degree of independence shall monitor the competition in the rail services markets, 
including the rail freight transport market. 
Directive 2001/14/EC (European Parliament and Council, 2001b) 
Whereas (16): Charging and capacity allocation schemes should allow for fair competition in 
the provision of railway services. 
Whereas (32): It is important to minimise the distortions of competition which may arise, 
either between railway infrastructures or between transport modes, from significant 
differences in charging principles. 
Article 6(1): Without prejudice to the possible long-term aim of user cover of infrastructure 
costs for all modes of transport on the basis of fair, non-discriminatory competition between 
the various modes, where rail transport is able to compete with other modes of transport, 
within the charging framework of Articles 7 and 8, a Member State may require the IM to 
balance his accounts without State funding. 
Article 6(3): Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the functions 
determining equitable and non-discriminating access to infrastructure, listed in Annex II, are 
entrusted to bodies or firms that do not themselves provide any rail transport services. 
Regardless of the organisational structures, this objective must be shown to have been 
achieved. Member States may, however, assign to RUs or any other body the collecting of the 
charges and the responsibility for managing the railway infrastructure, such as investment, 
maintenance and funding. 
Annex II contains a list of the essential functions Article 6(3) refers to: 
- Preparation and decision making related to the licensing of RUs including granting of 
individual licenses; 
- Decision making related to the path allocation including both the definition and the 
assessment of availability and the allocation of individual train paths; 
- Decision making related to infrastructure charging;  
- Monitoring observance of PSOs required in the provision of certain services. 
Directive 2007/58/EC (European Parliament and Council, 2007a) 
Whereas (7): The number of railway services without intermediate stops is very limited. In 
the case of journeys with intermediate stops, it is essential to authorise new market entrants to 
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pick up and set down passengers along the route in order to ensure that such operations have 
a realistic chance of being economically viable and to avoid placing potential competitors at a 
disadvantage to existing operators, which have the right to pick up and set down passengers 
along the route. This right should be without prejudice to Community and national 
regulations concerning competition policy. 
Whereas (9): Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road (5) authorises 
Member States and Local Authorities to award public service contracts. These contracts may 
contain exclusive rights to operate certain services. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the 
provisions of that Regulation are consistent with the principle of opening up international 
passenger services to competition. 
Whereas (10): Opening up international passenger services, which include the right to pick up 
passengers at any station located on the route of an international service and to set them down 
at another, including stations located in the same Member State, to competition may have 
implications for the organisation and financing of rail passenger services provided under a 
public service contract. Member States should have the possibility to limit the right of access 
to the market where this right would compromise the economic equilibrium of these public 
service contracts and where approval is given by the relevant regulatory body referred to in 
Article 30 of Directive 2001/14/EC on the basis of an objective economic analysis, following 
a request from the competent Authorities that awarded the public service contract. 
Whereas (11): Some Member States have already moved towards opening up the market for 
rail passenger services by transparent, open competitive tendering for the provision of certain 
such services. They should not have to provide full open access to international passenger 
services, since this competition for the right to use certain rail routes has involved a sufficient 
test of the market value of running those services. 
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Appendix III: EU DG Competition railway-related cases 
Date Type # Details 
11/1992 C 33585 92/568/EEC: Commission Decision of 25 November 1992 relating to a 
proceeding under art. 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/33.585 - Distribution of railway 
tickets by travel agents) Official Journal L 366 , 15.12.1992 P. 0047 – 0059 
3/1994 A  The Commission fines Deutsche Bahn under art. 86 for discriminatory pricing 
on its provision of traction and access to rail network. (OJ L 104, 23.4.1994, 
p.35 - IP/94/259) 
1994 C  Four co-operation arrangements in the field of rail transport are exempted or 
given negative clearance: Eurotunnel (OJ L 354, 31.12.1995, p.66), ACI (OJ L 
224, 30.8.1994, p.28), Night Services (OJ L 259, 7.10.1994, p.20), and CIA. 
The first three concern cooperation for the Channel Tunnel. (IP/94/762, 
IP/94/826, IP/94/870, IP/94/1202) 
1996 S C63/2000 Invitation to submit comments pursuant to art. 88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 63/2000 (ex NN 102/2000). BahnTrans GmbH (2001/C 
52/02) 
9/2000 S N687/2000 State aid N 687/2000 – United Kingdom Competition for Innovative Solutions 
in Rail Based Logistics 
10/2001 A 37985 Commission warns Deutsche Bahn about discriminating against a private 
competitor 
9/2002 M M.2905 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.2905 – Deutsche 
Bahn/Stinnes) (2002/C 248/05) 
8/2003 A 37685 Decision relating to a proceeding pursuant to art. 82 of the EC Treaty 
(COMP/37.685 GVG/FS) 
8/2003 M M.3150 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3150 – 
SNCF/Trenitalia/AFA) (2003/C 258/05) 
9/2004 M M.3554 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.3554 – 
SERCO/NEDRAILWAYS/NORTHERN RAIL) (2004/C 277/03) 
10/2006 M M.4292 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4294 – 
Arcelor/SNCFL/CFL Cargo) (2006/C 258/10) 
10/2006 M M.4398 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4398 – Veolia 
Cargo/RAIL LINK/JV) (2006/C 290/10) 
11/2007 S C58/2006 State aid No C 58/06 (ex NN 98/05) – Aid for the Bahnen der Stadt Monheim 
(BSM) and Rheinische Bahngesellschaft (RBM) companies in the 
Verkehrsverbund Rhein Ruhr (2007/C 74/10) 
11/2007 M M.4746 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4746 – Deutsche 
Bahn/English Welsh & Scottish Railway Holdings (EWS)) (2008/C 125/03) 
2/2008 S C47/2007 State aid C 47/07 (ex NN 22/05) — Public service contract between Deutsche 
Bahn Regio and the Länder of Berlin and Brandenburg (2008/C 35/10) 
3/2008 M M.4786 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4786 – Deutsche 
Bahn/Transfesa) (2008/C 137/04) 
8/2008 S C41/2008 State aid C 41/08 (NN 35/08) – Danske Statsbaner (2008/C 309/07) 
8/2008 S C5/2010 State aid C 5/10 (ex NN 48/09 and ex N 485/09) – Public loan granted to 
Železničná spoločnosť Cargo Slovakia, a.s. (ZSSK Cargo) (2010/C 117/04) 
6/2009 M M.5480 Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5480 – Deutsche 
Bahn/PCC Logistics) (2009/C 185/03) 
10/2009 M M.5557 Sent back to National Authorities (Case COMP/M.5557 - SNCF-P/ 
CDPQ/KEOLIS/ EFFIA) 
6/2010 M M.5655 (Case COMP/M.5655 – SNCF/ LCR/ EUROSTAR) 
8/2010 M M.5855 (Case COMP/M.5855 – DB/ Arriva) 
Source: Compiled from DG Competition 
Note: A=Antitrust, C=Cartels, M=Mergers, S=Staid aid 
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Appendix IV: Regulation covering Public Service Obligations 
Public passenger transport service by rail and road 
The Regulation defines the conditions in which the competent Authorities can intervene to 
grant exclusive rights and/or compensation to public service operators (PSOs). 
Public service compensation may be necessary to ensure the provision of services of general 
economic interest (SGEI) and guarantee safe, efficient, attractive and high quality passenger 
transport. This Regulation applies to regular and non-limited access, national and 
international public passenger transport services by rail and other track-based modes and by 
road. 
Public service contracts and general rules  
The competent authority
68
 is obliged to conclude a public service contract with the operator 
to which it grants an exclusive right and/or compensation in exchange for discharging 
PSOs
69
. Obligations which aim to establish maximum tariffs for all or certain categories of 
passengers may be subject to general rules. To define the framework for the competent 
authority, the latter grants compensation for the net positive or negative financial impact on 
costs and revenue occasioned by compliance with the pricing obligations established in the 
general rules. 
The public service contracts
70
 and general rules define: 
- The PSO to be fulfilled by the operator and the areas concerned; 
- The parameters based on which compensation must be calculated and the nature and 
scope of all exclusive rights granted to avoid any overcompensation; 
- The means of distributing the costs linked to service supply (staff costs, energy, 
infrastructure, maintenance, etc.); 
- The means of distributing income from the sale of transport tickets between the operator 
and the competent authority. 
The duration of public service contracts is limited and must not exceed ten years for bus and 
coach services, and fifteen years for passenger transport services by rail or other track-based 
modes. This period may be extended by up to 50% under certain conditions. 
Awarding of public service contracts  
Public service contracts are awarded according to the rules laid down in this Regulation. 
However, for awarding certain passenger transport services by bus or tram, the procedures of 
Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC apply. Subject to certain reservations detailed in 
Article 5 of the Regulation, Local Authorities may provide public transport services 
                                                 
68
 Defined as “any public authority or group of public authorities in one or more Member States which can 
intervene in public passenger transport in a given geographical area, or anybody invested with such power”. 
69
 Defined as “requirement defined or determined by a competent authority to guarantee general interest services 
in terms of passenger transport which an operator, in considering its own commercial interest, would not assume 
or would not ensure in the same measure or under the same conditions, without compensation”. 
70
 Defined as ”all arrangements made between one or more transport operators with one or more responsible 
authorities for all the rights and obligations of the service in question, including any unilateral public acts”. 
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themselves or assign them to an internal operator over which they have control comparable to 
that over their own services. Any competent authority who uses a third party other than an 
internal operator must award public service contracts by means of transparent and non-
discriminatory competitive procedures which may be subject to negotiation. 
The obligation to instigate competitive procedures does not apply to: 
- Low level contracts, the average annual value of which is estimated at less than 1 million 
euro or which supply less than 300,000 km of public passenger transport services; 
- Where emergency measures are taken or contracts are imposed in response to actual or 
potential service interruptions; 
- Regional or long distance rail transport. 
Terms and conditions  
The Member States have three months to provide the Commission with all the information 
necessary to determine whether the compensation allocated is compatible with this 
Regulation. Each competent authority must publish a global annual report on the PSOs 
incumbent on them and the resultant compensation received by them. One year prior to any 
competitive procedure, the competent authority must ensure that the following information is 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union: name and contact details of the 
competent authority, type of allocation proposed and services and territories likely to be 
affected. 
The Member States must gradually come into line with the Regulation, with the end of the 
transition period fixed for 3rd December 2019.  
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Appendix V: Interview questions 
Systemic approach to the railway sector 
- Who “speaks for the system” in your country? 
- In your opinion who is the ideal person to have a “systemic view”?  
- Who has the interest at heart for the entire system?  
- Who understands and defends the system in its entirety? 
- In your view what are the 5 most important PIs for the railway sector seen from a 
system’s perspective? 
Perspectives on performance for different stakeholders 
- How would you describe the mission of your organization? 
- From the perspective of your organization, how would you describe the concept of 
performance? 
- What are the drivers behind your definition of performance? 
- Since when have PIs appeared in your organization? How have they evolved over time in 
terms of number of things to measure and targets to achieve? 
- Who sets the PIs and targets? 
- What room is there for negotiation in setting the type of PIs as well as the targets to 
reach? 
- In your experience, what is their effect on the organization and its managers? 
Functions and drivers 
- In your opinion what are the key functions needed to achieve performance? 
- What are the drivers for performance? 
- What are your KPIs? 
- Who sets the KPIs? 




Appendix VI: Selected measures in the United Kingdom 
 
Figure 78. Train reliability (public performance measure – percentage of trains on time) 
 
Source: McNulty report (2011) 
 
Figure 79. Passenger rail industry expenditure 1996/97 to 2009/10 
 




Figure 80. Industry expenditure per passenger-km (2009/10 prices) 
  
Source: McNulty report (2011) 
 
Figure 81. Comparison of whole-system costs (partly normalised) £/'000 passenger-km 
 
Source: McNulty report (2011) 
 
Figure 82. Indexed trends in performance, passenger-km and costs 
 
Source: McNulty report (2011) 
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Figure 83. Hierarchy of railway outputs 
 
Source: McNulty report (2011) 
